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Abstract 
Unintentional injuries (accidents) are a global child health problem. Many child injury 
prevention measures are proven to be effective, yet government and community focus 
on prevention waxes and wanes through time and across locations. Within New 
Zealand some measures, such as child car seats, are mandated and enforced while 
the provision of other equally effective strategies, such as the enforcement of 
swimming pool fencing regulation, appears inconsistent. 
This research set out to discover what influences the government’s adoption of injury 
prevention policies and programmes. The research analysed interview and case study 
data using a Foucauldian understanding of everyday practice underpinned by the 
analysis of interview and case study data, while also applying critical and grounded 
theory and public policy research. Foucault’s concept of governmentality assisted in 
the exploration of government actions.  
The findings demonstrate support for improving child safety from government 
employees at various levels of responsibility across many agencies. Such support has 
been provided both with and without endorsement by political decision makers.  
Positivist, quantitative research is the foundation of injury prevention science, but at 
times can have perverse effects, especially if work to count and reduce injury events 
is construed as an effort to displace valued childhood experiences. Advocacy and 
lobbying for child injury prevention are acknowledged by those active in injury 
prevention as essential activities but are not well explored or researched within New 
Zealand. 
Collaboration has long been recommended as best practice for child injury prevention, 
because it enables wider distribution of messages and better use of resources. This 
research identified organisational cascades, where backbone organisations provided 
resources to other organisations, so they could also act as backbone organisations 
and support collaborative ventures. Collaboration can be counterproductive however, 
when child safety practitioners and advocates develop strongly coherent identities and 
reduce their communication with other groups. Such behaviour risks safety groups 
being unaware of emergent discourse that undermines injury prevention measures 
and sets them up to be negatively stereotyped and marginalised from decision making.  
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This research highlights how success at preventing child injuries is contingent upon 
both positivist research and the presence of a widely accepted safety culture, where 
the use of safety equipment and safe practices are promoted by everyone as ‘the way 
we do things’. 
New Zealand’s child injury effort has been mostly effective, and injuries are reducing 
in number. Despite this, there is a risk that gains in child safety might be lost, should 
there be insufficient recognition of the factors that have been important for these 
improvements to have occurred. There is also the possibility successful initiatives 
might prompt their premature demise by fostering an impression that government’s 
support for unintentional child injury prevention is no longer justified. This research 
concludes with recommendations for injury prevention practitioners and researchers. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“The way a society treats its children reflects not only its qualities of 
compassion and protective caring, but also its sense of justice, its 
commitment to the future and its urge to enhance the human condition for 
coming generations”(Barrington, 2004).1   
Injury from accidental causes is recognised internationally as a major threat 
to child health. In 2011 the World Health Organization (WHO) General 
Assembly resolved that all Member States take steps to monitor, prevent 
and reduce the incidence of unintentional injury occurring to children (World 
Health Assembly, 2011). These steps require decision makers to engage 
with child injury prevention researchers, practitioners and advocates to put 
in place policy and legislative measures that have been shown to be 
effective for preventing injury. The WHO resolution adopts a positivist 
scientific focus on preventing the unintentional injury of children and states 
that:  
“…multi-sectoral approaches to preventing child injuries and limiting 
their consequences through implementation of evidence-based 
interventions have resulted in dramatic and sustained reductions in 
child injury in countries that have made concerted efforts…” (World 
Health Assembly, 2011).  
Children within New Zealand have been provided with special constitutional 
protections for some time. There is a Commissioner for Children (New 
Zealand Government, 2003a) and as a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC), the New Zealand 
Government routinely reports to the United Nations on its progress for 
compliance (Ministry of Youth Development, 2000, 2008). The government 
also provides a wide range of services to promote child wellbeing, such as 
subsidized early childhood education; free health care (Ministry of Health, 
2000); and in 2007 after long standing action by advocacy groups, the New 
                                                          
1 Quotation of a statement made by the United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar 
during the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC). 
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Zealand Parliament removed a legal exemption (section 59 of the Crimes 
Act 1961) that had permitted adults to use physical force when disciplining 
children (D'Souza, Russell, Wood, Signal, & Elder, 2016; Wood, Hassall, 
Hook, & Ludbrook, 2008). In 2016 a new Ministry for "Vulnerable Children, 
Tamariki Ora" was established, a name which in 2017 the incoming Labour 
led government announced would be changed to the more inclusive 
“Ministry for Children” (Kenny, 2017). 
Such wide-ranging services for child wellbeing might lead observers to 
consider child health in New Zealand to be exemplary. The reality is that the 
wellbeing of New Zealand’s children is extremely variable, and many 
problems remain. New Zealand has high rates of child poverty and 
inequities in children’s access to healthcare (Mills, Reid, & Vaithianathan, 
2012). In recent years children under State care have been shown to fare 
very badly for rates of incarnation as adults and educational achievement 
(Office of the Children's Commissioner, 2015b). Child injury prevention is 
an area where it is argued more government commitment and action is 
needed (Bland et al., 2011; Shepherd et al., 2013) and that despite recent 
improvements, greater efforts are needed to better promote the wellbeing 
of children in New Zealand, overall (D'Souza, Turner, Simmers, Craig, & 
Dowell, 2012). 
The research 
The purpose of this research is to identify and better understand influences 
on the development and implementation of New Zealand Government 
policies to prevent unintentional injury of children from birth to 14 years of 
age. The term 'government ' used in this thesis refers to the New Zealand 
legislature and its public service, using the commonly accepted meaning of 
government as being the 'supreme authority in a state' (Hindess, 2012). 
Public policy is defined broadly as ‘whatever the government chooses to do, 
or not to do’ (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011, p. 5). To explore and better 
understand this topic, a grounded theory approach is used, and the project 
examines child injury prevention policies at multiple levels, from academic 
research to ministerial decision making, from officials setting budgets to 
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those delivering programmes. Published research papers and government 
documents are examined, as are interview data from individuals working in 
both government and ‘not for profit’ organisations involved in child injury 
prevention. Participating individuals were from senior levels of decision 
making to the “hands on" delivery of child safety information. 
The imperative to describe and explain processes and relationships 
involved in government is a common motivation for policy research 
(Tenbensel & Gauld, 2001). My motivation for researching this topic 
originated during my employment as a policy analyst and advisor in a 
government organisation funded to deliver child injury prevention 
programmes. Over this time, I developed an interest in achieving a better 
understanding of the inter-relationships, influences and outcomes involved 
in the creation and delivery of child injury prevention policy. These personal 
experiences shaped my approach to the topic, which is discussed further in 
the Methods chapter (page 33). 
This thesis intentionally adopts an advocacy position and incorporates 
normative assumptions about how to best care for children. There is an 
inherent assumption that it is morally correct and valuable to keep children 
healthy, safe and alive. This position is embedded prior to any discussion of 
how to keep children in this state. This explicit articulation of intent for an 
outcome ‘that is better’ (than the existing state of affairs) aligns closely with 
critical theory (Creswell, 2007).  
Charmaz (2011) considers qualitative method (and grounded theory in 
particular) well suited for research involving critical theory and social justice 
issues. Charmaz describes this as research which begins with an explicit 
values stance and ‘includes an agenda for change’ (in Denzin & Lincoln, 
2011, p. 359). Grounded theory is an ideal tool for a critical theory approach 
because it permits the upfront declaration of values. In an earlier paper they 
state:     
“Critical theorists place their epistemological and political baggage 
on the table... Whereas traditional researchers cling to the guard rail 
of neutrality, critical researchers frequently announce their 
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partisanship in the struggle for a better world” (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1998, p. 264). 
Post-positivist researchers advocate identifying research questions and 
describing methodologies because (they argue) this helps to provide 
disclosure of the choices made to explore the subject and presentation of 
the research conclusions. Such disclosure is described as ‘best practice’ 
because it provides opportunity for research findings and outcomes to be 
contrasted with competing methods of analysis and viewpoints. Research 
aims and questions are described in the following paragraphs and a full 
explanation of the research protocol is included in the methodology section 
(Greenhalgh, 2001; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  
Using this methodology, this thesis sets out to explore the following 
research aims and attempts to address the following questions:  
Research aims 
1. To describe and explore themes individuals working in child injury 
prevention identify as important for influencing government decisions 
about the development and implementation of policies, programmes and 
projects intended to reduce the incidence of unintentional child injury. 
 
2. To use major theoretical frameworks from injury prevention, Foucault’s 
studies on Governmentality and public policy theory to analyse data from 
interviews and demonstrate how New Zealand’s policy environment 
conforms or contrasts with these concepts.  
 
Research questions 
1. Who sets the government’s child injury prevention agenda?  
2.  How are government resources committed for injury prevention policies, 
programmes and projects? 
3. What information and research about child injury is provided to 
government and how does this influence decisions? 
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4. Do specific high-profile events influence the development of child injury 
prevention policy?  
5. Can common influences be identified through the thematic analysis of 
interview data from individuals experienced in the field of child injury 
prevention as well as case study charting the repeal of the Fencing of 
Swimming Pools Act (1987)?   
6. How is it that government commitment to child injury prevention appears 
to wax and wane, and why are some policies adopted, while others 
languish?  
Child injury prevention – Background 
Injury prevention as science and community 
This section briefly reviews the global development of injury prevention 
research, organisations and programmes.  
‘Accidents happen’ is a familiar homily. After this homily arises the idea that 
although accidents might just ‘happen’ they are both predictable and 
preventable. This idea has become pervasive within society and is not 
without controversy, yet the science of the predictability of accidents and 
the preventability of injury has created industries, shaped organisations and 
engaged communities.2 It has also saved countless lives (Haagsma et al., 
2015; B. Johnston, 2016; McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004).  
The field of injury prevention had its origins within medical disciplines, with 
public health in particular providing a focus on the reduction of population 
level incidences of injury and trauma through the delivery of evidence based 
programmes (Bugeja, Ibrahim, Ozanne-Smith, Brodie, & McClure, 2012; 
Green, 1999). The injury prevention field is not alone in its focus on 
preventing trauma and accidental death. Academics and practitioners in 
such diverse areas as the airline and insurance industries; occupational 
health and safety; water safety; fire prevention; local government and road 
safety publish research in specialist journals and promote the funding and 
                                                          
2 See Chapter Six: Perceptions of safety and supervision. 
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implementation of programmes to reduce the incidence of preventable 
trauma (McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004).  
The terms ‘safety’ and ‘injury prevention’ are often used interchangeably, 
despite their semantic difference. Safety is a state of being safe, or freedom 
from harm or danger, whereas injury prevention is the effort to prevent or 
reduce the severity of injuries before they occur. Safety is claimed as a 
human right, whereas injury prevention is an individual and collective effort 
to achieve (or provide) safety.  
Green (1999) traces the emergence of injury prevention as a distinguishable 
field of enquiry from 1862 when United Kingdom’s first Registrar General 
classified causes of death due to accidents differently and separately to the 
occurrence of death attributed to intentional violence and natural causes 
(Green, 1999, p. 27). Public awareness of accident prevention, and the 
rejection of the occurrence of what were seen as 'preventable deaths' was 
noted by the sociologist Vivienne Zelizer (1985) who described how during 
the 1920s thousands of people protested with street marches and outcry at 
the needless deaths of children hit by motor vehicles as they played in 
America’s streets. 
Research into preventing death and injury on the road provided major 
advancements in the establishment of safety as science. In 1966 Dr William 
Haddon was appointed as the first administrator of the newly created USA 
National Traffic Safety Agency, which in 1970 became the National Traffic 
Highway Safety Administration (NTHSA). This organisation established the 
first safety standards for motor vehicles, which required the mandatory 
installation of airbags and seat belts, both of which caused great 
controversy at the time (Waggoner, 1985). William Haddon developed the 
Haddon Matrix as a method of research into accident causality and 
emphasised the need for the disciplined and consistent use of the scientific 
method when researching ways of preventing accidents (Haddon Jr, 1968). 
Injury prevention practitioners were encouraged to adopt systematic and 
disciplined approaches to research and programmes. The "3 Es" approach 
was promoted, where programmes and initiatives to prevent unintentional 
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injury are categorised as requiring change (or effort to make change) within 
the one or more of the fields of Engineering, Environment or Enforcement. 
This model was later adapted to include Education as the fourth "E" (Peden 
et al., 2008).    
In 1995 the first edition of the bimonthly BMJ journal ‘Injury Prevention’ was 
published.3 The journal and its editorial board provided an international 
focus for ongoing academic work in the field (Williamson, Hayes, & Pless, 
2015). Since then injury prevention has steadily developed as a 
multidisciplinary academic community drawing from acute medicine 
(including emergency medicine, intensive care and trauma surgery), public 
health medicine, law, statistics, epidemiology, occupational health and road 
safety engineering. Agencies such as the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) have supported and 
promoted injury prevention through hosting biennial world conferences and 
funding both research and prevention programmes (Williamson et al., 
2015). 
Injury prevention researchers and practitioners have focussed on achieving 
shared understanding of the terminology used in their field. During the 
1980s the French sociologist Michael Foucault drew attention to the 
importance of how language is used and since there has been widespread 
acknowledgment that the shared use of language is important for providing 
and reinforcing collective identities (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).   
The term 'accident', early researchers suggested, describes an unforeseen 
(and usually uncontrolled and damaging) event involving the transfer of 
energy from one object (or body) to another. The adverse outcome of an 
accident, for a human or animal, is usually referred to as injury or trauma. 
In this interpretation it is accepted that accidents will happen, but injuries 
are often avoidable (Haddon Jr, 1968; McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 
2004). Initially the terms accident prevention and injury prevention were 
                                                          
3 The BMJ (formerly the British Medical Journal) is a company providing peer reviewed 
journals and educational resources for international medical and research communities.  
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used interchangeably, but after debate some practitioners decided the term 
‘injury prevention’ was preferred. This was on the basis that a scientific 
approach emphasises the predictability of injury and therefore the potential 
for prevention. In contrast the word accident, it was argued, unhelpfully 
infers randomness and inevitability. Not all agreed with the abandonment of 
the word accident, as a sole focus on prevention was thought to include an 
undesirable innuendo of blame (Girasek, 1999). Despite these concerns the 
word ‘accident’ was barred from use within the BMJ Injury Prevention 
Journal and conferences (Davis & Pless, 2001). 
The term 'safety' has also been the subject of discussion through 
international collaborations sponsored by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), the Quebec Ministry of Health and the Karolinska Institute 
(Stockholm, Sweden). Safety has most frequently been described as “the 
absence of injury events that can be counted and measured” then secondly 
“the perception of safety” (Nilsen et al., 2004, p. 71). Although safety is an 
non-material concept, its definition lends it to reification and quantification 
and it is sometimes argued there might be ‘too little’ or ‘too much’ safety 
(McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004). This definition means safety is a 
social phenomenon that requires individuals to hold internal feelings and 
understandings of "being safe". Nilsen suggests feelings and 
understandings about safety can be aggregated to the macro level and 
when positive attitudes to safety are observed within a group, community or 
society, a 'safety culture' can be said to exist (Nilsen et al., 2004).4 
Injury surveillance is the practice of defining the phenomenon of injury as 
objective reality and measuring its incidence and rates within populations 
(McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004). Accurate surveillance has been 
encouraged by injury prevention academics and advocates (Girasek, 1999), 
yet the process of counting injury events has not been without controversy 
and debate. In 2003 Langley and Brenner presented the challenges 
inherent within Haddon’s definition of injury to a conference called the 
‘International Collaborative Effort on Injury Statistics’. They observed how 
                                                          
4 The concept of a safety culture is discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
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the use of the International Classification of Disease manual (IDC9) used 
by governments to measure the incidence of injury provided very specific 
and sometimes unrecognised bias toward or away from certain injury 
events, such as bias toward recording fractured bones and away from 
psychological trauma and late effects (such as liver failure), which may 
occur weeks after, for example a poisoning event. This presentation drew 
attention to the importance of recognising that even the most stringent 
attempts to objectively define and count ‘injury phenomena’ are subject to 
interpretation and bias (Langley & Brenner, 2004).   
The application of positivist science to injury prevention was not confined to 
surveillance and the production of epidemiological reports. Haddon Jr also 
emphasised the need for scientific research into injury prevention 
interventions.5 Providing evidence-based injury prevention also relies upon 
a step by step process. This starts with the development of best practice 
injury incidence surveillance. Next is the development and testing of 
interventions for effectiveness, and then the publication of these as best 
practice guidance to enable their introduction and implementation as policy 
and programmes. Under this model further surveillance provides a feedback 
loop to ensure injury reduction goals are achieved (MacKay, Vincenten, 
Brussoni, & Towner, 2006; McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004). This 
systematic, step by step method (described as a public health approach) 
has been successful for identifying interventions, although delays in 
translating published research into policy (and programmes) have 
confounded many practitioners who have also turned to sociological and 
public policy theory to overcome barriers to implementation (Bugeja, 
McClure, Ozanne-Smith, & Ibrahim, 2011; Smithson, Garside, & Pearson, 
2010).  
                                                          
5 Injury prevention academics have applied research to identify the most effective strategies for 
preventing injury. Passive measures (such as traffic calming devices that slow vehicle speeds) are 
recommended as more effective than 'active' strategies that require the intervention of a person 
to ensure child safety (such as a person writing tickets or advising motorists to 'slow down').  
Advising people to 'supervise their children was found to be relatively ineffective for preventing 
home swimming pool drownings, whereas the introduction of mandatory fencing around home 
swimming pools resulted in a dramatic reduction in drownings (McDonald, Taylor, Carter, & Ward, 
2004; Peden et al., 2008; Peden et al., 2004). 
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The injury prevention community have not been alone in puzzling about how 
to better link findings from science with government policy. In 2009 the New 
Zealand Prime Minister created a Prime Minister’s Science Advisory 
Committee, which has hosted seminars, conferences, published papers and 
made recommendations for improving the link between published research 
and the development of policy (Gluckman, 2013).  
Promoting the adoption of positivist scientific findings by government 
agencies is not seen as the whole answer for effective injury prevention. 
Researchers and commentators in the field also place importance on 
promoting the development of a safety culture through widespread 
agreement of goals to promote safety and reduce preventable injury. This 
has been coupled with the promotion of collaboration across communities 
and groups with the agreed intention of achieving better outcomes and 
reduced injuries.  
Since the emergence of safety promotion and injury prevention as WHO 
supported fields of research, advocacy has been directed at governments 
(both national and municipal) to encourage them to promote safety and 
adopt injury prevention programmes. This has stemmed from an awareness 
of disparities between groups and countries, where patterns of injury differ, 
and those with fewer resources usually demonstrate disproportionately 
higher rates of preventable injury (Baker, 2010). Comparisons of how well 
governments deliver injury prevention for their populations has been profiled 
through the publication of standardised, comparative inter-country league 
tables and ‘Report Cards’ (MacKay & Vincenten, 2009; UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre, 2001).  
The acknowledgement of differences in the capacity of some communities 
to reduce the numbers of injuries occurring in their populations has 
generated interest in achieving government investment for preventing child 
injury. This occurs through the adoption of legislation and policies, the 
allocation of budgets and the implementation of programmes within 
communities (Johnston, 2011; Lyons et al., 2013). In 2007 the World Health 
Organisation published a Guide for Ministries of Health seeking to 
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implement injury prevention programmes (World Health Organisation 
(WHO), 2007) and The USA’s CDC (Centre for Disease Control) has 
published advice on how injury prevention advocates might influence both 
the public and government decision makers (2008). The United Kingdom’s 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has also published best 
practice advice on how to influence government and achieve policy change 
for improved injury prevention (2010).  
New Zealand's academic communities have contributed to injury prevention 
at an international level. The Injury Prevention Research Unit (established 
by Professor John Langley in 1990), the University of Waikato's Department 
of Societies and Cultures (Drs David Swain and Maxine Campbell) and the 
University of Auckland's Injury Prevention Research Centre (established by 
Dr Carolyn Coggan) have many research projects and publications in the 
field. In 2004, Dr Coggan established the Safe Community Foundation of 
New Zealand to further support the development of internationally 
recognised Safe Communities and in 2012 hosted a successful World Injury 
Prevention Conference in Wellington (Coggan & Kruig, 2012). During the 
1990s and the first ten years of the 21st century, injury prevention grew and 
developed as a science and community, with New Zealand providing an 
important contribution. 
Child injury prevention in the international context 
"A million families lose a child to a preventable injury every year 
around the world. Too many families don't have access to the 
information and resources they need to keep their kids safe from 
tragedies such as drowning, car crashes, fires and falls" (Safe Kids 
World Wide, 2017). 
Child injury prevention has achieved global recognition as a field within 
injury prevention. Researchers, advocates and practitioners involved in 
child injury prevention focus on injury events of children aged between 0 
and 14 years of age and on research and programme delivery aimed at 
reducing these (Peden et al., 2008). Protecting children from unintended 
injury is presented as an ideal normative values position, a good and useful 
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activity. The ideal promoted within the field of child injury prevention asserts 
that measures advocated must be consistent with the WHO definition of 
health, which describes health as being “a state of complete physical, 
mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity”.6 Under this definition, for example, it is not acceptable to prevent 
children from drowning by preventing them from experiencing water 
environments, rather children should fully experience and enjoy aquatic 
activities while (through the application of injury prevention science) they 
are protected from the adverse outcome of drowning (Peden et al., 2008, p. 
72).  
That children should be protected from injury was identified as one of their 
human rights in the 1989 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the 
Child (UNCROC); Article 19 states:  
“States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, 
social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation... (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1989).  
This statement asserts it is imperative for individuals, governments and the 
wider society to do their best to prevent children from experiencing trauma, 
abuse, neglect and injury. The UNCROC document establishes child safety 
as a 'child rights' issue and as such is widely and well understood to be a 
statement of claim, or legal argument (Dworkin, 1978). Upholding (and 
protecting) an agreed human right is also seen as a morally justifiable action 
(Alderson, 2012). Governments are expected to fulfil the role of protecting 
and promoting this right on behalf of children as a legally endorsed ‘values 
position’. This incorporates an assumption that government decision-
makers and community leaders will (and should) seek, wherever possible, 
                                                          
6 This is the preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organisation as adopted by the 
International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the 
representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and 
was enacted on 7 April 1948. 
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to implement programmes that have been proven to prevent unintentional 
child injury and death.  
Despite the UNCROC agreement, there are considerable and well reported 
inter-country differences in the numbers of children killed or injured due to 
preventable trauma, which are associated with differences in the adoption 
of child injury prevention policies. Consequently, child advocates have 
called for research that explores and describes the influences 
(determinants) and processes involved when public resources are required 
for preventing accidental (unintentional) child injury. Little research has 
been published on this to date (Lyons et al., 2013; MacKay & Vincenten, 
2010). 
The publication of the first World Health Organisation and UNICEF World 
Report on Child Injury Prevention was a crucial step toward 
acknowledgment of child injury as an global issue (2008). The report 
identifies the occurrence of unintentional injuries to children as a global 
public health problem and provides recommendations for developing child 
injury prevention programmes. In summary, these were to:  
1. Integrate child injury into a comprehensive approach to child health 
and development 
2. Develop and implement a child injury prevention policy and plan of 
action 
3. Implement specific actions to prevent and control child injuries 
4. Strengthen health systems to address child injuries 
5. Enhance the quality and quantity of data for child injury prevention 
6. Define priorities for research and support research on the causes, 
consequences, costs and prevention of child injuries 
7. Raise awareness and target investments towards child injury 
prevention. 
The WHO website lists many international and regional child safety 
organisations working in child injury prevention, these include the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); the International Society for child and 
Adolescent Injury Prevention (ISCAIP); Safekids Worldwide; The Alliance 
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for Safe Children (TASC); the European Child Safety Alliance and the Child 
Accident Prevention Foundation of Southern Africa (CAPFSA). Child injury 
prevention is now firmly established on the world stage.  
Child injury prevention in New Zealand 
Unintentional child injuries have long been noted as a problem in New 
Zealand. In 1982 a Government Board of Health Report stated that 
“accidents were one of the most important issues for child health” and that 
“accidents kill almost as many preschool children as all other diseases 
combined” (1982, p. 6). Injuries from accidents in all circumstances were 
noted as common, especially those happening around the home. Concern 
about these injuries led the government to establish (that same year) the 
Home Safety Council, which was a group provided with the mandate to 
investigate home accidents and publish advice for avoiding such events 
(Bryder, 2003, p. 223).  
The New Zealand Government has sometimes been slow to adopt child 
injury prevention measures, waiting decades before implementing 
measures to prevent and reduce the severity of unintentional harm to 
children. In 1983 Ministry of Transport officials advised government that 
serious injuries occurring while children were travelling as passengers in 
cars were happening in higher numbers in New Zealand than in similar 
overseas jurisdictions. To reduce these incidents, government was advised 
child car occupants needed to be restrained in specially designed car seats 
until they reached a height of 148cms, or approximately eleven years of age 
(Appleton, 1983). Despite the advice these measures were required, and 
that educational and rental programmes were ineffective for motivating car 
seat use in high risk populations, a law requiring the mandatory use of child 
restraints for children younger than five was not passed until thirteen years 
later, in 1996. A second law, that increased the age of mandatory use of 
child restraints until six years of age (inclusive) was not passed until thirty-
nine years later (in 2012) and was only achieved through the sustained 
lobbying of child safety advocates such as Plunket, community groups and 
paediatricians. This law, although an improvement, still does not match 
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longstanding car manufacturer recommendations for the use of child car 
seats until children reach the recommended height (Bridges, 2012; Bryder, 
2003; Klinich, Pritz, Weltry, & Burton, 1994).  
In 1993 the New Zealand Government ratified UNCROC and since then the 
Office of the Children's Commissioner and the Ministry of Youth 
Development have provided regular reports to the UN Committee about the 
New Zealand Government's progress protecting and advancing those rights 
(Ministry of Youth Development, 1995, 2000, 2008; United Nations General 
Assembly, 1989). 
Also, in 1993 the high rate of preventable child trauma admissions to the 
Auckland children’s hospital (at that time called Children’s Hospital Pacific) 
prompted a committee to report on the patterns of injury for children aged 
younger than fifteen in the Auckland Region. Interestingly (in contrast to 
present day access to data) the Committee noted that reliable data on child 
injury were only readily available from 1991 and prior to then could only be 
accessed with considerable effort (Lane, 1993). A similar report seven years 
later found the same causes of injury death and hospitalisations were 
persisting; these were motor vehicle (pedestrian, vehicle occupant and 
cyclists); suffocation of children younger than one and drowning. Kypri (et 
al) commented:   
“A number of existing strategies show promise (e.g. child restraints) 
others are inadequately implemented (e.g. swimming pool fencing) 
or are of unknown efficacy (e.g. government suicide prevention 
policies).  Strategies to reduce infant suffocation and child non-traffic 
pedestrian death remain to be developed and tested" (Kypri, 
Chalmers, Langley, & Wright, 2000).   
Safekids New Zealand was established in 1994 as a specialist child injury 
prevention service based at the newly opened Starship Children’s Hospital, 
with funding from the Auckland Hospital Board (now the Auckland District 
Health Board) and the Ministry of Health (then known as the Health Funding 
Authority). Based on the model of an American child injury prevention 
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organisation (Safekids USA) the idea to set up a New Zealand Safekids was 
advanced by Paediatric Surgeon, Anne Colby and Paediatric Intensivist, 
Elizabeth Segedin (Teague, 2014). Safekids adopted a similar operating 
model to Safe Kids World Wide, where emphasis is placed on establishing 
a positivist scientific base through strong links to the medical community 
coupled with collaboration with other agencies and engagement with the 
wider public. In 1995 Safekids (in conjunction with a hundred collaborating 
individuals and organisations) published a five-year strategic plan which 
listed ten priorities for child injury prevention in Auckland, the first of which 
was 'creating a child safe culture' (McCracken & Kokotlio, 1995). Safekids 
has been funded by the Ministry of Health since, with a change of contract 
and name in the mid-2000s requiring the service to provide information and 
support for child injury prevention initiatives nationally. 7  
In 2000 the University of Auckland Injury Research Centre and Otago 
University’s Injury Prevention Unit jointly prepared a report called “A 
proposed strategy for vote health funding for injury prevention”. The report 
identified twenty-four separate government agencies directly involved in 
child injury prevention and commented there “is an urgent need for 
leadership and co-ordination” and that the number of different agencies 
separately dealing with this issue in isolation from each other “illustrated the 
point” that more leadership is required. (Coggan, Langley, & Dawe, 2000, 
p. 25). This concern appeared warranted when in 2001 a UNICEF report 
was released which ranked New Zealand 22nd out of 26 OECD countries, 
better only for preventing unintentional injuries to children than South Korea, 
Mexico, Portugal and the USA (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2001). 
Public calls for improvement in injury prevention policies and programmes 
were repeated in media releases and published statements by 
organisations including Plunket, Safekids and Water Safety New Zealand 
(2005; 2002a). 
                                                          
7 Safekids is currently called ‘Safekids Aotearoa New Zealand’ and is discussed further in Chapter 
Seven – Advocacy and Lobbying. 
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In 2004 the Paediatric Society of New Zealand established the Child and 
Youth Epidemiology Service (C&YE Service) for the express purpose of 
providing better descriptive epidemiological reports on New Zealand's child 
health. Child injury was included as an important contributor to child 
mortality and morbidity, particularly noting the presence of a social gradient 
showing injury rates are significantly higher for children from families with 
lower incomes, and Maori and Pacific families (Craig, 2012).  
One initiative to improve child injury mortality reporting was the 
establishment of the Child and Youth Mortality Review Committee 
(C&YMRC or the Committee) under the Health Act (2000). This committee 
reviews causes of the deaths of children and youth aged 28 days to 24 years 
in 'order to find ways to prevent such deaths in future' and reports directly 
to the Minister of Health (Child and Youth Mortality Review Committe, 
2004). The Committee was established against the backdrop of changes to 
the New Zealand Coronial Service which, although also charged with 
investigating deaths and determining cause, was considered in crisis (Law 
Commission Te aka matua o te ture, 2000). In 2006 new legislation 
established a national coronial service and introduced full time, professional 
coroners, reducing a backlog of cases and improving the responsiveness of 
coronial services (New Zealand Government, 2006).8 
In 2011 the New Zealand Government's uptake and implementation of child 
injury prevention policies was assessed with a report which duplicated 
international methodology. This showed New Zealand scored at the 
average in comparison to a range of European countries. The study was 
repeated in 2013 and the results showed little change (Bland et al., 2011; 
Shepherd et al., 2013). 
Despite this apparently lacklustre government delivery of child safety 
programmes, child injury rates in New Zealand have been falling. In 2015 a 
Safekids Aotearoa NZ report showed there has been a significant and 
sustained decrease in the number of both child death and hospitalisations 
                                                          
8 The establishment of the C&YMRC and National Coronial Service is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Three, Power - in “The changing face of death review in New Zealand” page 87. 
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due to injury during the period of 2001 to 2015. For example, there were 
only 38 injury deaths in 2013, reduced from 126 in 1989. It was noted that 
by 2015 suffocation had overtaken traffic injuries as the leading cause of 
child death from injury.9 Child injury hospitalisations were also reduced from 
a rate of 1101.1 per 100,000 in 2001, to a rate of 826.3 per 100,000 in 2012. 
Reasons for these improvements are not completely clear. The Safekids 
report noted:   
“It is increasingly recognised that improving child safety is a more 
complex problem than previously recognised. Rather than an over 
reliance on ‘tame’ or ‘simple’ solutions effective child injury 
prevention requires dynamic solutions that address the complex 
contexts in which children are injured. As such, multifaceted 
interventions are effective in reducing injury; or showing promise” 
(Safekids Aotearoa, 2015a, p. 21). 
Despite this recognition that the prevention of child injury is complex, a front-
page media story of the day confidently announced that New Zealand was 
at last becoming a safer place for children (Johnston, 2016a).  
Thesis Roadmap 
This section provides an overview of each chapter of the thesis.  
Chapter two is in three parts. The first part overviews the theories 
underpinning the applied methodologies. These include grounded and 
critical theories, the Foucauldian research approach, case study 
methodology and participant observation. The second part describes the 
methods used to collect and explore the research data. Data collection was 
through in-depth interviews, participant observation and one case study. 
Data exploration and analysis was undertaken through thematic analysis. 
The final section of this chapter summarises the results of the thematic 
analysis, identifying the emergent themes: power, funding, collaboration, 
                                                          
9 The 2015 suffocation total included cases of ‘Sudden Unexplained Infant Death’ or SUDI, which 
had previously been counted separately. 
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perceptions and advocacy. The next chapters look at these themes in 
greater detail.  
The most dominant theme that emerged from the research data was that of 
‘power’, which is discussed in chapter three. A Foucauldian approach, 
modelled on the writing of French sociologist Michael Foucault, was used to 
examine the fine grain of the workings of power within public sector 
institutions and the actions of the people within them (Downing, 2008; 
Hindess, 2012). This approach involved looking at both the broad scope and 
higher levels of government institutions and then drilling down into the detail 
of unpublished documents to explore everyday actions and decision 
making. Interview participants included individuals who held positions of 
power within organisations and those who are traditionally seen to have less 
power but whose actions, on a day to day basis, have significantly 
contributed to improving child safety.  
 
Chapter four explores the social value we place on children and difficulties 
research participants reported when they were attempting to find resources 
for delivering child safety programmes. It presents an overview of the 
sociological literature on the value of children and briefly touches on 
common methods employed by government agencies to value human life. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of how these understandings and 
methodologies might create challenges for those promoting child safety 
programmes.  
 
Chapter five presents the theme of collaboration which (alongside the theme 
of power) emerged as a significant theme throughout the research data. 
Collaboration includes sharing information and resources, the joint 
development of public messages, and the co-ordinated delivery of projects 
and programmes. Collaborative activities were undertaken within and 
between government agencies, between government agencies and non-
government agencies, voluntary organisations and individual members of 
the public.  
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Kania and Kramer’s (2011) model of different types of collaborations is 
used. This provides a typology of collaborations and identifies the 
significance of ‘backbone organisations’. A pattern was discerned in the 
data which indicates the presence of a collaborative ‘cascade’, wherein 
through their contracts, backbone organisations actively require smaller 
organisations to collaborate, who in turn require others to collaborate.  
Research participants also discussed situations where collaboration failed, 
identifying factors they believed contributed to such failures. These included 
the presence of competitive behaviour, unclear boundaries, conflicting 
responsibilities, lack of fidelity to process and poor alignment between 
funding and goals. Despite these issues, the chapter concludes with an 
acknowledgement that collaboration has been at the heart of injury 
prevention and is considered best practice.  
Chapter six covers two important and complex themes, perceptions of 
safety and supervision. These are themes that traverse both public and 
private discourse. They include observations and comments about the ways 
safety and safety advice is discussed and responded to, in public and within 
the private sphere of parenting. Injury prevention workers, researchers and 
advocates promote the adoption of a safety culture, while at the same time 
emphasising the need for positivist research that counts and quantifies 
injuries, reifying safety into something that can be counted and measured. 
This sets the ground for debates about ‘how much safety’ is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
for children. Safety and risk are related topics which abound with 
complexity.  
In addition to normative and moral arguments about caring for children there 
are public and private debates about perceived 'trade-offs' between safety 
and other societal goals. These debates not infrequently invoke hostile 
attacks and defensive responses. The identification and exploration of 
barriers to the adoption of injury prevention measures are also discussed in 
this chapter. 
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Chapter seven examines how interview participants discussed ‘advocacy’ 
and ‘lobbying’ for child safety policies and programmes, along with 
associated literature. Advocacy and lobbying are poorly defined in the 
literature, and the participants used the terms interchangeably and 
infrequently, but none-the-less considered them activities that were 
important for advancing child safety. Because they were discussed in ways 
distinct from other activities they emerged as separate themes within the 
data.  
Participants described advocacy and lobbying as actions taken to advance 
child safety, yet many actions promoting child safety were referred to 
without being attributed to either term. Activities to advance child safety 
were said to be undertaken by individuals, groups and organisations that 
were both inside and outside of government. 
Advocates and lobbyists seek to shape public discourse about child safety 
which in turn influences social attitudes to safety. Such discourse frames 
the issues and can create a safety culture, or conversely generate 
challenges to safety measures. The dominant discourse (or hegemony) 
exerts a power that can encourage change in the direction favoured by 
those who promote it.  
The case study presented in chapter eight describes and explores the New 
Zealand Government’s legislative measures requiring the fencing of home 
swimming and spa pools. Events around the Fencing of Swimming Pool 
Act’s repeal and replacement with the widely criticised Building (Pools) 
Amendment Act (2016a) are described (Davidson, 2016; Te Ururoa Flavell 
& Fox, 2016). 
The persistence of discourse opposing the fencing of swimming pools is 
identified and linked to the introduction of policy to remove such 
requirements, retrenching child safety measures even against the advice of 
government agencies. Prevailing discourse about child safety and the policy 
changes removing pool fencing are linked to a market orientated ethos 
permeating policy making at the time, where industry interests are advanced 
 32 
 
and promoted and social goals and community input are marginalised. The 
case study demonstrates how, just as groups collaborate to promote child 
injury prevention measures, others can collaborate to reduce them. 
Chapter nine links themes that emerged from the interview data and 
processes and behaviours noted in the case study, to Foucault’s 
conceptualisations of governmentality and discourse (including the more 
recent concept of framing). Public policy and public health theory were also 
used to demonstrate how child safety becomes manifest in everyday actions 
of New Zealand government and society. Analyses of the interview and 
case study data are acknowledged as being bounded by participant and 
researcher knowledge, experiences, perceptions and interpretation. 
Chapter ten draws the various strands of the project together, weaving an 
understanding of the pathways that present possibilities for the 
enhancement of child injury prevention, but also seeking to explicate the 
complexity faced by individuals, organisations and agencies in their 
endeavours in this regard. Child injury prevention has been a discourse 
driven by both government and communities. The factors that have led to 
success in reducing the numbers of child injuries can also create 
oppositional activities.  
Chapter ten, and this thesis, conclude with two sets of recommendations, 
one for those who work to optimise child injury prevention and the other for 
those who might wish to extend our understandings of this field through 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY, METHODOLOGY, THEMES 
This chapter is in three parts. The first section briefly overviews the theories 
that under-pin the methodologies used by grounded theory and critical 
theory. This is coupled with a Foucauldian research approach which 
focusses the researcher on the experiences and everyday actions of 
research participants, including child safety discourse. Case study 
methodology was used to describe the retrenchment of New Zealand child 
drowning prevention policy. While the research is most closely aligned with 
post-positivism, there is also acknowledgment of the contribution of the 
strongly positivist science underlying much of the child injury prevention 
literature.  
Consistent with a Foucauldian approach, literature reviews went beyond 
standard searches and include unpublished government papers, web sites, 
media and other ‘grey’ (unpublished) documents located in archived files 
and retrieved through requests under New Zealand’s Official Information Act 
(1982).10 The researcher’s personal and professional involvement in the 
field of child injury prevention was also considered relevant to the 
methodology and is discussed in the context of the researcher being an 
‘insider’ in the ‘middle’ of the research field (Breen, 2007). 
The second section describes the methods used to collect and analyse the 
data, which included reflective commentary from in-depth interviews with 
fifteen individuals experienced in the delivery of government and local 
government child safety programmes. This information was subjected to 
thematic analysis. Grey literature and case study material were also 
included in the analysis.  
The third (and last) section of this chapter introduces the themes which 
emerged from interview data and research materials.  
                                                          
10 ‘Grey literature’ includes documents issued by government agencies, academic institutions and 
other groups, which are not published through a publishing house or in a journal. These include 
reports, discussion papers, technical notes, newsletters, theses, bulletins, fact sheets, conference 
proceedings, blogs and other documents (USLegal.com., 2018).  
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Grounded, qualitative and post-positivist research 
Grounded theory was proposed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 and has 
steadily gained acceptance as a research method. A grounded theory 
approach provides for a loosely structured research design that permits 
theoretical ideas to emerge empirically from the field during the course of 
the study, leading Charmaz to also describe it as a ‘method of social 
scientific theory construction’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 360). Grounded 
theory is a qualitative methodological approach, which is differentiated from 
quantitative research methodology by the ways in which the researcher 
views and understands the nature of reality and how the research process 
is carried out.   
Grounded theory is inductive, permitting researchers to generate 
understandings of whole systems and environments where information 
available on the subject is diffuse, multi-factorial and includes few (or no) 
overarching (or discrete) testable theoretical hypotheses. It is useful for 
exploring research questions such as ‘what’s going on here’ (Stol, Ralph, & 
Fitzgerald, 2016). Such research methods set out to discover ‘the why’ and 
are said to fulfil an important role “when the variables to be studied are 
poorly understood, ill defined, and cannot be controlled”(Greenhalgh, 2001, 
p. 169). Grounded theory provides a research process where the researcher 
actively interacts with the research environment in an iterative, backward 
and forward way, seeking to draw a conclusion from this interaction (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2011). Because of these characteristics, grounded theory is a 
particularly suitable methodology for exploring the complexities presented 
by the topic of child injury prevention policy. 
Both grounded theory and qualitative research are part of the 
constructionalist approach, which has a long and well accepted history of 
contribution to research. Berger and Luckmann’s landmark book “The 
Social Construction of Reality” (1966) heralded a shift toward qualitative 
research, but a shift that took decades to unfold and for qualitative 
methodology to become accepted and embedded into mainstream 
academic activity. Holstein and Gubrium describe how the constructionalist 
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approach began to slowly impact and shape research methodologies, 
guiding research interpretation and application (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 
341). Growing acceptance of the constructionalist approach has led to its 
incorporation and acknowledgment within many research fields, resulting in 
it being identified as an inclusive, broad church interpretation of research 
theory; a “mosaic of research efforts with diverse, but also shared 
philosophical, theoretical, methodological, and empirical underpinnings” 
(Holstein and Gubrium in Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 341).   
In addition to embracing qualitative and constructionalist methodology, this  
thesis includes positivist, epidemiological research in order to demonstrate 
the circumstances and incidence of unintentional child injury (McClure, 
Stevenson, Ameratunga, & McEvoy, 2004). Positivism and quantitative 
research require the researcher to undertake a formal process of 
constructing and testing hypotheses through identifying, defining and 
measuring variables (the deductive method). At the heart of positivism is the 
assumption of objectivity and the impartiality of the researcher (Coolican, 
2004). Positivist science argues that “objective accounts of the real world” 
can be given and focuses upon the careful identification and quantification 
of variables (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 15).  
The positivist and quantitative orientation within injury prevention is not co-
incidental. Over the past twenty years much of the published child injury 
prevention research has been led by academics in fields such as medicine 
(trauma surgery), engineering, statistics and epidemiology, all of whom are 
trained in positivist research methodology. Furthermore, the entire founding 
Editorial Board of the BMJ Injury Prevention Journal came from 
backgrounds in positivist fields of surgery, epidemiology and paediatrics. 
Those academics pursuing research into the prevention of child injury have 
mostly focussed on the positivist scientific method, and in doing so placed 
themselves in the best position to gain grants and resources, while 
delivering work in line with mainstream academic critique (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1998, p. 216).   
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Alongside this positivist orientation within the injury prevention field there 
has been an acknowledgment of the need to ensure injury prevention 
research has a broad academic base. In commentary reflecting on the 
history of ‘injury prevention science’ Mike Hayes, a member of the original 
Injury Prevention Journal’s editorial board, commented, 
“To be effective.... the journal (Injury Prevention) must strive to be 
relevant beyond those trained in public health and medicine...” 
(Williamson et al., 2015).   
Positivism, despite its prevalence and acknowledged contribution to 
science, has well acknowledged shortcomings. Medical research journals, 
even those considered bastions of positivist research, have begun to more 
routinely incorporate papers using qualitative methods in order to provide 
new perspectives and learning (Greenhalgh, Russell, & Swinglehurst, 
2005).  
Positivist research has well recognised shortcomings for exploring complex 
environments and the growing acceptance of qualitative research 
methodology, coupled with the emergence of constructionalism has seen 
the development of what is referred to as the ‘post-positivist’ approach. This 
approach places qualitative research within the context of wider, positivist 
‘scientific’ research, with authors working within this paradigm describing 
qualitative research as providing the best tools to provide explanations that 
could not otherwise be achieved through the identification and counting of 
variables (Greenhalgh, 1999).  
The post-positive approach is said to differentiate itself from other qualitative 
research paradigms or world views (such as social constructionalism and 
ethnography) because of the manner in which the researcher includes 
descriptions of the methods that have been used, as well as explicitly 
accepting and including the presence of contesting paradigms (Creswell, 
2007).  
When a researcher explores the philosophical assumptions that lie behind 
their research method, sets out discrete methodological steps and 
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acknowledges the existence of alternative interpretations, that researcher 
can be ‘placed’ within the overall context of a post-positive paradigm. Post-
positive qualitative methodology defines a research topic and carries out 
qualitative investigation (such as in-depth interviews, case studies and 
document examination) using an explicitly described methodology within 
the ‘bounded’ confines of a topic (Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, & Sabatier, 
2012).11 
Greenhalgh (2001) spells out how the post-positivist researcher, when using 
this methodology, is seeking ‘to uncover the truth out there’ as an objective 
reality. Yet it is this very singular idea of a “truth” being a definitive, testable 
reality waiting to be discovered and uncovered by the researcher, that is 
largely rejected by the constructionalist view point and earlier proponents of 
grounded theory, such as Kathy Charmaz (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). 
Qualitative methodology that does not require the structured approach 
required by most positivist researchers, or the assumption of objective 
reality, is now also integrated into mainstream research. Its many variations 
have long been subject to debates and challenges about what it is, and how 
it should be conducted (even among its proponents). 
“Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and 
sometimes counter disciplinary field. It cross-cuts the humanities, the 
social sciences and the physical sciences. Qualitative research is 
many things at the same time. It is multi-paradigmatic in focus. Its 
practitioners are sensitive to the value of the multi-method approach. 
They are committed to the naturalistic perspective and to the 
interpretative understanding of human experience. At the same time 
the field is inherently political and shaped by multiple ethical and 
political positions” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 408).  
Despite widespread acceptance of the ‘broad church research approach’ 
some researchers continue to disagree. Questions about which research 
approaches are best are sometimes so hotly contested they are referred to 
                                                          
11 The term ‘bounded’ refers to acknowledgment of the existence (and setting) of limits, referred 
to in policy theory, case study methodology and economics. 
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as the ‘paradigm wars’ between committed positivist researchers (i.e. those 
using quantitative method) and those who apply qualitative methodologies 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Greenhalgh, Russell, Ashcroft, & Parsons, 2011).   
Critical theory 
Critical theory accepts, incorporates, and in a very real sense requires the 
researcher to include a description of the research’s inherent values. In a 
critical theory approach, these values are included and explained as an 
integral part of the research. 
This research declares a values position, which is the moral and rights-
based argument that supports the prevention of avoidable child injury.   This 
normative orientation is declared, aligning this thesis to critical theory, where 
examples and illustrations of actions to improve child safety are considered 
morally good, and desirable. Actions taken to reduce child safety are 
discussed as being negative and undesirable. 
The inclusion of a declaration of values is not supported by the post-positive 
argument that it is enough to include a description of the method, coupled 
with acceptance of the validity of other paradigms. This acceptance is 
challenged by those who recognise the ubiquitous nature of values in 
society. Guba and Lincoln (1998) for example, identify the inherent 
contradiction of suggesting that researchers, who as part of society have 
inherent and internalised societal values, can present their research findings 
and outcomes as being value free 
This research, therefore can be characterised as reflecting critical, 
constructionalist and participatory theoretical approaches while 
incorporating positivist and post-positive methodologies. This exactly re-
creates the tension referred to by Denzin and Lincoln (2011), of a jostling 
for identity between research methodologies. This tension, it is argued, is 
an important feature of policy and research in child injury prevention policy 
development because of the essentially values based, critical and social 
nature of the topic and at the same time, the whole issue of child injury 
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prevention rests firmly within and upon an extensive field of positive and 
post-positivist academic research.   
Foucault as methodology 
In addition to critical and grounded theory methodologies, this research also 
adopts a Foucauldian approach for exploring government funded child injury 
prevention programmes and projects.  
Foucault’s research approach was driven from his philosophical and 
sociological questions. In his studies of government, Foucault asks the 
fundamental question, how it is that we are governed? This question posits 
the puzzle of how it is that we choose to accept and incorporate the state 
(and its rule) over the well-being of our everyday lives? This question can 
be examined by looking at what Miller and Rose (2009) refer to as the 
'political rationalities' which are the 'discursive fields and moral justifications' 
for particular ways of exercising power, accepting power, or acting. This 
means looking into the detail of political discourse, and government records 
to look for subtle expressions of power. One example might be noting the 
presence of a market focussed orientation to policy and politics through 
linguistic expression, and evidence of policy choices that appear to support 
business interests over social or moral imperatives. Miller and Rose state 
that the:  
"…problematics of government should also be analysed in terms of 
their governmental technologies, the complex of mundane 
programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents, 
and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give 
effect to governmental ambitions. Through an analysis of the intricate 
interdependencies between political rationalities and governmental 
technologies, we can begin to understand the multiple and delicate 
networks that connect the lives of individuals, groups and 
organisations to the aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal 
democracies of the present" (Miller & Rose, 2009, p. 55). 
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Foucault's influence drives researchers to focus on discourse analysis and 
on the specifics of everyday documentation; interviewing; reading media 
reports and examining 'grey literature' (literature distributed but not formally 
published) issued from government agencies and organisations (Miller & 
Rose, 2009).  
The case study 
A secondary, but important study methodology within this thesis is the use 
of the expanded case study method. The case study method provides a 
useful focus, particularly where it permits and requires the researcher to 
identify and establish boundaries, thereby creating limits in the exploration 
of a research topic. Establishing a boundary creates the settings and by 
doing so, also identifies sampling used in the study (Miles & Hubermann, 
1994, p. 26).   
The case study approach is considered by some authors as a research 
method in its own right (Yin, 2009). Not all agree. Creswell and Stake (2007) 
suggest case study research is not a methodology but simply a chosen 
design within the qualitative research approach. Others are more generous 
about the validity of a case study methodology. Bryman (2012) defines a 
case study as the systematic examination of a single, simply identified 
entity, such as an individual, organisation or geographic location and by 
doing so draws attention to a major advantage of the case study, which is 
the establishment of subject boundaries, Creswell agrees with this 
conclusion.  
“Case study research is an approach in which the investigator 
explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems 
(cases) over time through detailed in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information (e.g. observations, interviews, audio 
visual material, and documents and reports) and reports a case 
description and case based themes” (Creswell, 2007). 
Child injury prevention policy is a wide-ranging subject with many possible 
interrelated strands which can be difficult to isolate. Focus is provided 
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though identification of the boundaries of the specific topic being explored 
in the research project. Yin (2009) describes the ‘case study within the case 
study’ scenario, which fits this thesis. This thesis looks especially for factors 
that might influence or contribute to the development of government 
departmental and statutory responses to child safety; this might include 
abstract ideas conveyed by research participants; documents produced by 
government agencies to provide guidance and information; published peer 
reviewed research or papers created by other organisations and published 
by them.  
Child injury prevention is defined in this research, as the prevention of 
unintentional injuries to children (both fatal and nonfatal) with the following 
boundaries: 
• The definition of unintentional injury to children (which includes a 
published definition of unintentional injury). 
• Children aged from birth until their sixteenth birthday – 0 to 15 years 
old 
• Government policies, research, projects and programmes focused 
on preventing unintentional injuries to children in this age group.  
Another aspect that ‘bounds’ this research is its focus upon policy, which 
was described earlier simply as being whatever government chooses to do, 
or (with greater detail and wider application) as a law, regulation, procedure, 
administrative action, incentive, or voluntary practices of governments or 
other institutions (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011). 
A case study is included. This is a descriptive account of the development 
and change of government policy regarding the prevention of pre-schooler 
drowning in home swimming pools, spas and garden ponds. This case study 
was selected because it provides a demonstration of policy change to the 
extent of legislation and includes (somewhat unusually) an example of the 
repeal of child safety policy in legislation. Grey literature, including letters 
and documents obtained under the Official Information Act (1982) were 
available for inclusion. Several of the research interview participants were 
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involved in the delivery of pre-schooler drowning prevention programmes 
and provided comment during interviews. 
Time is another boundary often used in positivist and post-positive research. 
The specification of a discrete ‘time’ for a study assists in providing a focus 
and limitation of the scope of the research. This research was intentionally 
and specifically not ‘time bounded”. This was because it was considered 
desirable for interview participants to be unconstrained in their recollection 
and observation. It was also useful to track different aspects of policy 
developed within different context over differing time periods. For example, 
Ministry of Health Briefings to Incoming Ministers, published from 1984 to 
2014 were reviewed in response to one interview participant’s observation 
of their importance. Another interview participant provided a paper with a 
chronology of significant events in the development of swimming pool 
fencing policy (appendix 5), dated from 1974 to the present time. Examining 
these documents is consistent with the grounded theory methodological 
approach of ‘zigzagging’ from the research data (interview content) into the 
‘real world’ and back, yet it is not practical in research terms to attempt to 
align these publications within the same ‘time envelope’ (Creswell, 2007). 
Interview as methodology 
Interviews are routinely used for developing, auditing and researching 
government policy across a wide range of circumstances. New Zealand 
researchers and research companies use interviews as a practical tool for 
analysis in the policy arena. Interviews are also used to critique policy 
processes and prompt debate about how policy improvements can be 
achieved (Gluckman, 2011; Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003; Stewart & 
Cash, 1974). 
Richie and Lewis (2003) describe the interview in a number ways. In the 
post positivist paradigm knowledge is ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered by 
the interviewer who ‘uncovers’ it through the course of the interview with a 
research subject. Ethnographic, constructivist and critical theory paradigms 
stress the interview is a creative and reflective process where information 
emerges from the interview process as a shared construct between the 
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researcher and participant together. In critical theory, in particular, the 
research interview identifies material conditions influencing beliefs, 
behaviours and experiences (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 12).  
This thesis draws strongly from constructivist theory, where there is 
recognition interview data is the result of interpretative and dynamic 
processes occurring between the researcher and interview participant.   
Although themes are described as ‘emergent’ it is acknowledged they are 
identified, validated and extrapolated by the researcher. This process is 
supported through reference to existing theory and challenged by the 
oversight and critique of the research supervision process.  
Researcher as participant 
It is acknowledged from the outset this researcher was for many years an 
integral part of the child injury prevention community from which the 
research participants are recruited. A researcher’s presence within a field of 
research (or within the context of the research topic) and therefore their 
bias, can be acknowledged and explained in various ways. 
In one sense this research might be described as an ethnographic 
exploration of a community within which the researcher has participated and 
been employed. While my familiarity within the research area is 
acknowledged, (due to my having worked within it over a long period of time) 
an ethnographic account would apply narrative methodology in the 
presentation of the research (Creswell, 2007). In contrast, research data in 
this thesis is explored through the techniques of in-depth interviews and 
thematic analyses.   
The use of case study methodology provides another way to note and 
manage situations where a researcher is part of the environment being 
researched. In these situations the researcher is referred to as a 
“participant–observer” (Yin, 2009). This technique involves or requires the 
researcher to become part of the research area under study and actively 
participate, such as moving into a neighbourhood, or joining a group. Such 
engagement is not seen as an obstruction to the research but permits the 
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advantage of access to the research field and familiarity with research 
subjects. A weakness of this approach Yin points out is that the participant 
observer may be susceptible to the introduction of bias into the study, and 
consequently undermine the study’s credibility.  
Yin notes it is important to deal directly with the issue of bias in the case 
study method as a study will be undermined if it becomes evident the 
researcher has selected a case to confirm predetermined opinions. One 
way to avoid or mitigate bias, Yin suggests, is to engage reviewers or “two 
or three critical colleagues” who will challenge findings and present contrary 
views. The supervision process for this thesis provided this function.  
Another way to mitigate and manage bias is the application of the grounded 
theory approach, which is the exploration of the topic without ‘pre-
determined hypotheses’, which in turn permits the emergence of themes 
from the data (Yin, 2009, p. 72).  
Positivist and post-positivist researchers use hypotheses and actively seek 
to identify, declare and exclude bias. For this type of research bias is 
believed to reduce the efficacy of the findings. This is most clearly 
demonstrated in the traditional positivist ‘hierarchy of evidence’ model that 
grades the quality of evidence provided by research findings and places as 
most reliable those studies that use randomised controlled trails at ‘the top’ 
of the evidence hierarchy. Meta-analyses and systematic reviews are next 
followed by case studies involving researcher narrative. Such narrative is 
considered the least reliable of positivist research methodologies 
(Greenhalgh, 2001).  
However this view should be contrasted with acknowledgment that narrative 
data collected and presented by a researcher who is intrinsically part of, or 
at the very least fully familiar with, the area under study, has richness and 
‘much to offer’ (Greenhalgh et al., 2005). Furthermore, Breen (2007) points 
out that “it is naive to think” that minimal exposure to the research field 
removes bias and notes that that ‘from a constructionist point of view, bias 
can never be eliminated’ (p. 169).  
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Another well accepted method of describing the ‘researcher as participant’ 
is to position the researcher as either an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’. Insiders are 
researchers who are considered part of the group they are studying, while 
‘outsiders’ are not part of the group (Bonner & Tolhurst, 2002; Merton, 
1972). The ‘insider–outsider’ description of researcher presence creates a 
dichotomy that is not always reflected in the researcher’s experience. In 
these cases the researcher has been described as ‘the researcher in the 
middle’ (Breen, 2007; Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). My position for this research 
most closely fits the ‘researcher in the middle’ description because 
circumstances identify me as both an insider and outsider.  
Prior to starting (and during) this research I was an employee within a 
government organisation described as a Crown Entity that is within the 
public sector (i.e. a District Health Board) but not within the group of 
agencies described as ‘core public service’ or ‘central government’ (Shaw 
& Eichbaum, 2011). Because I was an employee in the child safety service 
based within Auckland City Hospital (Starship), I was acknowledged as a 
government child safety advocate. This was important for the case study on 
pool fencing, which was chosen because it provided a good example of 
legislative change, and also because my roles as both insider (child safety 
advocate) and outsider (employed in a Crown Entity, rather than core public 
service) provided unique access to government processes while at the 
same time provided me with a perspective that was different to that of a 
public servant working within a core government agency.  
Research participants in this study were selected and purposively 
approached based on my personal knowledge of their roles (as an insider) 
but because I was not recently part of the organisations or groups within 
which they worked (or had worked) in that sense I was an outsider. My 
identity as an individual who worked and published in the field of child injury 
prevention was known by all research participants and was specifically 
revealed by me as part of my approach for their permission to be 
interviewed, establishing ‘insider credentials’. However, an important factor 
was that the research itself was conducted through a University, rather than 
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a health care organisation or medical school, suggesting the presence of 
‘outsider’ standing.12  
Breen (2007) commented that insider-researchers are sometimes criticised 
for being advocates rather than ‘real’ or ‘legitimate researchers’ and the 
main way to counter this is to declare values held by the researcher or that 
might be implicitly within the research. Early in the research the values 
associated with this subject area are identified as explicitly as possible, 
confirming they are values both held by me as the researcher and presented 
by this research as normative for wider society. The values bias within this 
research is (and intend to be) explicit and was the focus on the positive 
value of permitting children to have a healthy, injury free childhood and 
defined by the WHO definition of health. My choice of data for inclusion and 
emphasis as themes will be explained within accompanying text and relates 
to the exploration of how child injury prevention actions and policies become 
evident within government.  
The benefit of my own experiences and background in child injury 
prevention and public policy and access to the interview participants and 
field under study, coupled with explicit description of the values position and 
a thoughtfully managed method, provides the positive trade off that allows 
for acceptance of researcher involvement and participation in the subject of 
the study.  
This thesis uses a qualitative research approach. It also occasionally 
incorporates positivist, quantitative research to elucidate observations 
about child injury and its prevention. Providing a description of the overall 
characteristics of the research methods used, disclosing actions, describing 
and identifying challenges to the limits of knowledge (referred to as 
‘bounding’), and being explicit about the values orientation of the subject 
(child injury prevention) places this thesis within a post-positivist orientation.  
                                                          
12 The concepts of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ emerged as part of the Sociology of Knowledge during 
the 1950s (Merton, 1972) and is also discussed further in Chapter 2 (Results); Chapter 3, (power); 
Chapter 4 (Finding funding) and Chapter 7 (Advocacy and lobbying).  
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Positivist and post positivist research publications usually carefully notarise 
study limitations. This practice assumes researchers can either control all 
variables or attempt to negate confounding effect and the study’s short 
comings by identifying all features of the research that are not controlled, 
with comment of the study’s limitations. In contrast, this research engages 
qualitative methodology where data is provided as a contribution by 
participants, rather than elicited by testing subjects (variables). People 
familiar with child safety were invited to hold a conversation with the 
researcher. The natures of these participants, and their contributions, are 
acknowledged as integral to the research findings. The researcher’s 
interpretations of these conversations became research findings, which 
were properly tested by the assessment of academic colleagues (thesis 
supervisors), who did not participate in the collection of the data.  
In essence, while post positivism is a possible epistemological home for this 
thesis, the use of grounded theory methodology coupled with an overall 
Foucauldian approach and the inclusion of an explicit acknowledgment of 
values firmly identifies this thesis as qualitative research aligned with critical 
theory. 
Literature review 
Standard literature search strategies were used to access published peer 
reviewed literature across a range of disciplines, including media, public 
health, policy, trauma surgery, road safety and injury prevention. In addition, 
grey literature was accessed both through submitting Official Information 
Act (1982) requests and the researcher having in-depth knowledge of 
specialist documents not held within library collections, but either briefly 
available (such as a letter circulated by a group or organisation) or posted 
on organisation websites. Google and Google scholar key word searches 
were conducted to identify additional literature on topics, particularly for 
material not found in scientific journals, such as media reports, parenting 
course information and sector news releases and reports. A specialist injury 
prevention database (Safety Lit®) was also searched for relevant papers. 
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Research Protocols 
Interviews 
In-depth, semi structured interviews were conducted with fifteen participants 
who had held decision making roles in central and local government where 
child injury prevention was within their portfolios and/or they had child injury 
prevention programmes and projects within their areas of professional 
responsibility.  Ethics approval for conducting interviews and presenting 
content was sought and gained from the University of Waikato Human 
Research Ethics Committee and the process described in the approved 
application was followed for all participants, throughout each of their 
interview processes. This included adhering to the principles of respect, 
cultural awareness and a commitment to learning and sharing knowledge.  
Individuals working in non-government organisations (NGOs) with a 
‘delivery component’ focussed on preventing child injury were also 
interviewed. I was acquainted (through professional contact) with all the 
research participants approached. This was due to my previous roles 
working within child injury prevention. Some participants held roles that 
would have been considered senior to mine during my employment, while 
others would have been more collegial. My status as a university student 
and researcher permitted this difference to be of less consequence during 
the research interviews. More than one participant commented on the value 
and importance of New Zealand based research in child injury prevention 
and all participants who agreed to be interviewed were encouraging.  
Large sample sizes and the inclusion of statistically significant samples of a 
target population is not a critical requirement for this methodological 
approach. This was a non-probability sample where subjects (participants) 
are deliberately selected to reflect particular features sought by the 
researcher in a method described as purposive sampling (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003, p. 78). 
This study’s aim of ‘better understanding influences on the development of 
child injury prevention policy’ meant the main criterion was for interview 
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subjects to have an awareness of (and involvement in) child injury 
prevention activities. A secondary aim in the selection of this group of 
participants was to obtain as broad a range of commentary as possible 
about what might influence the adoption (or otherwise) of child injury 
prevention measures. Based on this approach an injury prevention directory 
was referred to and in the first instance individuals with whom the 
researcher had an acquaintance, or working relationship, were selected 
(Injury Prevention Information Centre, 2009).  
This type of approach, where the sample is selected with an intention in 
mind, is referred to by Richie et al (2003) as ‘purposive sampling’ where 
criteria related to the aims of the study are used to guide selection. Although 
this method involves deliberate choices, this does not predetermine the 
research findings, as the interview subject selection was based on the 
disclosed goal of fulfilling the aims of the study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) and 
interview data were scrutinised by thesis supervisors, meeting Yin’s 
recommendation for mitigating bias (Yin, 2009).   
In addition to purposive sampling, some interviewees were selected after 
being referred to me by other interviewees. A method known as “snow 
balling” is described by Kingdon (2003) as the technique of identifying 
further research participants through asking interviewees for referrals. At 
the completion of each interview I asked participants if they could refer me 
to any other person who may wish to contribute to the research. Participants 
did not limit themselves to referring me to individuals within government 
agencies and more than one recommended an approach to someone 
working within local government or non-government organisations (NGOs).  
Study participants spanned a range of occupations and levels of 
responsibility (detailed in Table One). The initial research intention was to 
engage only central government staff, but when reviewed, this strategy 
provided only a limited number of interview participants (and perspectives) 
so the scope was broadened to include participants with extensive and 
valuable knowledge of Crown Entities and Local Government. Two of the 
participants reported directly to Parliament, with significant budget 
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responsibilities and staff, one worked as a Minister of the Crown, while 
another worked primarily on projects that delivered directly to members of 
the public. Others worked in non-government organisations of varying sizes. 
Participants chose to be interviewed either in their homes, at work or in 
public places where private conversation was possible. Interviews were 
conducted at a time and place where there would be little interruption and 
confidentiality of the conversation could be reasonably assured. In practical 
terms interruptions were unavoidable and were managed as appropriate for 
the situation, in one instance at an interview participant’s home a child 
entered the lounge where the interview was being conducted and interviews 
conducted at outside tables in cafes were suspended while cafe staff 
delivered coffee and food.  
Interviews ranged between 37 and 88 minutes in length. Each participant 
was provided with an introductory letter, consent form and information 
sheet. Participants also requested indicative questions. These were 
provided with an explanation that the interview was intended to be open-
ended and they were to feel comfortable covering any topic in the subject 
area of child injury prevention they wished. 
The earlier interviews were conducted face to face but later in the process, 
three interviews were conducted by phone. Trier-Bieniek (2012) found no 
substantial differences in interview content when face to face interviews 
were compared to phone conversations,  noting the use of the phone 
possibly increased the inclination of research participants to share more 
information on sensitive topics. Opdenakker (2006) also assessed the 
choice to use telephone interviewing, identifying its value when research 
subjects were geographically distant, the researcher had a small budget and 
standardisation of the interview was not important. Overall, Opdenakker 
found use of the telephone provided outcomes not significantly different to 
face to face interviewing. My choice for interviewing by phone, once I had 
established there could be minimal impact on content, was primarily based 
on pragmatic grounds as interviewing by phone enabled participation by 
individuals living in geographically distant localities. 
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Fifteen interview participants who were approached accepted and were 
interviewed, five declined. Some subjects were willing, yet (even with 
assurances of confidentiality) were concerned about possible repercussions 
on their employment, others reported they were too heavily committed to 
participate, some felt they were not sufficiently involved in child safety and 
others simply did not respond to an initial approach.  
All individuals approached were assured of confidentiality, especially if they 
declined to participate. It was considered important for participants to feel 
comfortable with their choice not to participate and to be able to continue 
what was in some instances an ongoing working relationship with me as 
one of their professional colleagues. Individuals who were interviewed 
consented to be identified and have provided approval for statements to be 
quoted and attributed. Contributions are anonymised, with pseudonyms 
used to ensure the interview data remain the focus, rather than risking 
discussion being side-tracked by the personal characteristics of research 
participants.  
At the start of each interview participants were asked to reflect on their 
experiences of influences or imperatives that brought about the introduction 
of child safety policies, programmes and projects. In this way the interviews 
were structured with open-ended questions to encourage wide ranging 
responses. Early in the research process, however several participants 
requested greater guidance about what would be helpful to cover. This 
guidance was provided in the form of open ended questions included in the 
introductory correspondence and meant the interviews were more in line 
with a semi-structured interview format, rather than completely open. 
Legard (in Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) notes that even in the most unstructured 
interview the researcher has some idea of the area, or topic they wish to 
cover and the use of a topic guide within the context of an overall flexible 
format was a standard and well accepted practice.  
Table One presents a summary of the organisations research participants 
were employed by at the time of their child injury prevention experience and 
a subjective appraisal of the organisational level of their participation in the 
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delivery of child injury prevention projects. Six worked in a central 
government agency, four worked in local government, four in non-
government organisations and one in a Crown Entity.13 The level of 
responsibility and scope for direct involvement in child injury prevention 
projects by participants also varied. Participants with more senior roles were 
involved with allocating budgets and advising on strategic commitments on 
behalf of their organisations, while others were involved in the setting up of 
single projects and the distribution of injury prevention material directly to 
the public. Some participants held various roles (over many years) that 
required high level strategic input to their organisations and others held 
roles that included the provision of ‘direct to public’ services. The third 
dimension described is the amount of involvement in child safety 
programmes. This subjective appraisal by the researcher is a simple 
observation of the degree of involvement the participant had with child 
safety activities overall.   
This wide range of profiles created challenges for identifying themes and 
similarities within the interview data yet offered a rich opportunity to draw 
from many perspectives. The ‘non-bounded’ nature of this research 
regarding time was important for recording of research participants’ working 
experiences in child safety. Some participant experiences were recollected 
over many years, while others recounted experiences from a specific period 
during which they were engaged with child safety.  
  
                                                          
13 Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) (as the name suggests) are not government agencies; in 
this research NGOs discussed were contracted by a government agency to deliver child safety 
activities (projects, programmes or training) at the time the research participant was employed. A 
Crown Entity is a government owned agency that is not listed in the State Sector Act (2004). Crown 
entities have a variety of forms, depending on their legislation, sometimes operating with close 
government oversight, (such as District Health Boards and the Accident Compensation 
Corporation) or more at arm’s length (such as Air New Zealand).  
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Figure One: Description of the work roles and engagement with child injury 
prevention of research participants. 
 
Identification in text  Position Description  
 
Hans (Central Govt.) 
 
High level / Advisory / 
Reported directly to 
Parliament 
 
Highly influential in child safety and 
long term, high level involvement in 
child health 
 
Robert (Central Govt.) 
 
 
High level / Advisory / 
Reported directly to 
Parliament 
 
Highly influential in child safety and 
long term, high level involvement in 
child health  
 
Beth (Central Govt.) 
 
 
High level/Funding  
 
Frequent involvement in resource 
allocation and contract monitoring 
of child safety programmes 
 
 
 William (Central 
Govt.)  
 
High level/Funding 
 
Infrequent involvement directly with 
child safety, but highly influential in 
health promotion fields over a long 
period  
 
Rick (Central Govt. 
Politician) 
 
High level strategic 
political governance 
and funding  
 
For a short period of time in child 
injury prevention, also highly 
influential in the associated field of 
local government. Many years of 
experience in government and 
politics 
 
 
 Maau (Local Govt.)  
 
High level manager  
 
Frequent involvement in resource 
allocation, staff supervision and 
contract monitoring in child and 
adult injury prevention  
 
Imia (Local Govt.) 
 
High level manager 
 
Frequent involvement in resource 
allocation, staff supervision and 
contract monitoring in child and 
adult injury prevention  
 
Leilani (Local Govt.) 
 
High level manager 
 
Infrequent but influential 
involvement in child injury 
prevention projects; and long term, 
sustained involvement in the 
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Identification in text  Position Description  
associated field of crime and 
violence prevention 
 
Chaya (Local Govt.) 
 
Multiple project and 
programme delivery 
roles covering all but 
the highest levels of 
organisational 
decision making 
 
Extensive experience in the 
development and delivery of 
programmes both at a project 
governance level and public 
interface. 
 
Salesi (NGO) 
 
 
High level/Advisory/ 
Delivery – CEO of NGO 
 
 
Extensive experience in the 
development and delivery of 
programmes at a governance level 
and public interface. 
 
Teuila (NGO)  
 
 
High level/Advisory/ 
Delivery:  
Senior team member 
of influential safety 
NGO 
 
Extensive experience in the 
development and delivery of 
programmes both at governance 
level and public interface. 
 
Josephine (NGO)  
 
High level/Advisory/ 
Delivery - CEO of NGO 
 
Extensive experience in the 
development and delivery of 
programmes both at governance 
level and public interface. 
 
Steffi (NGO) 
 
 
High level/Advisory  
 
Involved with child injury prevention 
for a long period of time, well known 
and highly influential within child 
injury prevention. 
 
Jivin (Crown Entity) 
 
High Level   
 
Involvement with child safety, and 
sustained, highly influential 
involvement in community safety 
and occupational health and safety 
 
Sione  
(Crown Entity) 
 
Advisory/Programme 
Delivery  
 
Extensive experience in child safety 
programme development and 
delivery – also operated in 
community and governance  
 
 55 
 
Data analysis 
Interviews were electronically recorded and manually transcribed into 
Microsoft Word by the researcher using a proprietary recording and 
transcription programme. Data transcription was verbatim, but in a format, 
which excluded speech omissions, grammatical error or repetitions, as their 
inclusion detracts from the readability of the spoken word. Transcription was 
managed consistent with a practice referred to as ‘intelligent transcription’ 
where participants’ grammatical errors or unintentional repetitions are 
removed for coherence, ensuring this was done without disruption of 
meaning. 
Each interview participant’s transcription was emailed back for their reading 
and response. Some participants replied they were not concerned about 
reading the transcript; some took the opportunity to read their transcription 
and emailed back confirming the content accurately reflected their 
recollection of the interview. Three interview participants returned the 
transcription with typographical errors corrected. No interview participants 
gave feedback that identified any concerns about the process or the 
transcription.  
Interview transcripts once sent back to me (either edited or unedited) were 
entered into the NVIVO thematic analysis programme and the word 
documents were filed on a secure computer within the ENDNOTE reference 
programme. Interview transcripts were read, analysed by key ideas then 
coded into main themes, which were discussed with research supervisors.   
Krippendorff (1980) notes that the concepts of reliability and validity provide 
important research tools for establishing the robustness of data analyses. 
Reliability is the capacity of the researcher to demonstrate that findings from 
data can be repeated by another independent researcher.  Validity means 
it is possible to recognise the research as coherent and as being consistent 
with established knowledge (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 155). These measures 
apply most readily to research carried out with positivist and post-positivist 
paradigms. For this research, transcriptions were reviewed (read and re-
read) on multiple occasions by the researcher. Emergent themes were 
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presented and discussed at regular intervals with the thesis supervisors, 
who challenged and provided feedback on their interpretation and 
application. The validity of the emergent themes was assessed in the 
context of larger studies from other political jurisdictions. Major themes 
identified are discussed in the context of other studies, identifying 
similarities and differences. This was also noted as an advantage of the 
researcher having familiarity with the field.  
Data saturation is said to occur when themes are repeatedly appearing 
within qualitative data and no new themes emerge (Mason, 2010). This 
occurred most clearly for the themes of power and collaboration. When 
interview transcripts repeatedly contained the same or similar comments 
related to this theme it was determined that saturation had occurred. 
Comments in relation to the themes of advocacy and lobbying, funding and 
the ‘perception of child safety’ occurred less frequently and were often 
discussed in relation to different contexts. Despite this variation, these 
themes were considered important and were included to identify interview 
participants’ focus on advocacy, challenges finding funding and providing 
messages about child safety and supervision.  
Interview data – overview of emergent themes  
Foucauldian methodology directs the researcher to focus on the discourse 
and everyday activities of individuals, groups and organisations as 
described within their commentary and in documents, media and literature 
(Foucault, 1982). 
Fifteen individuals knowledgeable in child safety discussed the provision of 
government funded child injury prevention programmes. Participants 
provided reflective commentary on what they thought might motivate 
government to adopt and implement policy and programmes. The 
commentary formed the interview data, which were subjected to grounded 
theory analysis. This method requires the researcher to ‘step back’ and 
permit such data to provide emergent themes, which are then identified and 
discussed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). 
 57 
 
Five themes emerged from the interviews. These were: power, funding, 
collaboration, perceptions, and advocacy. This section introduces and 
summarises these themes, setting the scene for exploring the detail of how 
child safety policies are adopted and advanced. 
1. Power - Child safety within national and local government 
Research participants identified how individuals within the New Zealand 
public service acted in many ways to improve child safety. Participants 
across a range of government agencies described how they allocated 
discretionary funding for child injury prevention contracts, organised 
Ministers to meet with academics, discussed child injury prevention at 
meetings, and included child injury prevention within strategic documents.  
The impact of political decision making was mentioned. Participants 
emphasised the political reality that political decision makers tend to present 
themselves in ways consistent with predominant public sympathies.   
Government organisations were identified as important. The Ministry of 
Health has consistently funded child safety programmes and the Ministry’s 
longstanding requirement that contracted organisations must work in 
collaboration with others was considered valuable. Other government 
agencies mentioned, included the Accident Compensation Corporation 
(ACC), the (now defunct) New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy, the 
Office of the Children’s Commissioner, Safekids Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
Regional Public Health Services and the New Zealand Transport Agency. 
Non-government organisations, such as the Royal New Zealand Plunket 
Society (Plunket) were also noted as important.  
Participants noted how improvements in New Zealand’s death review 
process has improved accessibility to data and increased the publication of 
mortality reports. One participant recounted how Child and Youth Mortality 
Review Committees were established.  
Local government agencies (Councils) are responsible for promoting and 
protecting community health. Interview participants discussed the 
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challenges of motivating Councils to deliver local child injury prevention 
programmes. Senior local government sector participants noted the 
importance of ensuring child safety and injury prevention were included 
within Councils’ Strategic Plans another documents. 
Interview data illustrated how relationships between local government 
politicians and council employees varied widely, depending on which local 
government agency was involved and the context of the situation in which 
child safety was raised. Sometimes child injury prevention issues could be 
discussed informally with local government politicians, in other situations 
child safety input was only possible through formal processes, such as 
submissions.  
The Safe Community Foundation was identified as contributing significantly 
to local government’s motivation and capacity for delivering child injury 
prevention programmes. This has occurred through the (WHO) Safe 
Communities Accreditation programme and its emphasis on collaboration 
and the provision of proven programmes and evaluation (Coggan & Peters, 
2008).  
2. Finding money for child safety 
Uncertainty about securing resources for child safety programmes recurred 
throughout interviews. Comments made about funding were orientated 
around the theme of power, for example the need to take the opportunity to 
access resources to ‘do things’ (take action). In addition to the existence of 
child injury prevention contracts, participants also described occasions 
where central and local government staff undertook injury prevention 
projects that were unfunded or outside their delegated responsibilities.  
Injury prevention researchers frequently point out that preventing child 
injuries provides overall positive economic value for society (MacKay et al., 
2006). Only one interview participant mentioned the economics of child 
injury prevention, and then simply to wonder whether child injury economics 
within New Zealand was adequately researched and discussed. 
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Moral arguments in support of preventing child injury often revolve around 
discourse about child rights and the presumption of an adult ‘duty of care’ 
(Peden et al., 2008). However, participants did not raise such arguments for 
justifying funding child injury prevention programmes. Instead moral and 
rights-based issues were discussed in the context of describing parental 
rights and the supervision of children.  
3. Collaboration 
Collaboration was discussed frequently during interviews. Participants 
commented that collaboration was the preferred practice for child injury 
prevention groups and organisations and a normative orientation within 
child injury prevention. In short, collaboration was consistently presented as 
‘the best way to do things’.  
Comments about collaboration generated subthemes across a range of 
topics, such as contracting, collaborative funding, leadership and the 
importance of an operational model that requires and promotes 
collaboration.  
Interview participants described collaboration in pragmatic terms, as 
‘everyone around the table’ agreeing and sharing ideas and resources. 
Several collaborative projects were described. Collaboration often 
happened smoothly (such as in water safety projects and programmes) but 
sometimes met barriers that included competitiveness, misalignment 
between objectives; differences about ‘time frames’; differences about 
funding and lack of fidelity to agreed processes.  
Although collaboration was acknowledged as difficult to achieve and not 
easy to measure, interview participants described many examples of the 
successful funding and promotion of collaborative child safety activities 
between individuals, groups, organisations and government. 
4. Perceptions of child safety and supervision 
Injury prevention practitioners stress the importance of a scientific approach 
to injury prevention that requires evidence of rigorous surveillance, random 
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controlled trials, and quantitative methodology (McClure, Stevenson, & 
McEvoy, 2004). There is also widespread acceptance that a safety culture 
approach is required (New Zealand Government, 2003d). This involves 
groups agreeing about messages and working collaboratively to promote 
general acceptance of safety measures (Johnston, 2011; McClure, 
Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004).  
Despite the clarity of these two approaches within injury prevention literature 
and the willingness of researchers and advocates from different disciplines 
to work together, interview data identified public perception of injury 
prevention as conflicted, with injury prevention measures sometimes 
derided, sometimes praised.  
More than one research participant described child injury prevention as a 
‘battle’ that had to be ‘fought’. Other battle analogies were used, for example 
it was said injury prevention efforts might ‘lose ground’ because of conflict. 
Such conflict seems to arise at least partially because of belief that child 
safety removes a desirable aspect of children’s experiences and that child 
safety advocates adopted an authoritarian stance that transgressed 
reasonable social expectation of privacy about parenting. 
The concepts of supervision and risk were mentioned by interview 
participants who focussed on personal choices made by parents, caregivers 
and children and their understanding of ‘risky’ environments.  Risk taking 
(and its assessment) was described as an individual, private experience. 
This contrasts with other concepts of risk, such as the calculation of 
actuarial risk, or those described in sociological concepts of ‘risk society’ 
(Beck, 1992a; Matthewman, 2012).  
5. Advocacy and lobbying 
The terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘lobbying’ were used interchangeably but 
infrequently within interviews. However, participants also discussed many 
actions that fitted descriptions of injury prevention advocacy and lobbying, 
without using those terms. So, despite the infrequent use of the exact words, 
these terms and their associated actions were used sufficiently within 
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interview data to justify their inclusion as a theme. Many of these actions 
are also discussed within the ‘power’ section of the thesis, following the 
Foucauldian interpretation of power as action.  
Interview participants discussed how child injury prevention was advocated 
for by those working within central government, government agencies and 
local government (insiders).14 Participants discussed the importance of 
advocates having ‘insider’ knowledge of government, so they could 
contribute to improving child safety by including the issue within 
organisational documents, taking opportunities to raise child safety to 
decision makers and by allocating resources.  
The importance of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and individuals 
who are ‘outsiders’ was also stressed.15 Interview participants named and 
described organisations and individuals who were outside of government 
but which they saw as important contributors to New Zealand child injury 
prevention. These included the Helmet Lady, the Royal New Zealand 
Plunket Society (Plunket), the Safe Communities Foundation and the (now 
defunct) Child Safety Foundation, all of whom can be viewed as advocacy 
organisations and / or lobbyists.16  
Conclusion 
The next chapters more closely examine these themes, drawing on 
participants’ transcripts to illustrate how these relate to public policy and 
injury prevention research and theory.  
  
                                                          
14 ‘Insiders’ are individuals within the group who hold special knowledge about how the group 
functions and emerged from the Sociology of Knowledge during the 1950s: (Merton, 1972) see 
also Chapter Two (Methodology), Chapter Three (Power); Chapter Four (Finding funding) and 
Chapter Six (Advocacy and lobbying). 
15 ‘Outsiders’ are also part of the Sociology of Knowledge (Merton, 1972). 
16 The ‘Helmet Lady’ refers to Rebecca Oaten, who successfully campaigned for a New Zealand 
cycle helmet wearing law after her son Aaron became severely disabled following a fall from his 
bike (Duff M, 2010).  
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CHAPTER 3: POWER 
This chapter was guided by the theme of government power, as it emerged 
from interview data. It examines government actions in the development of 
child safety policy and programmes, first within central government, then 
within government agencies and lastly, New Zealand local government.  
The topic of power (who has it, how they use it and for what effect) 
permeates throughout social science and society. It would be hard to find a 
topic that has generated as much literature, research, consideration, 
consternation and debate as power. Traditional theories identify power as a 
force embodied by the powerful that subdues and enslaves, creates class 
division, poverty, privilege and leads to war and revolution (Bottomore & 
Nisbet, 1979). 
Foucault challenged these traditional concepts of power, turning them on 
their head. For Foucault power is diffuse, through-out society. Furthermore, 
Foucault wrote: “power only exists when it is put into action” (Foucault, 
1982, p. 788). In sociological and political literature, Foucauldian research 
examines the fine grain of the workings of power within institutions through 
the actions of individuals. Following this approach interview participants 
were asked to describe actions they took (or were aware of) across the 
many circumstances of their agencies and organisations, that promoted the 
safety of children. 
This approach revealed the day to day challenges of implementing child 
safety projects, as recounted by participants who worked within and 
alongside government. It also revealed the actions taken by many 
individuals to recruit support and obtain resources for delivering child safety 
programmes.   
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New Zealand Government overview 
New Zealand’s Westminster system of government includes a House of 
Parliament (the House), a Government Executive (Ministers) and a public 
service who maintain independence from direct political direction through 
the provisions of the State Sector Act 1988. Each element of government 
has a role but is also constrained in its power and the application of its 
influence (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011).  
New Zealand has no single constitutional document. Laws and significant 
documents collectively create the constitutional and governance structures 
that determine New Zealand's law-making and expenditure of public money 
(Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011, p. 45). The Constitution Act 1986 recognises the 
ruling British Monarch as New Zealand’s Head of State and defines the roles 
and powers of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Other important 
laws include the Electoral Act (1993) which sets the Parliamentary electoral 
cycle; the Bill of Rights Act (1990) which establishes rights for New Zealand 
citizens and the Official Information Act (1982) which provides citizens with 
access to information about government decision making. Important 
constitutional documents which are not laws include the Treaty of Waitangi, 
the Cabinet Manual and Parliament’s Standing Orders (Chen, 2012; R. 
Miller, 2010).17 
The media also have a constitutionally vital role scrutinising government 
actions and the behaviour of politicians by providing an opportunity for 
public debate (Miller, 2010). Child safety issues are raised in the media at 
regular intervals. Sometimes Ministers announce the introduction of child 
safety measures in the media (Bridges, 2012) and sometimes advocates 
and individuals raise concerns in the media about which government action 
is sought (Dangerfield, 2009; Plunket et al., 2005).  
This research drew attention to the importance of child injury prevention 
practitioners having insider knowledge of government and its processes. 
                                                          
17 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies to the rights of children in criminal procedures 
to be “dealt with in a manner that takes account of the child’s age’ Section 25 (i).  
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Power: Child safety in central Government - from ministers 
to ministries  
Cabinet Ministers 
The Cabinet Minister’s role is a fundamental part of a Westminster 
democracy. Ministers are responsible for deciding the policy priorities for 
their departments and authorising Departmental Vote (financial 
expenditure) through the Budget process.  
“...individual Ministers of the Crown make a difference. They really do 
make a difference. We see it day in and day out. General people in the 
street do not realise how important those Ministers are.”  
Jivin (Crown Entity)  
Ministerial responsibilities also include taking part in Cabinet decision 
making and submitting legislation to the House. The role, powers and 
expected practices of Ministers are detailed in the Cabinet Manual, which 
includes wide ranging detail from the exact format of how Ministers must 
present papers to Cabinet Committees, to their conduct when interacting 
with the public and media (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2008; 
Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011).  
Ministers must sponsor government legislation through the House. MPs 
who are not in the Executive (‘Back Benchers’) also have the opportunity to 
introduce legislation through the Parliamentary Ballot system which is a 
mechanism for introducing Bills to the House that are not sponsored by a 
Minister. These are called "Private Member's Bills". Although the House as 
a whole is responsible for passing statute, the Government has a right of 
veto over any proposed legislation (Chen, 2012).  
There have been very few Ministerial or Private Members’ Bills specifically 
for child safety. The Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987 and the Crimes 
(Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 are notable exceptions to 
this paucity, as was the passing of regulations for the mandatory use of child 
restraints. Measures improving child safety are sometimes included within 
other legislation, such as the Vulnerable Children Act 2014; Dog Control Act 
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1996 (and Dog Control Amendment Act 2003), and the Health and Safety 
at Work Act 2015.   
Government Insiders 
Those seeking change in government policies need knowledge about the 
detailed workings of government and Cabinet (insider knowledge). Public 
servants interviewed for this research were cognizant of how the distribution 
of money and resources are primarily determined by the decisions, actions 
(or inaction) of Cabinet Ministers. Observations that Ministers have 
considerable influence on what happens within Government were usually 
quickly followed by comments about the importance of knowing as much as 
possible about what initiated, shaped and influenced what Ministers 
understood, believed and did.   
Insider knowledge about child safety involves recognising which Ministerial 
portfolio has responsibilities for child injury and how this might be 
understood and interpreted by the individual holding the Ministerial role. 
One recommendation from an interview participant was for child safety 
practitioners to ensure interactions with a Minister were only ever carried 
out by someone with both an awareness of the personal characteristics of 
the Minister and knowledge of the system within which they work. In this 
way, knowledge about the Minister becomes a very direct form of power.  
“...You also have to bear in mind that (any given) Minister has 
responsibility for ‘that’ but not ‘that’. Then you have in mind the business 
of what is being fed to the Minister. Is that actually going to fill the 
Minister’s knowledge gaps, or confirm his or her prejudices...?”  
 William (Central Govt.) 
The importance of knowing the Minister’s background and personal and 
policy preferences is also supported by Chen whose publication “The Public 
Policy Tool Box” concludes that “who the Minister is” as an important 
principle for working directly with Ministers and government (2012, p. 184). 
Ministers have considerable discretion to determine Ministry and 
departmental priorities, while at the same time their behaviour must meet 
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the expectations of their parliamentary colleagues and the wider public 
(New Zealand Government, 2008a). Ministers are required to accept 
collective responsibility for Cabinet decisions and participate in 
Parliamentary debate, where they must respond to questions asked of 
them, so their conduct and decision making can be scrutinised by 
parliamentarians, media and the public (Kibblewhite, 2016; Miller, 2010; 
Mulgan, 1994).  
The exact manner in which Ministers are constrained and the degree to 
which they comply is usually unclear outside of the inner circle of the 
Executive (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2008). However, 
concern about Ministerial behaviour is occasionally expressed in public. In 
2016 the Prime Minister gave a public speech where he reiterated the need 
for Ministers to adhere to the rules of professional conduct when interacting 
with public servants. 
“Prime Minister John Key has laid down the law about the way 
ministers and public servants should interact, saying ministers may 
not always like the advice they receive but they must listen to it 
carefully, respectfully and professionally” (Smellie, 2016).  
This concern was echoed elsewhere. In 2016 the Office of the Ombudsman 
raised a proposal for New Zealand to have a second independent body (in 
addition to the Ombudsman’s Office) with the mandate to monitor the 
Executive's exercise of their responsibilities and interactions with the public 
service (Eichbaum, 2016).  
Political party election manifesto, although usually only in evidence during 
election campaigns were identified as an important way to ‘put things on the 
agenda’ as a successful and popular manifesto will result in a political party 
winning votes and government.  
“...a party in Opposition is looking to putting together an agenda that is 
typically something they want to put to the people so that they will win. So 
that really is about marketing to win in the election, but it also actually 
puts things on an agenda.” Rick (Central Govt. Politician)  
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Participants stressed another aspect of democracy, the need for the 
politicians to remain cognizant of the moods and wishes of their 
constituency. One interview participant (Rick) had previously held the 
position of Government Minister and observed that political decision making 
is made based on appealing to voters.  
“...we have to be careful about what people will accept. There are these 
moods and you can’t overstress it, there is a mood of the people the 
politicians and the political process is very adept at reading and if you 
don’t read it, you are out.” Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Another issue identified was the need to remain aware of public opinion and 
avoiding making policy commitments during elections that could not be 
delivered post-election. 
“Politicians these days have become very conscious not to make radical 
policy announcements after the election, ‘on the fly’; they like to put it in 
front of the electorate because the experience has been that those 
governments who do that, don’t do well at the next election.”  
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Rick identified four main ways injury prevention issues might come to the 
attention of Ministers. These were the political party election manifesto, the 
occurrence of an accident (especially a tragic accident with a high media 
profile), input from government officials (particularly the Briefing to Incoming 
Ministers) and the presence of sustained and credible advocacy from 
individuals, groups and organisations.18 
 “Now the things that might put issues on the agenda are, first of all a 
terrible accident, and you get the Minister or the Prime Minister in front 
of the television and you say, there has been this terrible accident what are 
you going to do? Now the Minister or the Prime Minister can’t ordinarily 
say they are going to do nothing.  
                                                          
18 Advocacy is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
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They ordinarily say they are going to have officials or a team look into it, 
and immediately then it starts. Because there is an inquiry at that point, 
then the inquiry’s going to look into something, then there’s a report and 
the report is going to recommend something.  
Then they say well what are you going to do about these 
recommendations? The ‘thing’ gets a momentum. So an accident that 
people feel strongly about can put this all on an agenda, particularly if 
you get the Minister or the Prime Minister in the hot seat with people 
asking them what they are going to do.” 
Rick (Central Govt. Politician)  
Tragic events have initiated government reviews and resulted in major 
policy and legislation changes. An example might be an incident that 
involved multiple deaths with national media attention and coverage over 
sustained periods of time. On other occasions there may be a singular but 
particularly poignant circumstance. When this happens, Ministers may 
make contributions to public comment on both social networks and 
mainstream media.  
The Pike River Mine disaster in 2010, when a mine explosion caused the 
death of 29 people, prompted a Royal Commission of Inquiry which 
uncovered major safety failures, prompted the resignation of the Minister 
and resulted in the introduction of substantial workplace safety policy 
changes (Martin, 2014; McSoriley, 2013; Royal Commission on the Pike 
River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012).  
In 2014 a summary of the chronological events relating to Pike River was 
published by the New Parliamentary Library. This description shows how 
the resulting Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 was the culmination of a 
long process of actions directly related to Pike River Mine events (New 
Zealand Parliamentary Library, 2014). The outcome was described as 
“Strengthened legislation, increased funding, more inspectors and greater 
workplace participation will certainly mean there will be increased vigilance 
over workplace safety” (Martin, 2014, p. 2).  
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Table Two: Chronology of policy changes following the Pike River Mine 
disaster. 
19 – Nov - 2010 Pike River coal mine disaster; 29 fatalities  
Dec – 2010  Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine 
Tragedy appointed 
Aug - 2011  High Hazards Unit formed in the Department of 
Labour  
Jun - 2012 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and 
Safety appointed  
Oct - 2012 Royal Commission Reported  
Nov - 2012 Minister of Labour resigned 
Feb - 2013 Government announced new occupational health 
and safety agency would be created  
April - 2013  Taskforce reported 
Jun - 2013 Health and Safety (Pike River Implementation) Bill 
introduced to implement Royal Commission’s 
recommendations and create a new Crown entity 
Nov - 2013 Worksafe New Zealand Act passed 
Dec – 2013  Worksafe New Zealand established 
Mar - 2014 Health and Safety Reform Bill based on Australia’s 
Model Act introduced into Parliament  
Sept - 2015 Health and Safety at Work Act given Royal Assent 
4 September.  
Reference: Compiled by the New Zealand Parliamentary Library (2014) 
Not all policy development can be so clearly and sequentially described. 
Kingdon’s 2003 landmark study looked at decision making within the USA 
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Federal Government. It concluded decision making within Capitol Hill is so 
complex and variable that no single person or group could be said to 
dominate the political environment, “The Administration – the President and 
his political appointees – is central to agenda setting but has less control 
over the alternatives and less control still over implementation” (Kingdon, 
2003, p. 42).  
New Zealand government is smaller, and Ministers may have more direct 
influence over policy outcomes than their USA counterparts, however even 
within New Zealand’s comparatively simple constitutional structure and 
smaller government size, the presence of multiple inputs and the 
unpredictability of outcomes was acknowledged. Rick commented;   
“...when you are a Minister you might be making decisions but there are a 
thousand and one ways by which those decisions get translated in to 
action and what action actually gets done…”  
Rick (Central Govt. Politician)  
The lack of clarity about where power resides and who has control over 
decision making was described by Rick, who recounted a conversation with 
the Prime Minister over a crucial policy vote. The House was sitting, and it 
became apparent policy changes were urgently required to ensure 
Parliament’s business could make progress on the next day. Laughter 
ensued between the two individuals when the newly elected Prime Minister 
momentarily deferred Prime Ministerial decision-making to an unknown third 
party.  
“...He (the Prime Minister) looked at me and said – this was very early 
days remember – he said “Oh, shit I had better go and talk to the people 
who make these decisions.” And I said “Prime Minister ....  You’re the 
bloody Prime Minister!”  And we both laughed and laughed. Even the 
Prime Minister can’t wave a magic wand and just make things happen.” 
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) ‘Guide for Policy Makers and 
Planners’ sets out steps for achieving government commitment for 
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programmes to prevent injuries and violence. The authors recommend a 
step by step approach where political leaders are approached last, only after 
all other possible preparations are completed and there is community 
support for the initiative (2007). This echoes Kingdon’s analysis that elected 
officials, including the President, have more constrained and variable input 
to decision making than public perception suggests (Kingdon, 2003). 
Aside from issues driven from election manifesto influence on a 
Government Executive is often cause for speculation. After many years 
working closely with Ministers, one participant (Hans) speculated:  
“What excites Ministerial interest? Not the science...It’s whatever seems 
to be necessary for them to do...” Hans (Central Govt.) 
Hans continued, referring to the primacy of the electorate in shaping 
Ministerial behaviour.  
“...in a way all politics is populist, I mean it has to be in a democracy, or 
even in a dictatorship for that matter. You have to do what suits and 
satisfies your constituency...   ...that’s politics 101” Hans (Central Govt.)  
Another research participant, Beth added a comment that political risk 
assessment and mitigation might be motivations for policy initiatives:  
“It’s risk management. A lot of what happens is managing political risk.  
Politicians manage risk, so they reduce the – well they reduce the 
likelihood the electorate will be disaffected.” Beth (Central Govt.) 
In 2016 a Victoria University School of Government commentator summed 
up what he described as the 'mystique' of influence on Ministerial activity;  
“The collective public will arrives on the desks of public servants via 
the cabinet and ministers, who apply some sort of ideology, personal 
prejudice, hubris and intelligent inquiry and distillation to what they 
hear, mishear or selectively hear from constituents, polls, interest 
groups and pressure groups, consultants and experts” (James, 2016, 
p. 1).  
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In addition to being aware of the preferences of their constituencies, 
decision making is another crucial part of political life. When asked about 
the difficulties of making decisions about child safety policies, Rick, who had 
held elected office, identified a dynamic that delayed political decision 
making: 
“...It’s the politics. While everything is up in the air, you are winning. You 
haven’t pissed anyone off, you are all powerful; people are wanting to see 
you, wanting to suck up to you. As soon as you have made a decision you 
have immediately pissed off about half.  Then the half that thought you did 
the right thing, they won’t like the way you did it. You are at risk of falling 
backwards” Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Interview data demonstrated that within the framework of Executive power, 
Ministers are both enabled and constrained, powerful and important but also 
scrutinised by media and the public and only able to do 'acceptable things' 
in 'accepted’ ways. There was acknowledgment of the complexity of the 
system within which Ministers work and that it could generate its own 
momentum in response to an event. Insider knowledge is important, as is 
the political reality that politicians need to ensure their constituency do not 
become disaffected. The delivery of public services is an integral part of this 
process and central to this delivery are the professional capabilities, skills 
and integrity of the public service.  
Ministries and agencies - the Public Service  
The Public Service is another cornerstone of a Westminster system of 
government and consists of individuals (public servants) employed by State 
Sector organisations as defined by the State Sector Act (1988). A defining 
feature of the Westminster system is that governments may change but 
individuals within the public service remain in place. This permanency 
means the public service serves the government of the day and also any 
future government, whatever it’s philosophical or ideological persuasion. 
There is an expectation public servants work for the 'public good' and not 
for any partisan cause or objective (Eichbaum, 2016; Kibblewhite, 2016).  
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The permanency of public servants across election cycles ensures public 
services can be managed consistently throughout changes of government 
and the 'swearing in' of new Ministers. In 2016 the Head of the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) Andrew Kibblewhite, gave a speech 
noting the need for clear professional boundaries and protocols to be in 
place for interactions between Ministers and their staff. Kibblewhite 
identified public servants as ‘insiders’ who are trained to offer “deep, 
evidence based apolitical advice to ministers...” (2016). At the same time, 
they were expected to ensure the public good was maintained; 
“Ministers are responsible for deciding the policy direction and 
priorities for their departments while public servants in the roles of 
policy advisors are expected to have the capacity to act properly for 
the current Minister, keep the public good in mind and deliver advice 
for ministers that provides, not just advantage for one or another 
preferred position or policy programme, but stewardship for the 
future” (Kibblewhite, 2016).   
Differences between the roles of elected politicians and public servants 
were noted by interview participants. Rick commented that while politicians 
generally make the ‘broad brush’ decisions, public servants daily make 
major decisions about the use of resources.  
“Huge decisions are made by officials. You can think of it as the 
government of the day setting the ‘broad brush’ and then particular 
decisions are made by the chief executives and below.”   
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
This was reinforced by Beth, who commented that during her tenure working 
in the Ministry of Health, officials had substantial discretionary funding and 
were able to deliver many programmes that were not subject to political 
decision making.  
“...that was nothing to do with the political process, it was because we as 
public health planners and funders had discretionary funding and as 
planners it was totally appropriate to decide how that money was spent, 
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and it did involve bidding and scoring within the senior management team 
to have the list.” Beth (Central Govt.) 
Beth also noted ‘ego’ was sometimes a motivation for obtaining resources 
and the ubiquitous presence of ‘gaming’. This candid description of the coal 
face of departmental decision-making throws light onto one reality of 
everyday dynamics within government agencies.  
“...I have to say like everything in the public service there is an element of 
“gaming the system” that goes on. So, you know, people like me have egos 
and every work stream has someone with an ego, so you tend to protect 
your own patch and you want to grow your spend. But you still have to 
convince the other people that your particular hobby horse is the right one 
to make the priority in any given year...” Beth (Central Govt.) 
In contrast to this suggestion of self-interested behaviour by public servants, 
Rick commented on the high standard of professionalism and qualification 
of public servants they had experienced while working within New Zealand 
government: 
“…the State Sector Act in New Zealand is the greatest thing in the world. I 
never realised until I was in that role (of Government Minister). It is the 
most astonishing thing; we get Chief Executives and their management 
teams who are second to none.” Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Not all participants held the view that government agencies worked 
effectively and adequately provided services for child injury prevention. 
Josephine (who held the role of Chief Executive for a Non-Government 
agency) commented: 
“…it is the people on the ground who do all the hard work. I get sick of 
the big money that is left in government agencies, and to do what? 
Sometimes it is difficult to see what is actually coming out of them.”  
Josephine (NGO) 
Despite such criticism, New Zealand's public service has been consistently 
credited with low levels of corruption and high ranking for the ethical conduct 
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of its public-sector employees.19 This reputation has sometimes been 
threatened by lapses in the conduct of individual public servants or the poor 
performance of a government department or agency (Radio New Zealand, 
2017).   
In 2004 a survey indicated that up to a third of New Zealand's public 
servants had witnessed misconduct within government workplaces. In 
response the State Sector Act was amended to include a Code of Conduct 
which provides guidance for public servant behaviour and requires New 
Zealand public servants to be "Fair, Responsible, Impartial and Trustworthy" 
(State Services Commission, 2013).  
Public servants are simultaneously required to receive direction from their 
Minister and as part of their professional role, to also actively pursue goals 
and outcomes for the benefit of the public (Hartley, Alford, Hughes, & Yates, 
2013).20 One way public servants could influence political decision making 
was mentioned by interview participants. This is the opportunity to prepare 
documents referred to as Briefings for Incoming Ministers, or BIMs.  
Briefings to Incoming Ministers (BIMS) 
Briefings for Incoming Ministers (BIMs) are an important way a topic or issue 
might arise in Ministerial business and emerge as policy direction or agenda 
for a government agency. BIMs are documents prepared to inform new 
Ministers of the activities of an agency or department. Their importance was 
emphasised by Rick, who related this observation from his time spent as a 
Minister. 
                                                          
19Transparency International is a Non-Government Organisation which uses a Corruption 
Perceptions Index to measure corruption of public officials and government entities. The Index has 
consistently shown New Zealand as a country with low levels of corruption in its public sector, 
usually scoring in the 98th percentile and ranking either at the top or within the top three countries 
in the world (Transparency International New Zealand, 2018).    
20 The role of public servants is also discussed in Chapter Seven, referring to Hartley et al.’s research 
which also emphasises the necessity of public servants to be politically aware and the paradox that 
such awareness, and political competence can mean they can be ‘less political’ and interact less 
frequently with politicians than they otherwise might.   
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“...So, when a Minister becomes a Minister... the officials prepare a 
briefing. Basically, they say here is the state of child safety in New 
Zealand, this is your portfolio, here’s the sort of things we would like to 
do, and we would be interested to know if you would be interested to 
making a difference.” Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
In recent years various government agencies have released edited versions 
of BIMs on government websites. In June 2016 a Cabinet webpage hosted 
approximately seventy-eight online links to BIMs. Some links were to 
multiple BIMs, some BIMs were posted separately on departmental 
websites and others were available, but not online (Government, 2012).   
Ministry of Health BIMs were reviewed for mention of child injury prevention. 
From 1984 to 2014, the Ministry of Health published thirteen BIMs. It was 
noted unintentional child injury was only intermittently included.21 When 
mentioned, child injury was identified as having serious impact. In 1984 the 
Director General of Health advised the Minister “there will be a need for 
further New Zealand information about how precisely child pedestrian 
deaths can be prevented and whether we are proceeding on the right lines” 
(Barker, 1984 Department of Health Report: p. 6). Ministry of Health BIMs 
published in 1987 and 1989 did not mention child injury though the latter 
document stated “Road accidents are a costly cause of death and disability” 
(Salmond, 1989, p. 9).  
Child injury prevention was next included as a Ministry of Health priority nine 
years later in the 1993 BIM which stated “New Zealand’s record of (child) 
deaths from unintentional injury, especially motor vehicle crashes, is 
especially high” (Ministry of Health, 1993). During 1993 the Ministry of 
Health funded the first Safekids contract, establishing a small team (of two) 
at the newly opened Children's Hospital in Auckland. Safekids is discussed 
in greater detail in chapters one and seven. Ministry of Health briefings over 
                                                          
21 See Appendix 1 for the table of Ministry of Health BIMs, their date of publication, the change of 
Minister associated with the BIM and whether injury prevention or child safety is mentioned.  
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the next fifteen years focussed substantially on major health sector 
restructuring, rather than health issues (Blank & Burau, 2006).  
The next mention of child injury to an incoming Minister of Health was in 
2008, when it was noted that “Children in the most disadvantaged families 
and communities are at greater risk of illness and injury...” (Ministry of 
Health, 2008a, p. 27). This corroborated a 2008 BIM produced by the 
Accident Compensation Corporation which noted New Zealand's high rates 
of injury in comparison to other countries (Accident Compensation 
Corporation 2008, page 75).  
The 2012 Ministry of Health BIM provided the next and most recent briefing 
that included child safety and identified it as an issue within overall concerns 
about child health, it stated; “Compared to other OECD countries, New 
Zealand children experience high rates of infectious disease, injury, 
maltreatment, and overall mortality” (2012, p. 12). The BIM included 
prevention as an option for Ministerial attention, “Ministers also have a 
number of choices about how the sector as a whole can be designed to 
better focus on prevention, early intervention and management of long-term 
conditions” (2012, p. 12). Child injury was omitted from the Ministry of Health 
Briefing for 2014. 
Ministry of Health BIMs are often accompanied by other reports such as the 
New Zealand Health Survey (Ministry of Health, 2008b), Child and Youth 
Epidemiology Service Reports (Craig, Jackson, Han, & NZCYES Steering 
Committee, 2007) and Child and Youth Mortality Review Reports (2011) 
which enable agencies to identify issues so they can more effectively deliver 
intended outcomes.22 
The relationships between government strategic publications, Ministerial 
directions (written and oral) and departmental goals are complex and there 
is little or no research showing relationships between issues identified within 
these New Zealand documents and programmes. Neither is there research 
                                                          
22 Alignment between published academic work and government policy documents has been 
frequently discussed in recent years, with concern expressed that there needs to be greater use of 
scientific research within public policy decision making (Gluckman, 2013).  
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that demonstrates the degree to which BIMs are evidence based (i.e. the 
result of systematic scoping and collation of research and data) or 
descriptions of existing work programmes, which have been determined 
through internal processes.  
Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health has been a major funder of unintentional injury 
programmes in New Zealand. Over ten years (2005 to 2015) the Ministry 
provided fifty-five different organisations with contracts to deliver injury 
prevention services. These included District Health Boards, Public Health 
Units; Universities; local government agencies and community trusts 
(Ministry of Health, 2016a).23  
Beth held a management and policy role within the Ministry of Health during 
the early 1990s and described how she could promote child injury 
prevention within the budget priorities set by his team. The outcome of this 
action was the provision of Ministry contracts and funding, so organisations 
would deliver injury prevention programmes, many of which included child 
injury prevention activities. 
“...the public health group would decide on its priorities for discretionary 
spending. We had sort of twelve or thirteen categories, sexual health, 
nutrition, physical activity, alcohol and drugs, injury prevention and so 
on. Now each one of those areas had a work stream leader and sometimes 
whatever came up onto the top of the list was the result of effective 
lobbying and advocacy by the work stream leader... and there was one 
year when child injury prevention was our number one priority and a 
range of internal mechanisms and strategies (had been used) to get it 
there…” Beth (Central Govt.) 
Research participants in this study referred to the Ministry of Health’s 
engagement with academics. Beth provided an example where to make the 
case for expenditure of discretionary funds on child injury prevention 
                                                          
23 See Appendix 2 for a table of Ministry of Health contracts.  
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programmes, she took the opportunity, as a senior manager, to include child 
injury statistics within a management meeting.  
“One of them included a presentation at a staff day that was by an 
academic ... He had done an analysis of New Zealand’s child injury rates 
compared to other OECD Countries and lots of graphs and so on and so 
forth which didn’t put us in a very good light. I asked if I could use his 
presentation, then we had this senior management team meeting I was 
asked to do something. I started off with this that I wasn’t really supposed 
to do, but I just did it, making the point that injury, compared to other 
issues, was entirely preventable and we needed to do something about it.”        
Beth (Central Govt.) 
Beth presented the need to improve child safety in a way that was not fully 
sanctioned within those circumstances. Other interview participants also 
identified taking apparently unapproved actions in order to support child 
safety.  
Ministry of Health contracts for injury prevention were implemented during 
the mid-2000s and onwards, and required territorial authorities to engage in 
collaborative injury prevention activities (Ministry of Health, 2000, 2016b).24 
Territorial authorities were required to establish and host injury prevention 
programmes, through Programme Advisory Groups (PAGS).25 Programmes 
delivering across New Zealand, such as the Safe Communities Foundation 
New Zealand (SCFNZ) and local programmes such as Kidsafe Taranaki 
were provided with funds to carry out injury prevention activities and work 
closely with local government. These groups were visible champions of 
community-based injury prevention and safety promotion.26  
Support provided by the Ministry of Health was praised by another interview 
                                                          
24 See Ministry of Health contract table Appendix 2.  
25 Local Government “Injury Prevention Programme Advisory Groups” (PAGs) were established 
and funded by Public Health Units across New Zealand during the early 2000s. 
26 The SCFNZ works with local government agencies across New Zealand to support Councils to 
demonstrate their fidelity to the World Health Organisation (WHO) Safe Community Model, 
thereby gaining accreditation.  
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participant, Maau who commented:  
“...through support provided by the Ministry (of Health) who have 
absolutely funded the project, and the individuals within council who lead 
the project together with the individuals that the health sector provided, 
who have been implementing it. It’s really matured and in terms of seeing 
how the particular, vulnerable demographic (groups) are exposed to high 
levels of injuries, it’s been good work … You know there are really good 
outcomes that have come from this project and continue to be delivered.” 
Maau (Local Govt.) 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme is defined by the Accident 
Compensation Act that creates the Accident Compensation Corporation 
(ACC) which collects levies from eligible individuals and employers to 
deliver no-fault injury insurance cover for all people within New Zealand.  
The ACC BIM prepared in 2014 identifies ACC’s commitment to delivering 
injury prevention initiatives for “everyone in New Zealand” (2014a, p. 14). 
Services for children are identified in the areas of child care entitlement for 
claimants (page 25); a proposed extension of support services for children 
with mild traumatic brain injury (page 14) and working with the Ministry of 
Social Development to support vulnerable children (page 22). 
ACC’s legislation defines injury prevention activities as “the promotion of 
measures to reduce the incidence and severity of personal injury” and must 
demonstrate cost effectiveness (New Zealand Government, 2001). The Act 
states the Corporation must only undertake or fund injury prevention 
measures if the Corporation is: 
“(a) satisfied that such measures are likely to result in a cost-
effective reduction in actual or projected levy rates set under Part 6 
or expenditure from the Non-Earners’ Account under that Part; or 
(b) Parliament has appropriated money for such measures, and 
they are included in the current service agreement under section 
271; or 
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(c) money is available for such measures from any other source 
(such as a joint venture or sponsorship); or 
(d) any combination of any of paragraphs (a) to (c) applies. 
(New Zealand Government, 2001Part 7 Section 263(3)). 
Under ACC legislation injury prevention activities are required to 
demonstrate cost effectiveness (New Zealand Government, 2001). ACC’s 
focus on prevention activities demonstrating a cost benefit return is 
problematic for child injury prevention, which is a policy area where cost 
benefit calculations are applied with difficulty (Leung & Guria, 2006; Wren 
& Barrell, 2010). 
Challenges for ACC’s injury prevention efforts have also been related to 
factors outside this cost-benefit constraint. Since its introduction the 
Scheme’s legislation has been amended because of political differences of 
opinion about the manner in which the Corporation receives funding (St 
John, 2010). A short history of ACC on the organisation’s website notes that 
between 2000 and 2010 there were five substantial changes to the primary 
ACC legislation (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2018). In 2001 a 
Labour led government gave ACC a greater focus on injury prevention and 
an injury information manager was appointed to oversee the establishment 
of what was referred to as the National Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS 
Secretariat, 2003).  
In 2005 the principle Act was renamed as the “Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act” a title that was to be short lived. Four 
years later a change of government to a National-led coalition resulted in 
another change to ACC. In 2009 the government announced there had been 
an ‘explosion of costs’ and that ACC needed new leadership and a greater 
focus on ‘value for money’ (Smith, 2009). The principle Act was renamed 
the “Accident Compensation Act” dropping the reference to injury 
prevention. St John describes the Minister’s so called ‘explosion of costs’ 
as an artifice used to justify ideologically driven changes to the financial 
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arrangements of the scheme which had the impact of constraining and 
reducing ACC’s service delivery (St John, 2010). 
Those interacting with ACC staff on a regular basis noted that these 
changes had a constraining and unsettling impact on the delivery of injury 
prevention services. This was reflected in participants’ comments, Chaya 
noted ‘another complete’ restructure had recently occurred:  
“I think there is an awful lot of uncertainty, especially about the financial 
stuff. You know changes to ACC; they have just had another complete 
restructure. They have shifted positions and moved things around 
significantly and changed things.” Chaya (Local Govt.) 
Beth also referred to the disruptive impact that constant organisational 
change had on ACC’s involvement in community-based injury prevention 
programmes. The impression of ACC provided by interview participants was 
that it is a constantly changing organisation that does not maintain 
commitments to programmes.27 
One impact of these changes has been the development of lingering 
suspicions that ACC provides little for child injury prevention programmes. 
This was expressed by one interview participant. 
“When we look at injury prevention as a whole (and that child and youth 
injury prevention are within it) we know the biggest amount of money for 
injury prevention sits with ACC. But injury prevention programmes, at a 
government level, are funded by the Ministry of Health. Yet ACC has the 
biggest amount of money. It is not weighing up. So it’s - where is all that 
money going?” Josephine (NGO)  
Others also noted ACC's shortfalls in child injury prevention delivery. 
Simpson (2010) noted that despite expectation, ACC do not always take a 
leadership role for the delivery of child injury prevention initiatives;  
“It is generally assumed ACC is the agency responsible for injury 
prevention nationally and will always take a leadership role to actively 
                                                          
27 The impact of ACC’s restructuring is also mentioned in chapter 5 Collaboration.  
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promote child injury prevention ... Unlike other countries where injury 
prevention is part of Public Health, this uncertainty of responsibility 
leaves much of the prevention of child injury without consistent 
leadership or dedicated resources at government level” (Simpson J, 
2010, p. 30). 
ACC’s frequent organisational changes, coupled with its mandated 
requirement to fund only programmes of demonstrated fiscal net worth for 
account holders, seem to have created a perception of inconsistency and 
generated a lack of clarity and confidence about services delivered for child 
injury prevention. Interview participants also expressed a sceptical attitude 
(despite its positive evaluations) toward what was ACC’s major injury 
prevention initiative, the Injury Prevention Strategy. 
The New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) 
Strategic documents are created by governments to provide guidance for 
Ministries and others delivering programmes in affiliated and similar areas. 
In 2003 the Minister for ACC released the Government’s New Zealand Injury 
Prevention Strategy (referred to as NZIPS or the Strategy) as a way of 
providing leadership, monitoring performance and promoting collaboration 
across the government sector and for the benefit of non-government 
agencies working in injury prevention (New Zealand Government, 2003c).  
“New Zealand’s Injury Prevention Strategy (2003) 
Objectives and Actions  
1. Raise awareness and commitment to injury prevention  
2. Strengthen injury prevention capacity and capability  
3. Design and develop safe environments, systems and products 
4. Maintain and enhance the legislative and policy framework 
supporting injury prevention 
5. Integrate injury prevention activity through collaboration and co-
ordination 
6. Advance injury prevention knowledge and information 
7. Develop and implement effective injury prevention interventions 
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8. Ensure appropriate resource levels for injury prevention  
9. Develop, implement and monitor national injury prevention 
strategies for priority areas 
10. Foster leadership in injury prevention.”  
New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (2003) page v 
The New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) employed a 
Secretariat that oversaw the operation of the Strategy, engaged 
stakeholders, received advice and provided funding to organisations for 
recommended projects. The Secretariat routinely published strategies, 
reports and progress updates. These included evaluation reports on the 
impact and effectiveness of injury prevention programmes within New 
Zealand; a “Drowning Prevention Strategy – Towards a Water Safe New 
Zealand 2005 to 2015” (2005) and “falls” prevention strategy, “Preventing 
injury from falls – the National Strategy 2005 to 2015”.  
Although child injury prevention was never released as a stand-alone 
strategy, strategies included specific references to child safety issues and 
identified evidence-based methods for addressing them (New Zealand 
Injury Prevention Strategy, 2003, 2005; NZIPS Secretariat, 2008, 2010, 
2011; Wren & Barrell, 2010). 
The benefit of having a New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) 
was noted soon after its introduction. In 2007 Coggan commented that in 
the past those involved in injury prevention and associated fields such as 
crime and family violence prevention, water safety and alcohol harm 
reduction had worked within their own silos with very little recognition of the 
links between them or consideration of how these issues could be 
addressed collaboratively. This improved considerably with the introduction 
of NZIPS, while at the same time the new Local Government Act 2002 also 
prompted greater collaboration between agencies (Coggan & Gabites, 
2007). 
Although NZIPS provided a useful overarching Strategy, constraints on its 
effectiveness were noted. In 2008 ACC contracted Price Waterhouse 
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Cooper to review New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme and this 
report identified difficulties with the Strategy. These included constraints due 
to ACC legislation requiring it to demonstrate ‘returns’ to account holders for 
prevention programmes and in addition the report noted the: 
“…limited scope of the Secretariat function for NZIPS; i.e. while the 
Secretariat reports directly to the Minister for ACC, specific 
instructions have been given to ACC that it must not interfere in the 
responsibilities of individual agencies; therefore any ACC influence 
must be pursued via persuasion and cannot be mandated” 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. xiii).  
Such limits appear to have had a significant impact as the report also 
commented that the New Zealand ACC scheme played a small role in 
prevention in comparison to similar private schemes internationally. New 
Zealand’s lacklustre injury prevention record was noted in the 2008 ACC 
Briefing to the Incoming Minister, which stated “New Zealand’s injury rate 
has a direct impact on the scope and cost of the ACC scheme. New Zealand 
has a high rate of injury relative to other countries” (Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2008, p. 19). 
Concerns about the effectiveness of NZIPS and ACC’s injury prevention 
work were echoed elsewhere. In 2010 Langley concluded that “The 
establishment of NZIPS represented a bold and internationally unique 
approach to injury prevention, however the 5-year evaluation has raised 
some serious questions about its implementation” (Langley, 2010, p. 6). 
One research participant, Steffi, also raised her initial concern that the 
Strategy might not deliver the anticipated outcomes.  
“A couple of things that have come up which have given a bit more focus 
to child injury are things like IPNANZ and the Injury Prevention Strategy 
(NZIPS). I am not sure where NZIPS is at. In theory it was going to be 
very good we thought, I guess it was ‘watch this space’.” Steffi (NGO) 28 
                                                          
28 The Injury Prevention Network Aotearoa New Zealand (IPNANZ) was an organisation funded by 
the Ministry of Health to promote networking and collaboration between academics and 
professionals working in the injury prevention sector. It was disestablished in 2017.  
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Despite these concerns, five years later a 2010 report on the Strategy 
identified positive outcomes were being achieved; 
“… overall, injury-related deaths have decreased specifically in areas 
such as road crashes and workplace injuries owing to sustained 
activity and investment in injury prevention over a period of time” 
(NZIPS Secretariat, 2010, p. 1).  
This ten-year evaluation report also noted the importance of child injury 
prevention and shortcomings in its management;  
“Child injury prevention in children poses specific challenges in terms 
of requiring targeted interventions (e.g. child restraints). This is an 
area where injury is a major problem, but there is no national 
leadership, a lack of specific targets or priorities and a lack of co-
ordination” (NZIPS Secretariat, 2010, p. 2).  
Confidence in the effectiveness of the creation of multiple strategies to 
create focus, direction and consistency for injury prevention was not 
completely shared by research interview subjects. Beth expressed 
reservation about the overall approach of creating multiple strategies to 
address issues and commented: 
“… (the previous government) …was doing strategies all the time; they 
had about seventy at one stage. This current government haven’t done 
any. It’s much more action orientated and focussed on clinical issues 
perhaps because I think they probably felt the balance got out of kilter. 
And they may well be right...” Beth (Central Govt.) 
The New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy and its Secretariat remained 
in place for ten years, eight years after a change of the government which 
introduced it. In December 2013 the New Zealand Injury Prevention 
Strategy Secretariat was disestablished by the Minister for ACC. Official 
acknowledgement of its existence briefly remained online at the government 
ACC website, which said that an ‘injury prevention action plan’ would be 
developed and published and work on this is underway. 
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The changing face of death review in New Zealand 
Investigation and reporting processes for death in New Zealand have 
changed substantially in recent decades. In 2002 the Child & Youth Mortality 
Review (C&YMR) Committee system was established and in 2006 New 
Zealand’s Coronial system was completely overhauled through the 
establishment of a professional national Coronal system. These changes 
(considered well over-due) increased the timeliness of death reporting; 
improved responsiveness to the bereaved; established better investigation 
processes and improved systems for providing prevention advice for 
government sector agencies and the wider public (Law Commission Te aka 
matua o te ture, 2000).  
Government departments are required to maintain a close interest in the 
accuracy of death certification (and the data this generates) to fulfil their 
statutory responsibilities. These include the Ministry of Justice (under the 
Coroners Act 2006); the Department of Internal Affairs (notification and 
registration of deaths) and the Ministry of Health, who have responsibility 
for administering the Burial and Cremation Act (New Zealand Government, 
1964) and for the recording, analysis and international reporting of New 
Zealand mortality data (Law Commission  Te aka matua o te ture, 2011).  
In 2000 a Law Commission report noted New Zealand’s Coronial System 
and death documentation processes were in significant disarray. This 
disarray resulted in lengthy delays, difficulties for bereaved families 
accessing information, and disorganised documentation systems leading to 
incomplete surveillance and reporting. The Law Commission report also 
drew attention to the reason death certification is an important part of 
government process: 
“The State takes a vital interest in ascertaining, as precisely as 
possible, the cause of all deaths so that suspicions of foul play, 
homicide or neglect of human life can be fully investigated. The 
underlying objective is to identify practices that have cost human 
lives and then to modify or eliminate them” (Law Commission Te aka 
matua o te ture, 2000).  
 89 
 
Six years after this critical report a new Coroners Act (2006) established a 
Chief Coroner’s Office and created a national Coronial Service supported 
by administrative resources. Fewer coroners are employed, but each now 
must now be a qualified lawyer, undertake specialist training and report their 
findings to the Chief Coroner’s Office. Although these changes have been 
heralded as a success, further changes are recommended. In 2010, just 
prior to his retirement Chief Coroner, Justice McLean described the process 
of death certification in New Zealand as still being an ‘unholy mess’ 
(McClean, 2012).  
Child & Youth Mortality Review Committees (C&YMRC or 'the Committee') 
are statutory bodies appointed under section 59E of the New Zealand 
Health and Disabilities Act 2000. These committees conduct 
multidisciplinary reviews on the circumstances of child and youth death 
outside of hospital. In addition to a single, national C&YMR Committee, 
regional committees investigate each death and report to the National 
Committee who publishes information focussed on recommendations and 
system improvements (Baker & Griffin, 2015; New Zealand Government, 
2000). 
C&YMR Committees came into existence in large part due to the work of 
individuals who advocated for this process. Hans discussed how he and 
others with him first sought to bring in a system for reviewing the 
circumstances of a child’s death that occurred in the community.   
 
“...I wasn’t the first person to come to the realisation that child injuries 
were a big cause of death, but mostly they didn’t occur in hospital and 
there was a need for review of these deaths or some process for reviewing 
these deaths...” Hans (Central Govt.) 
Whenever a child dies while in hospital, whether a Coronial case or not, the 
circumstances of that death are usually considered carefully by clinicians 
involved and a report on the care the child and their family is provided to 
either the hospital management or senior clinicians. This review is carried 
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out in addition to any Coronial or police investigations that might have been 
initiated during the death certification process (Ministry of Health, 2014). 
In contrast to hospital death processes, prior to 2000 a child’s death that 
occurred within the community (and was not referred to a Coroner) had 
limited investigation that often took extended periods of time to conclude. 
The final report did not usually reach the clinicians and community services 
involved (Law Commission Te aka matua o te ture, 2000). This situation 
generated calls for improvement, which in 2000 resulted in a change to 
legislation. 
“....and over the years I and others agitated for there to be more 
systematic and universal review of child deaths (that occurred in the 
community) which we eventually got, with the last minute add on when 
Annette King put this into her New Zealand Health and Disabilities Act”. 
Hans (Central Govt.)  
Since its establishment the National Committee has published (and tabled 
in Parliament) a series of major reports on causes of child and youth death 
in New Zealand including reports on child driveway runovers, adolescent 
risk taking, suffocation and drowning. In 2011 the Committee reported to 
Parliament that over a five-year period (2006-2010) an average of 289 
children in New Zealand (aged between 28 days to fifteen years) died 
annually. The largest number of children died from medical causes (n= 160: 
55%); next was unexplained causes of death, which includes what is usually 
referred to as ‘Sudden Unexplained Infant Death’ or ‘SUID’ (n= 58: 20%); 
unintentional injury was next (n= 54: 18%); those who died from injury 
inflicted intentionally were the next group (n= 13: 4%); with a small number 
(n=3: 1%) reported as having ‘missing data’. The accessible on-line 
availability of this information (and its detail) contrasts with the challenges 
of the earlier 1993 Children’s Hospital Research Committee who, when 
attempting to report child death from injuries, commented that “Only 1991 
data could be used (in this report) because of the difficulties involved in 
accessing and tabulating data...” (Lane, 1993; New Zealand Child and 
Youth Mortality Review Data Group, 2011).  
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Mortality data is now available in ways not imagined in the 1990s. The 
Australian Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics 
(BITRE) provides monthly detailed public information about Australian road 
fatalities and the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
publishes a Morbidity and Mortality Weekly (MMWR) Report of data about 
selected illness and causes of death from fifty American States (Bureau of 
Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics BITRE, 2018; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). Major data sets have also permitted 
the collaborative development and publication of the influential "Global 
Burden of Disease" studies (Gore et al., 2011). 
During the 1980s and 1990s rapid improvements in the accessibility of data 
raised fears such technology might bring into existence a ‘surveillance 
society’ that would be typified by a ‘grandiose, overarching technocratic 
dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood as the irruption of 
the unpredictable’ (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991, p. 289).  
Thirty years after such dire warning research suggests that regarding death 
data (at least), this anticipated dystopian outcome has not been realised.29 
In 2012 Bugeja et al drilled down into the detail within the Australian 
mortality data collections, looking into the specifics of what information had 
been collected, who had accessed it and how it had been used. The 
research showed that over five years from 2000 to 2005 there had been 
infrequent responses to the enhanced accessibility of this information. 
Despite improvements to death investigation and the collection and access 
to comprehensive data records, recommendations for change were few and 
far between. Researchers raised the concern this reflected a disjuncture 
between policy making and evidence, commenting that the infrequent use 
of the data reflected concerns more widely expressed about how to achieve 
more effective and appropriate use of research in the formation of policy 
(Bugeja et al., 2012; Gluckman, 2011, 2013).  
                                                          
29 The evolution and use of 'Big Data' beyond the collection of death review information has been 
the subject much international discussion and debate- see the 'Six Provocations' paper (Boyd & 
Crawford, 2012).   
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In 2015 Baker and Griffin conducted a similar review of New Zealand Child 
and Youth Mortality Review Committee mortality data and 
recommendations. They noted a significant and steady reduction in the 
numbers of child and youth death in the fifteen-year period from 2000 to 
2014. During this time the Committee had made 202 recommendations for 
policy changes. They stated: 
"Recommendations from more recent reports have been 
implemented to a lesser extent. This is important for two reasons:  
1. It demonstrates that a well-developed recommendation may still 
require a considerable amount of promotion and advocacy in order 
to be fully achieved. The time and resource required for such 
promotion and advocacy must be planned.  
2. For recommendations that focus on areas over which the health 
sector has less influence, it is harder to achieve high levels of 
implementation. This suggests more effort may be required to grow 
greater influence outside the health sector" (Baker & Griffin, 2015). 
Death data appear to have achieved an arcane standing, mostly filed and 
left and when accessed, used only partially successfully to argue for 
measures and programmes to prevent future death from the same or similar 
causes. Yet when actions based on this data are grounded in respect for 
the rights of children and their families and aimed at preventing future 
deaths, such data provide the basis of a positive contribution for the future 
(Fraser, Sidebotham, Frederick, Covington, & Mitchell, 2014). 
Office of the Children’s Commissioner 
The Office of the Children’s Commissioner (the OCC) was established in 
1989 as a statutory agency to advocate for the interests and wellbeing of 
children and young people in New Zealand. This includes raising awareness 
and interest in children’s rights and welfare, investigating and reporting on 
the welfare of children under New Zealand state care and encouraging the 
participation of children in decision making on matters relating to them (New 
Zealand Government, 2003b).  
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A primary function of the OCC has been to monitor and report on 
government’s fulfilment of its responsibilities under the Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act (1989) and its advocacy has included 
raising awareness and submitting to government on child injury prevention 
issues. In 2015 the OCC submitted to government on the repeal of the 
Fencing of Swimming Pools Act (1987) to request the improvement and 
retention of safety provisions in any replacement legislation (Office of the 
Children's Commissioner, 2015a). In 2016 the OCC submitted to 
government's Transport and Industrial Relations Select Committee on the 
issue of children riding bicycles on footpaths, identifying both children's 
views and the safety aspects of the practice (Office of Children's 
Commissoner, 2016). 
The Children’s Commissioner Act (2003) also requires the OCC to take 
particular regard of the New Zealand Government’s fulfilment of its 
obligations as a signatory of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of 
the Child (UNCROC) (Barrington, 2004). In 2008 the OCC Briefing to the 
Incoming Minister stated: 
"The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has called on New 
Zealand to build on our base of child health, education and 
community services to produce a more effective service system for 
children and young people" (Kiro, 2008). 
The most recent Government (Fifth) UNCROC Report to the World Health 
Organisation in 2015, signed by the Children's Commissioner, again 
identified New Zealand's major child health challenges as its unacceptably 
high rates of child poverty and deprivation, the (poor) outcomes being 
achieved for children in State care and systemic inequalities for Māori 
children. Unintentional injury was also noted as an important child health 
issue in the UNCROC Report, mentioning recent government activities 
taken to address this:  
"Safekids Aotearoa works at a national level to undertake 
preventative health promotion initiatives to reduce the incidence and 
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severity of unintentional injuries to New Zealand children. 
Unintentional injury is a leading cause of death and hospitalisation 
for children aged 0-14 years in New Zealand. Of note during the 
reporting period are the amendments to the Land Transport Act and 
Rules which improve road safety for children and Housing New 
Zealand’s Driveway Safety Programme which seeks to minimise the 
risk of driveway injuries and deaths to children by auditing existing 
properties where there are children under the age of five" (New 
Zealand Government, 2015b, p. 34). 
Monitoring government delivery of child injury prevention services is not a 
primary responsibility for the Children's Commissioner, yet the OCC 
identifies and responds to major child injury prevention issues, while at the 
same time acknowledging Safekids Aotearoa as having national 
responsibilities in the field.  
The OCC and its Commissioner together play an important role as a 
commentator on the broader picture of New Zealand child rights and 
wellbeing, yet participants did not mention it during interviews. This is 
perhaps not co-incidental (or in any way reflective of the OCCs contribution 
to child safety). The OCC, as an Office of Parliament receives its own 
budget allocation which is for the Commissioner to use in the fulfilment of 
the Office’s statutory duties. Child injury prevention programmes and 
projects receive funding from other sources, such as the Ministry of Health 
or ACC and as such, the focus of participant interviews was toward these 
agencies. In the context of building constructive social discourse about 
childhood in New Zealand, through their promotion of child rights overall, 
the OCC and its Commissioner provide a substantial contribution toward the 
benefit of New Zealand’s children. 
Power – Local Government 
This section provides a brief overview of local government’s political and 
legislative involvement in child safety and discusses how such activities are 
linked to arguments about what services local government should deliver. It 
includes interview participants’ comments about the importance of local 
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government’s statutory plans, Ministry of Health funding and the contribution 
of the Safe Communities Foundation (SCF) for establishing community-
based injury prevention projects. 
Interview participants drew attention to how integral local government 
agencies are for the delivery of community child safety programmes such 
as the provision of safe local roads, cycle ways and pedestrian paths, safe 
parks and playgrounds, swimming pool fencing enforcement, building 
safety, dog control and many other functions. Some activities are required 
by law, such as dog control measures (New Zealand Government, 1996), 
others are discretionary, such as the provision of free swimming lessons in 
Council owned pools (Wellington City Council, 2018). Despite the breadth 
and number of involvements local government has in the provision of child 
safety measures, interview participants identified challenges encouraging 
them to engage in child safety (beyond activities they are required by law to 
provide) and described measures needed to encourage local government 
to undertake child safety programmes and projects. 
Local Government overview 
New Zealand’s local government agencies are collectively referred to as 
local authorities and consist of Regional Councils, Unitary Authorities, 
Territorial Authorities (City Councils) and Community (or Local) Boards. 
Local authorities hold elections three yearly, elected Members provide 
governance and consist of Mayors, Councillors and Community (or Local) 
Board Members. Local government politicians are directly elected by their 
constituents and can set and collect property tax (rates) and pass local 
regulations. However local government is subject to the authority of 
Parliament, through its law-making ability (Asquith, 2012; Local 
Government New Zealand, 2004).  
The role and scope of activities undertaken by local authorities are defined 
by legislation (Local Government New Zealand, 2004). In 2002 local 
government in New Zealand was dramatically changed when the 5th Labour 
Government passed the Local Government Act 2002 (the Act), replacing 
the highly prescriptive Local Government Act 1974. Under the new 
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legislation elected Councils and their staff retained responsibilities for 
providing basic infrastructure services (such as maintaining local roads, 
removing rubbish and providing clean water) and their regulatory functions 
(such as enforcing building regulations and land use planning). In addition, 
they became empowered to deliver whatever services and activities are 
supported by their local populations (Asquith, 2012; Local Government New 
Zealand, 2004). This was a dramatic change which resulted in Local 
Authorities becoming more diverse in both their structure and functions. 
Local government’s representative organisation Local Government New 
Zealand (LGNZ) commented on the impact of this change; 
“(Councils)...can differ widely in relation to activities they undertake, 
as long as they have consulted their communities in making the 
decisions. As a result, there is considerable diversity in the range of 
activities that councils provide, reflecting the different circumstances 
that cities, towns and communities find themselves in’  (Local 
Government New Zealand, 2018). 
To ensure elected Members take note of (and are constrained by) 
community wishes, the 2004 Act specifies how Councils must consult their 
communities and publish Long Term Council and Community Plans which 
identify proposed Council activities and explain how they will be funded 
(Local Government New Zealand, 2004; Ministry of Social Development, 
2005).  
Safety in local government – up for debate 
The initial 2002 Local Government Act required Councils to consider “the 
social, economic and cultural well-being of people and communities” in their 
decision making. This was not an onerous or entirely new expectation and 
sat well with other legislation local government complies with when carrying 
out its functions (McSoriley, 2002). Local authorities have a long tradition of 
protecting public health by providing clean water and removing rubbish and 
waste. In New Zealand much of this health promotion activity stems directly 
from legislative requirements related to protecting public safety, including 
dog control; alcohol sales and food safety licensing; managing local roads 
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and ensuring pedestrian facilities such as school crossings are safe (New 
Zealand Government, 1996, 2012b). The Building Code requires buildings 
to be safe and swimming pools fenced to prevent child drowning (Ministry 
of Business Innovation and Employment, 2014b).30 Councils, as employers 
must also provide workplace health and safety for their employees (Local 
Government New Zealand, 2004). Many Councils also engage with other 
services to support the delivery of community programmes, such as health 
education and sports. These activities are required by other legislation, for 
example Section 23 of the 1956 Health Act requires each local authority to 
“improve, promote and protect health of the people in its district” (Auckland 
Regional Public Health Service, 2006).  
Ensuring New Zealand's local government is funded sufficiently to carry out 
its functions is a vexed issue. Unlike many overseas jurisdictions, New 
Zealand’s local government receives only a small portion of its funding from 
central government and legislation limits its ability to raise income and 
provides very specific investment constraints (Allender et al., 2009). Local 
government's dependence on property tax (rates) has led to debate about 
Council involvement and expenditure on any activities other than those 
funded by central government or described as ‘core services’ (Lewis & 
Murphy, 2015). In 2010 these debates lead to an important and contentious 
amendment by the 5th National Government. This amendment, referred to 
as the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Act (2010) removed 
clauses that required local government to ensure the ‘well beings’ of 
communities. The intended effect of this change was to require Councils to 
focus more on ‘core responsibilities’ and implement more expenditure 
control (McSoriley, 2010). 
Council involvement in community issues (such as providing an injury 
prevention programme) is argued by some to be an additional financial 
burden for ratepayers and an ‘irresponsible’ duplication of services that 
should be provided by the private sector or central government (New 
                                                          
30 Swimming Pools safety is discussed further in Chapter Eight – Case study – The rise and fall of 
swimming pool fences (see page 199).  
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Zealand Government, 2012a). The presence and impact of this view was 
noted by one research participant, Leilani, who had long experience 
promoting and supporting local government involvement in community 
safety:   
“When you are in local government there is a very strong push to say we 
do not want to be engaged in anything that is actually the responsibility of 
central government. So, at a local government level you have to find other 
ways to continue to be engaged in some of that stuff (community safety) 
and it is much harder.” Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Not everyone shared the view that local government was irresponsibly 
causing unwarranted costs for ratepayers by engaging in an excessive 
number of issues, and the need to limit local government activities was 
strongly challenged from within the local government sector. In a 
submission to the Local Government 2002 Amendment Bill (2010) Local 
government’s representative organisation, Local Government New Zealand 
(LGNZ) stated its opposition and concern about the removal of the need for 
Councils to attend to the ‘well-beings’ of their communities in its submission 
to the Bill:  
“Given the lack of problem definition, the lack of any evidence to 
substantiate the general claims made by government about the 
impact of the well-beings, and the un-scoped legal risk associated 
with the change, the proposal to alter the well-beings appears 
somewhat reckless” (Local Government New Zealand, 2012). 
Further comment by Leilani suggests the presence of the “Well Being’ 
clauses in the 2002 Act had facilitated Council involvement in community 
safety activities and after their removal it became more difficult to promote 
safety.   
That (i.e. Council involvement in community safety) has been made 
harder by the changes to the legislation and the pulling out of the four 
‘wellbeing(s)’ as the central point of the Council’s way to operate.  
Leilani (Local Govt.) 
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Local government expenditure was debated even after the 2010 legislation 
was passed. The supposed negative fiscal impact of local government’s 
involvement in activities outside of their ‘core responsibilities’ was defined 
and signalled as 'a problem' by officials working within the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. An April 2012 Department of Internal Affairs Briefing (BIM) 
advised a National government’s incoming Minister of Local Government 
that: 
“Central and local government are increasingly faced with a 
challenging fiscal environment, changing community and iwi 
expectations, and the availability of new technologies. Local 
authorities are under pressure to respond to these changes, while 
keeping both rates and debt as low as possible. This can be difficult” 
(New Zealand Government, 2012a, p. 4).   
Others stated emphatically that New Zealand’s local government agencies 
were spending wisely and not ‘out of control’. In July 2012 LGNZ released 
a report from the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) 
which concluded “There is no consistent evidence that local government as 
a whole has been fiscally irresponsible in New Zealand over the last two 
decades”(Nicholls & Gill, 2012).  
Some Councils provide safety programmes for their communities, but others 
appear reluctant, especially when those activities might be thought of as 
discretionary.31 This reduces certainty that all local government agencies 
will support the promotion of public safety beyond their statutory 
responsibilities (Morrison, Chalmers, Langley, Alsop, & McBean, 1999). 
Robert commented on the difference between two Councils regarding pool 
fencing enforcement:  
“Contrast that (other child safety activity) with pool fencing, where 
enforcement is largely dependent on resourcing and policy within local 
                                                          
31 The installation of fencing around home swimming pools was initially proposed to happen by 
Councils voluntarily adopting a 'model' By-Law. Only a small number of Councils did this, and 
children continued to drown in home pools. Significant reductions in drowning only occurred when 
central government passed the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987 which required Councils to 
enforce the installation of safety fences around pools (see Chapter Eight). 
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government. It is much more variable. Hastings has a strong history of 
enforcement. I have been actively involved in that, even to the extent of being 
asked by local government enforcement officers to go to a house to provide 
an expert opinion about whether a particular safety feature was scalable by 
a small child and why... Then you have the Napier City Council right next 
door, with effectively no, or almost no enforcement of pool fencing 
legislation.” Robert (Central Govt.) 
In addition to arguments about whether Councils should be involved in 
safety, Council's lack of information about safety and lack of skills to 
establish effective community safety programmes were also seen as factors 
in Council's reluctance to engage in child safety activities. Leilani 
commented:  
“I remember when I first went to Council and I started talking about crime 
prevention and of course the first thing they said to me was ‘that’s not 
Council’s business, the police are doing that’.   ... So, I think that it is 
really hard for local government to figure out exactly what it’s going to 
do, so it needs help from those people that are working in the area, and 
it’s not just about banging on about how local government should be 
helping; it’s actually about saying, local government should be helping, 
because...” Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Injury prevention advocates stress the importance of using epidemiological 
studies to make the case for the adoption of particular injury prevention 
policy and associated programmes, yet the relationship between 
quantitative data and policy is fraught and remains the subject of much 
debate (Gluckman, 2011, 2013). When there is not a direct relationship 
between injury data and priorities noted by community consultation, local 
authorities find themselves at the forefront of this debate. A senior staff 
member who worked in local government, Chaya commented; 
“...we also develop projects depending what our priorities are from our 
local data and what our communities are telling us are their priority. 
Because sometimes those things are not aligned, sometimes the data is 
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quite different to what the community feel is really important to them. So 
those are two ways we look at how we are going to develop and deliver a 
project” Chaya (Local Govt.) 
Councils are required to consult and are expected to consider community 
preferences, while at the same time ensuring and promoting public safety. 
The need for council staff to manage what might be competing priorities for 
spending draws attention to the need for information to assist decision 
making. Ready access to best practice injury prevention information and 
resources was addressed in the early 1990s when community injury 
prevention projects were started within New Zealand. The first five projects 
were started by the Public Health Commission in 1994 as pilots and in 1998 
the Waitakere Community Injury Prevention Project (WCIPP) based at 
Waitakere City Council was accredited as New Zealand’s first World Health 
Organisation (WHO) Safe Community.32 
Safe Community projects are based on the WHO ‘Safe Community’ model 
of promoting safety through Councils encouraging widespread community 
participation and collaboration. The projects are usually hosted by Councils 
who contribute by providing office space and administrative support. They 
also receive funding from central government agencies (for example ACC 
and the Ministry of Health) and actively promote collaboration and 
interactions across their communities. The Safe Communities model makes 
safety expertise and advice available, while providing opportunity for 
community organisations, groups and individuals to identify local safety 
concerns and seek solutions in conjunction with Council and central 
government staff. During the early 2000s Safekids Aotearoa provided 
support for the Auckland based community injury prevention projects by 
sending staff to attend meetings and providing resources.33 Safekids also 
published ‘advocacy guides’ on promoting local government involvement in 
child injury prevention activities (Safekids, 2004). These projects assist 
                                                          
32 The Safe Community Foundation is discussed on pages 21 and 58. It is also mentioned in the 
chapters on power and collaboration. 
33 As Safekids Senior Policy Advisor I routinely attended Auckland Community Injury Prevention 
Project meetings over a period of five years. These projects were hosted by the legacy Auckland 
City, Waitakere City and Manukau City Councils.  
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Councils by providing avenues of advice about effective injury prevention 
measures, ways to appropriately offer these measures for collaborative 
uptake and the means to facilitate their adoption within and by communities 
(Johnston, 2011).  
Despite the National government legislating to remove the need for Councils 
to take ‘well beings’ of communities into account and ongoing debate that 
local government activities needed to be curtailed, during the later 1990s 
and 2000s local government involvement with injury prevention projects 
grew and by 2017 the Safe Communities Foundation website listed 26 Safe 
Community projects (Safe Communities Foundation NZ, 2018). 
The impact of this growth has been to change the nature of local 
government's involvement in delivering safety programmes. These 
programmes provide links between local government, injury prevention 
research and communities and have been consistently evaluated as 
effective for achieving a range of improved community safety outcomes. Six 
years after community injury prevention projects were started they were 
evaluated by Auckland University Injury Prevention Research Centre who 
noted that “Evaluation findings have highlighted the powerful (positive) 
effect that (these projects) have had with regard to the institutionalisation of 
injury prevention within local authorities…” (Coggan, 1995a, 1995b; Coggan 
& Gabites, 2007; Coggan & Peters, 2008). 
Child safety in local government 
Local Government's child safety activities include collaboration with central 
government agencies such as the Ministry of Health and ACC  to deliver 
programmes and the adoption of the WHO Safe Communities model, which 
includes child safety as an important component of service provision for a 
vulnerable population group (Spinks, Turner, Nixon, & McClure, 2009).  
New Zealand's largest local government agency, Auckland Council included 
a child injury prevention target at the highest level of its inaugural strategic 
plan. The Local Government Act (2002) requires Councils to consult widely 
in order to create and publish Long Term Strategic Plans. Legislation that 
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established Auckland Council also included a requirement for the Council to 
consult and publish “The Auckland Plan” in order to; 
“...contribute to Auckland’s social, economic environmental and 
cultural well-being through a comprehensive and effective long term 
(20 to 30 year) strategy for Auckland’s growth and development” 
(New Zealand Government, 2009 Part 6: Section 79: Clause (2)).  
This 'Auckland Plan' (the Plan) was developed between 2009 and 2011 
through widespread consultation and released online by the Mayor of 
Auckland in 2012 (Auckland Council, 2012). It is a massive document of 
fifteen sections used by Council staff to identify which programmes and 
projects to develop and implement. Chapter One includes a target to; 
“Reduce the number of child hospitalisations due to injury by 20% 
by 2025” (Auckland Council, 2018a). 
The presence of a target to reduce child injury hospitalisation within this first 
version of the Auckland Plan reflected acknowledgment of child injury as a 
problem and a recognition Auckland Council can influence its prevalence. 
Leilani (who was not associated with the Auckland Council Plan) stressed 
the importance of having child and community safety included within local 
government documents, such as Council strategic plans.  
“It’s got to be in the ‘Plan’. It has to be in the Long-Term Plan and in the 
Annual Plan. It’s got to be on the Council’s agenda.  So, like that thing I 
just read to you where it says, ‘this council is about making the city safe’ 
then that is enshrined in the Long-Term Plan.  Some of the projects might 
change, but the ethos of wanting to be safe and wanting to be connected 
and wanting to have social cohesion and wanting to work as a community 
is not going to be lost.” Leilani (Local Govt.) 
The inclusion of a child injury hospitalisation target into the Auckland Plan 
meant child injury was (and is) identified as a problem by Auckland Council's 
decision makers. Child hospitalisations then become a target or indicator of 
the success or otherwise of Auckland Council’s child safety activities. 
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Kingdon discusses the concept of indicators as important for defining policy 
problems.  
“Decision makers and those close to them use the indicators in two 
major ways: to assess the magnitude of the problem and to become 
aware of changes in the problem” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 91).   
Having a child injury hospitalisation target in the Auckland Plan means 
decision makers compiling the final report made a deliberate choice that this 
should be included. Within the cohort of interview participants of his study 
of Capitol Hill staff, Kingdon identified the presence of individuals he 
referred to as 'policy entrepreneurs' (Kingdon, 2003). These individuals 
described themselves as “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of 
an idea” and their presence, Kingdon suggests, is a feature of successful 
policy adoption (Kingdon, 2003, p. 122).   
Leilani stressed the importance of Council Strategic plans and the need for 
'getting something into the plan' describing how she used her influence to 
ensure safety was included in their Council's Long-Term Plan (not 
Auckland). First, she stated, it is important to ensure the broad issue is 
acknowledged and present at a high level:   
“…it’s about making sure that what you want to do is there, not about 
specific projects but about the broad issue. What would be the vision, if 
you like, around the prevention of child injuries, that you somehow or 
another wanted to ‘enshrine’ and could that be dealt with through things 
like social cohesion, connectedness, communities, families, young people, 
those sorts of things?” Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Next, Leilani stressed, it is important to act to ensure the specific issue (that 
is being championed) is recorded in ways that will require acknowledgment 
and discussion by decision makers; 
“That was the thing I did while I was there, it was one thing I achieved 
was to get safety related issues into the (Council’s) Long-Term Plan and 
annually that would come up so that people were talking about that issue 
every year around the council table.” Leilani (Local Govt.) 
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Kingdon differentiates political windows from problem windows in the policy 
development process. A political window might open, Kingdon suggests, 
when a new politician is elected, or politicians governing the organisation 
adopt a new direction or proposal (2003, p. 165). Interview participants who 
were (or had been) employed in local government discussed their 
interactions with politicians and how they might use those interaction to 
advance ideas for policies and programmes. One interview participant’s 
comment indicated there are informal (or casual) opportunities for 
interaction between local government staff and elected officials that are not 
formally recorded. Chaya explained how opportunities for interaction 
between local government staff and their elected officials vary, even within 
Councils.  
“Interviewer: As a team within Council, did you ever engage with the 
politicians? Or did you only engage with the other officers? 
Interview Participant:  It’s always a bit of a balance between the two. 
Sometimes you need to engage with the politicians, and sometimes that is 
through the submission process, or sometimes it’s possible to develop 
personal relationships. Some structures allow you to have them, some 
don’t. It depends on the situation.” Chaya (Local Govt.) 
This variation and such opportunities for informal exchanges between 
politicians and staff differs from central government, where Parliamentary 
conventions (for example the Cabinet Manual) and State Services 
Commission guidance (such as the State Services Code of Conduct) directs 
and constrains such interactions between politicians and public servants 
(State Services Commission, 2018).  
Kingdon noted that in Capitol Hill political decision makers sought out 
connections with community networks, a finding consistent with New 
Zealand interview participants (Kingdon, 2003). Maau commented that an 
essential part of a local government politician’s leadership role was their 
involvement and communication with community leaders. The following 
comment demonstrated his observation that collaboration between a 
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community leader advocating for an issue and a local government political 
decision maker was a powerful catalyst for action and change:   
“If you have strong community leaders who really believe in why they are 
standing up for a certain issue and working within a certain issue within 
the community then that in itself is a catalyst for change and encouraging 
decisions (within Councils). Where it’s got real strength is where you have 
a community leader who is passionate and clear and working alongside a 
politician with similar concerns.” Maau (Local Govt.)  
In another example of staff working to promote safety, Chaya described 
working with other staff within local government to improve playground 
safety. Chaya had many years expertise in child safety programmes within 
local government and provided a description which illustrated the role of the 
policy entrepreneur within council and the importance of local government 
staff working together; 
“We also did a significant amount of work with our parks playground 
person. We ended up with (named) Park, which has the spider frame rope 
climbing frame apparatus. You know in the start it was too hard, too 
expensive and (they kept saying) ‘Councils don’t know anything about it’, 
but you know by working quietly with the people who do these things and 
manage parks and do make decisions on what the budget will be spent on, 
we were able to change their thinking around child playgrounds.”  
Chaya (Local Govt.) 
Conclusion  
The theme of ‘power’ revealed how New Zealand Government employees 
(central and local) play an important role in the provision of regulations, 
programmes and environments which protect children and enhance their 
safety. Policy initiatives such as the introduction of improvements in death 
review, the New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy and continued vigilance 
of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner have been important. The 
complexity of government was identified, and research participants 
explained how government ‘insiders could mobilise resources and promote 
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actions’. Those ‘outside’ of government were also identified as important 
influencers, which is discussed further in chapter seven, on advocacy and 
lobbying.  
Debates over whether local government should be involved with delivering 
child safety programmes are important, yet despite these, staff and 
politicians working within local government agencies demonstrated how 
they have persisted in ensuring child safety is (and has been) identified in 
ways that provide commitment for future actions. The contributions of 
organisations (such as the Safe Communities Foundation) to inform and 
empower local government involvement in child safety, are also important.  
 108 
 
  
 109 
 
CHAPTER 4: FINDING FUNDING AND THE VALUE OF 
CHILDREN 
“At the end of the day, money makes the world go around and if we don’t 
get that right, we’re going to struggle in everything else”  
Josephine (NGO) 
This chapter explores the social value we place on children and difficulties 
research participants reported when they were attempting to find funding for 
child safety programmes. It briefly reviews participants’ comments about 
funding child injury prevention and presents a brief overview of the 
sociological literature on the value of children and common methods 
employed by government agencies to value human life. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how these understandings and 
methodologies might create challenges for those promoting child safety 
programmes.  
A disjuncture is noted in how cost benefit is presented in child injury 
prevention advocacy, the way ‘finding funding’ was discussed by interview 
participants, how children are accounted for in cost benefit analyses and 
government requirements for cost benefit analyses. 
Finding money for child injury prevention projects and programmes was an 
important and challenging issue for interview participants34. They discussed 
seeking funds from within their organisations and other sources for a range 
of reasons that included the purchase of safety equipment, creation of 
educational resources and to host workshops and community meetings. 
Participants described seeking funding for child injury prevention as a 
struggle. This was reflected in Steffi’s comment;   
“In a lot of ways Plunket does have a lot of wonderful things going on, but 
it is very hard to get money for (injury prevention) things. Not only is it 
                                                          
34 The terms ‘project’ and ‘programme’ are used (often interchangeably) to describe different but 
similar activities. A project is usually considered of shorter duration and includes a limited scope. 
A programme is usually a government commitment an activity of a longer duration, involves a 
wider scope of actions and includes more participating groups and individuals.  
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hard to get people internally to raise the need for it, but also then to go out 
there and find it is increasingly difficult. Steffi (NGO) 
Theme – Finding money for child safety 
Funding for child safety was a recurring theme throughout research 
interviews. Some interview participants shared their experiences about 
allocating funding while others shared their perspective of individuals 
applying for funding. Comments were also made about how funds were 
accounted for the constraints of inadequate funding and the impact of 
having no funding for child safety projects. It was notable, given recent 
government emphases on cost benefit analyses that there were few 
comments about this by participants, with only one speculative comment by 
one participant who worked outside the public service.  
Organisations most acknowledged as providing funds for child injury 
prevention programmes were the Ministry of Health and ACC. This was 
stressed even for projects delivered by local government agencies. One 
local government manager Maau, identified support for injury prevention 
was provided by the Ministry of Health:  
“First, the (Local Government) budget for injury prevention isn’t funded 
from rates, it is funded from the Ministry of Health, and there is rates 
funding that does support the injury prevention work, I am sure, but 
predominantly what we do within our team for injury prevention is 
Ministry of Health funded.” Maau (Local Govt.)  
Steffi commented on financial support provided by ACC.  
“ACC has been a really good provider of pockets of money at times. They 
provided things like a stair gate project, we had also change mats which 
had a falls prevention message on them that we gave out to families 
through the Plunket nurses.” Steffi (NGO) 
Discretionary funding was available from departmental budgets which 
Ministry staff could allocate without reference to politicians. 
 111 
 
“There was a good deal of flexibility around how you spent discretionary 
dollars in my period as a Public Health Planner and Funder. It wouldn’t 
be the case now, but most years you’d have around about between one and 
two million (dollars) discretionary funding available.”  
Beth (Central Govt.) 
Beth recalled her discretionary budget provided funding for the Injury 
Prevention Network of Aotearoa New Zealand (IPNANZ), which became a 
long-standing programme (until closed in 2016) that provided networking 
and support for the New Zealand injury prevention workforce.  
The way funds are allocated to programmes is important ‘insider 
knowledge’. Beth also described how during her time working within the 
Ministry of Health opportunities were taken for providing funding to injury 
programmes, especially noting the value of having, at that time, substantial 
flexibility and discretion:  
"The money we got from that year when it (injury prevention) was the top 
priority was used to initiate a range of programmes that are still going. It 
was how IPNANZ got its first funding... It was also the money we used to 
extend the community injury prevention pilots. So how that was spent 
depended on processes within the HFA (Health Funding Authority) and 
RHA (Regional Health Authority) or within the Ministry, and to who was 
successful within funding teams around getting money."  
Beth (Central Govt.) 
Factors external to government also impact on the availability of funding. 
William noted how the availability of all government funding for projects 
changed after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007, which was 
described as ‘the squeeze’:  
“But of course, it was also a period when there was more money around 
and there were new initiatives, whereas when I got onto the Ministry of 
Health in 2007 was bad timing on my part, ‘the squeeze’ came on.” 
William (Central Govt.) 
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Rick also noted the response of government to the 2007 GFC from the 
perspective of someone in a political role; 
"Ministers have given the Chief Executives a very stern view of their 
baselines, and so the Chief executives in turn have to turn the screws 
everywhere they look. So, it’s not the Ministers that decide that discretion 
it will be the Chief Executives, but the Chief executives have a clear 
direction that there is no more money." Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Research participants noted child safety projects were sometimes 
supported through funds and resources being ‘cobbled together’ by multiple 
groups. Whenever ‘the squeeze’ became evident, discretion was reduced, 
and projects were retrenched or stopped.  
“...we had a deal with ACC, police, MSD and Health, all putting some 
money in (for this project). But then when the squeeze come on all of our 
budgets. We all started to draw back and say, well I can only fund what I 
am mandated to fund, I can’t find extra money for something like this. So it 
wasn’t because any of the players thought this was a waste of money, it 
was because we were not mandated to do it.”  William (Central Govt.) 
Resources for child injury prevention projects were sometimes provided 
generously, sometimes in a constrained manner, sometimes as money and 
sometimes as resources. Sione recounted her experience of funding 
constraint during the promotion of one project; 
“Stakeholders said that they wanted it, but when it came down to 
supporting it, nobody had any capacity to do anything extra. There was no 
funding to do anything extra, there was no time, people did not have time 
in their roles to do anything extra, and so it was, what was it, really just 
repackaging what was already existing” Sione (Crown Entity) 
The attiudes of politicans to the funding of projects was noted as important. 
In another situation within local government, Salesi noted that when they 
were applying to Council committees for funding, the responses of elected 
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members to the proposals gave a clear indication as to whether or not funds 
would be forthcoming:  
“...if you were very quickly attacked, personally, by people who didn’t 
agree, then you knew straight away then there was no way that we were 
going to get funding.”  
Salesi (NGO) 
Another interview participant Robert, noted the importance of the ideological 
orientation of political leadership in regard to government expenditure, and 
the implication of this for child injury prevention funding in the future.  
“So, what does the future hold? I think with a centre right government we 
are very unlikely to see much more movement on any environmental 
change that is likely to cost money” Robert (Central Govt.) 
Interview participants did not comment directly about cost benefit analyses 
of programmes, so it might be assumed this was not at the forefront of 
consideration about programme delivery. Only one participant commented 
about economic issues, to wonder about work carried out on the economics 
of child injury prevention:  
“I don’t know if anyone has ever done anything around thinking about 
injury economically, if we know how many hours are lost through injuries, 
but sometimes people are not connecting that to what’s that doing within 
local government in terms of the economy of that community. Not that I 
want to put a monetary value around this to prompt people to have to do 
something about child injury, but I think sometimes you have to find ways 
to approach it differently than we have perhaps in the past.”  
Leilani (Local Govt.)  
The apparent lack of discourse about the cost effectiveness of child injury 
prevention programmes in relation to everyday programme development 
and funding (i.e. outside of academic injury prevention literature) may be 
due to the complex and changing way society views the value of children.  
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Social value of children 
Injury prevention literature promotes positive ‘cost benefit’ outcomes of 
injury prevention programmes (MacKay et al., 2006). The major premise for 
this approach is that policy makers will invest in prevention measures that 
are shown to be both effective and provide a return on investment. This 
masks a stark truth, it presumes governments and political leaders require 
it to be demonstrated that it is less expensive to save the lives of children, 
than to let them come to harm (Friedlaender & Winston, 2004; MacKay et 
al., 2006).  
The question of ‘what value we place on children’ underlies cost benefit 
discussions. Ambivalence toward children is an everyday phenomenon. 
Some adults will risk their lives to save a child (Hannan, 2012; Strongman, 
2014) while others require support to provide children in their care with basic 
essentials and a safe environment (Dubowitz, Feigelman, Lane, & Kim, 
2009). This ambivalence creates challenges for applying cost benefit 
analyses to establish the level of investment required for protecting children 
from injury (Leung & Guria, 2006).  
Jivin noted that whether child injury prevention programmes received 
funding or support appeared to be dependent upon the availability of money 
and the personal and political philosophies of those who allocate it:  
“The objections (about funding injury prevention) have nothing to do with 
the science; the objections have got to do with personal and political 
philosophy; and money.” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
In her influential book “Pricing the Priceless Child” Viviana Zelizer traces 
how American attitudes towards the value of children changed from 
considering them as workers within families, to regarding them as family 
members whose care had moral implications for all of society. Zelizer traced 
the development of road safety measures in the USA during the 1920s. 
These measures were developed in response to widespread public outcry 
against children being killed or injured by cars while they played on the 
streets. Zelizer followed American society’s changing responses and 
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demonstrated the emergence of strongly held public opinion that 
preventable child pedestrian injury was unacceptable, and even morally 
undesirable.  
“The statistical magnitude of the problem, well publicised by safety 
groups, now became compounded by the social ‘discovery’ of its 
moral significance” (Zelizer, 2012).  
Compulsory education of American children was also hotly debated at the 
time it was introduced, Zelizer explains, primarily because of the view that 
children are better off when considered for their earning capacity and as 
useful contributors to household economies. The opposing debate argues 
it is more socially beneficial for children to be kept apart from the economic 
disciplines and realities of the adult workforce and educated as an 
investment in the future of society. Compulsory education and the idea of 
children as a social investment prevailed which, Zelizer points out, lead to 
the ‘sentimentalisation’ of children where they are perceived as 
“economically worthless” but “emotionally priceless” members of society 
(Zelizer, 1985, p. 3).  
Criticisms of the work were that, while Zelizer describes this significant 
social change in attitudes, she does not adequately provide a reason for 
these changed attitudes or sufficiently explore the impact of this ambiguity 
and the opposing points of view (Postman, 1985). Zelizer’s work however 
led to a sociological focus on childhood consumerism and has subsequently 
generated sociological work on the economic costs of parenthood and child 
welfare benefits (Zelizer, 2012).  
An often-overlooked implication of Zelizer’s work is how the ‘value’ of 
children should be ‘accounted for’ within government policy. There is very 
little work on how this accounting should be calculated and measured. The 
absence might reflect the changing ways society values children combined 
with the discourse that positivist cost benefit analyses are ‘value free’ tools 
that should be used by government agencies to determine the allocation of 
resources and that is it too challenging to shift focus and attempt to include 
‘values’ factors into such equations (The Treasury, 2015).  
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Cost benefit and child safety interventions 
Measuring the value of human life for policy and resource allocation 
purposes has become established as expected practice for policy 
development. Government departments are expected to use cost benefit 
analyses for assessing programmes and submitting funding applications. 
Business cases are required for road safety funding applications to the New 
Zealand National Road funding programmes and include economic tools 
such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QUALYs); Disability Adjusted Life 
Years (DALYs), Value of Statistical Life (VoSL) and Net Present Value 
(NPV) (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2015).35  
Problems emerge when attempting to ‘prove’ injury prevention interventions 
are cost effective. There is scarcity and variation of economic evaluation of 
injury prevention programmes, with a systematic review in 2012 suggesting 
greater harmonization and rigor in injury prevention economic evaluations 
was urgently required (Polinder et al., 2012). Issues also arise when the 
nature of the programme makes it difficult to demonstrate economic benefit. 
It is difficult to relate to the provision of swimming lessons to drowning 
reduction in a population, for example. Enjoying water environments is part 
of healthy activity and knowing how to swim is lifesaving in some 
circumstances, in other circumstances swimming in the context of an 
inadequate assessment of an environmental danger (such as swimming at 
an unpatrolled surf beach) increases the risk of drowning (Wallis et al., 
2014).  
The first ‘World Report on Child Injury’ published by the World Health 
Organisation in 2008 dealt directly with the issue of cost-benefit and child 
injury prevention by confidently drawing attention to the economic benefit 
that can be achieved through preventing child injuries. “The cost-
                                                          
35 Expenditure on NZ’s National Land Transport Programme (NLTP) is guided by the Minister’s 
policy statement and an analytical framework that includes safety; however, business cases with 
cost benefit analyses are an increasingly important requirement for funding applications. The ways 
projects are evaluated, and the tools that are used for this evaluation change from time to time so 
individuals applying for funding must regularly be updated on the most recent economic measures 
and ways of presenting business cases for their applications.  
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effectiveness of some child injury prevention strategies has been found to 
be at least equal to that of other well-accepted strategies to prevent 
childhood illnesses” (Peden et al., 2008, p. 150).  
However, cost benefit analyses are not as simple and formulaic as they 
appear. Ongoing problems exist. One difficulty lies within the 
methodological basis of these estimations. The Value of Statistical Life 
(VoSL) measure widely used in road safety is based on what adults would 
pay to save the life of an adult, for example. A 2006 Leung and Guria study 
evaluated this method for estimating a social value of children and 
concluded that: 
“It is often argued that the values for children may be higher than that 
for adults because parents are usually more concerned about the 
mortality and morbidity risks of their children than for themselves. 
However, it is not an easy task to determine separate VOSLs for 
children and adults. Only a few empirical results are available, and 
they do not show a definite pattern… (in this study…) no definite 
conclusion could be drawn” (p. 1208).  
Leung and Guria make it clear the tools for cost assessments and business 
cases are underdeveloped and imperfect for assessing expenditure for the 
health benefit of children. 
The inadequacy of cost benefit calculations for children has an ongoing 
impact for child safety policy and programmes. Leung and Guria also note 
that: 
“Modern transport patterns pose a significant threat to children in 
terms of road safety, health and environmental risks. To enable 
appropriate transport decision making to address children’s needs, it 
is therefore desirable to have specific cost and value measures of 
health and safety impacts for children. Significant differences in the 
VOSL for children and adults would strongly influence transportation 
policy developments such as regulations and enforcement 
concerning child restraints and other safety issues related to school 
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bus and school patrol, etc. A higher value for children would result in 
a higher funding priority for safety projects/programmes that focus on 
children” (Leung & Guria, 2006, p. 1208).  
Other economists simply refer to the difficulty of considering ‘discount rates’ 
when the period under consideration extends many years into the future and 
note that for this reason alone, children’s interests cannot easily fit into 
standard government policy cost benefit calculations. Given the debate 
about the relevance and integrity of attempting to attribute ‘cost’ to the life 
of a child, the Injury Prevention Strategy Secretariat (IPS) strongly 
recommended more research and further debate in the prioritization of injury 
prevention services for children (Wren & Barrell, 2010).  
Challenges prioritising children 
Global Burden of Disease studies of injury are primarily about the 
economics of injury prevention. They emphasize the economic benefit of 
saving lives against the less expensive prevention interventions and were 
written to provide an advocacy platform for increased government 
investment in injury prevention measures. This evidence-based, 
multidisciplinary scientific and economic approach is credited with achieving 
huge gains in government investment and reducing human suffering on 
global levels (Haagsma et al., 2015; Spicer & Vallmuur, 2015). These 
studies have also helped mobilize philanthropic funding for life saving 
projects, such as the Bloomberg Initiatives for Global Road Safety (2015 to 
2019) that provide safety programmes at local, national and international 
levels (Bloomberg Philanthropes, 2015; The Treasury, 2015).  
In contrast to the many studies describing adult epidemiology, few Global 
Burden of Disease studies have been published for younger age groups. 
The first was published in 2011. The authors of this report noted an inherent 
bias against children, based on age; “The health of young people has been 
largely neglected (in burden of disease studies) because this age group is 
perceived to be healthy” (Gore et al., 2011, p. 2093).   
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The call for measures to improve road safety for both children and adults 
provided the impetus for the development of both scientific research and 
institutions such as the American National Highways Traffic Safety Authority 
(NHTSA). One of the hallmarks of road safety research has been the 
systematic collection of large amounts of data and their careful analysis and 
application to prevent avoidable trauma and to save lives. This focus on 
measuring the numbers of crashes and their characteristics has been a 
feature of global initiatives for road safety (McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 
2004; The Editor: The Lancet, 2011).  
In the early 1990s Roberts and Coggan (1994) examined the official 
description of a road crash event, proposing the use of language in the 
reports illustrated the unequal status of children against economic interests. 
The authors noted that at each stage of the investigation the incident was 
attributed to the child's behaviour, while other factors, such as vehicle 
speed, road engineering, the need for the child to cross the road at that 
location and the absence of a safe crossing place were ignored.36 
"The case presented illustrates how responsibility is located with the 
child, whilst structural contributors, in particular aspects of the 
transport system, are ignored. The strength and pervasiveness of the 
ideology of victim blaming in child pedestrian injuries is explained by 
the special position that the road transport system holds in relation to 
dominant economic interests. Victim blaming ideology is a strategy 
that serves to maintain these interests at the expense and suffering 
of children" (Roberts & Coggan, 1994). 
Government transport agencies have a responsibility to uphold the 
government’s strategic commitment to safety when building roads (Ministry 
of Transport, 2010). At the same time economic benefit must be considered 
                                                          
36 The injury prevention community completely reject ‘Victim blaming’ as a response to the 
occurrence of injury. For example, the Government's Road Safety 2020 Strategy incorporates the 
'Safe System' approach. This approach accepts the fallibility of human decision making and 
requires road engineering to incorporate margins that protect individuals against fatal outcomes 
from driving errors or 'mistakes'. The policy has a tag line that asserts "People make mistakes" 
See:  www.saferjourneys.govt.nz/about-safer-journeys/the-safe-system-approach accessed 
11/08/2017   
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when they apply for road safety project funding. These agencies must 
include business cases that consider costs and benefits. Projects that do 
not demonstrate a positive financial outcome in their applications are less 
likely to be funded (NZ Transport Agency, 2016). This causes difficulties 
when local communities seek funding for projects where, while the situation 
may expose children to danger, the cost benefit case is not easily arguable, 
such as building a road-bridge so children can avoid crossing a busy road 
(Cousins, 2017).  
Even when funding is not required, difficulties between local and national 
priorities can emerge. In June 2008 a Tauranga schoolgirl was killed by a 
truck as she waited to cross a major road by the main entrance to her 
school. The persistently high speed of vehicles using this road as a major 
highway was identified as a contributing factor and the Council and local 
community sought to reduce the speed limit to avoid future tragedies. The 
move was opposed from an unexpected quarter: NZTA made a submission 
to the Council opposing any lowering of the traffic speed because, they 
argued, the road provided an important access from the port to the national 
road network. This was an unstated, but inferred argument that a reduction 
in speed would result in negative economic impact for businesses (Radio 
New Zealand, 2008). In October 2008 Tauranga City Council passed a 
resolution that reduced the speed limit outside this school to the usual 
suburban limit, rather than leaving it at the faster open highway speed. In 
this case the local Council, supported by active advocacy from the 
community, considered the implementation of a safety measure as the over-
riding priority and implemented the changes (Tauranga City Council, 2008). 
However the issue was hotly debated between the agencies and became 
so contentious that the local Member of Parliament raised the issue in the 
House to champion the local Council’s position (New Zealand House of 
Parliament, 2008).  
The value of measures for preventing child death has also been questioned 
at senior levels within government. In 2013 the Minister for Building and 
Housing released a consultation document on the Fencing of Swimming 
Pools Act (1987). The Minister’s foreword invited the public to: 
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“Please ask yourself whether the Ministry’s proposals strike an 
acceptable balance between protecting young children from 
drowning and the practicality of the rules for pool owners and 
councils” (Williamson, 2013c, p. 2).  
The Minister was appealing to the wider community to weigh the 
‘practicality’ (cost) of ‘protecting young children’ (preventing children from 
drowning) against the compliance costs of fencing spa and home swimming 
pools yet to be purchased or built (2013b).  
In 2015 a Bill was tabled in the House and referred to the relevant Select 
Committee for public consultation (New Zealand Government, 2015a). Most 
submitters (115 of 183 submissions) rejected the proposed legislation, the 
Bill needed to be significantly redrafted to improve child safety. Despite 
objection in 2016 the legislation was passed, largely as tabled (New 
Zealand House of Parliament, 2015). 
Cost benefit analyses that use statistical methodology alone have been 
tabled in local Government meetings. Hamilton City Council faced a 
planning question of which should be preferred, permitting the location of 
garages on street frontages in areas of special significance thereby 
reducing the risk of a small child being driven over when on a driveway or 
prohibiting the location of garages on street frontages, potentially increasing 
the risk of a driveway run-over. An engineering company was contracted to 
advise the Planning Commissioners on an appropriate balance between the 
aesthetics of open street frontages as opposed to imposing measures which 
would separate children from places vehicles move (especially driveways) 
to ensure their safety. The report calculated risk according to the numbers 
of people in the affected population, the national incidence of child fatalities 
from driveway run-overs and the likelihood of a child being killed in a local 
driveway. The resulting formula identified that although the risk of a child 
being driven over would be increased with aesthetics being accommodated, 
it was estimated as a sufficiently small increase as not to warrant being 
taken into account (Gray Consulting Engineering Ltd, 2013). The 
recommendation to ignore an acknowledged increase of risk is strongly 
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challenged here. Death is an irretrievable consequence. This report 
measures a child’s death (and its wider impacts) against the value of 
subjectively assessed street frontage aesthetics, which can be changed. 
The second premise challenged is that it is justifiable to increase the risk of 
a child’s death if it is only by ‘a very small amount’. This belies the 
uncertainties of the probability calculations used. These identify a young 
child’s death will occur in a driveway (and will be more likely to occur) but 
does not (and cannot) predict to whom or exactly when. Third, the report’s 
recommendation implies it is acceptable for local government Planning 
Commissioners to knowingly increase the risk of a child’s death in a 
driveway (if it is by a small amount) but it does not specify who agrees they 
may, nor the exact amount of increased risk that is acceptable. The next 
section discusses a United Kingdom proposal of a community panel 
determining such issues, rather than individuals.  
Other approaches 
Cost benefit analysis is a powerful public policy tool for determining the best 
use of resources and can provide substantial benefits. At the same time, 
inconsistencies and difficulties in measuring value as well as social attitudes 
to saving lives (for all ages, especially children) have been identified. These 
need to be acknowledged and addressed if best practice is to be delivered 
within the public service (Guria & Leung, 2003; Leung & Guria, 2006). 
New Zealand government agencies have been considering establishing 
guidance for expenditure on child injury prevention projects. In a 2010 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) report on cost benefit 
estimations for policy, the authors recommended that future cost benefit 
studies aimed at informing national injury prevention policy should use a 
standardised approach; that government undertake a new study to update 
the official transport sector VoSL and “should robustly explore the extent to 
which New Zealanders place different values upon preventing fatalities and 
serious injuries” (Wren & Barrell, 2010). Treasury Guidance published in 
2015 notes that: 
 123 
 
“measuring costs and a benefit in money terms … (ignores) … the 
fact that money itself is worth more to some people than to others. 
Such ’equity issues’ are difficult for CBA (Cost Benefit Analyses) to 
take into account, but does not mean they should be ignored and the 
guide recommends that equity or distributional consequences of 
decisions should be drawn to the attention of decision makers” (The 
Treasury, 2015, p. 7).  
Children, it is argued are one such ‘equity issue’ because they are valued 
more by some than others, but when these issues are to the fore or noted 
as potentially difficult, New Zealand Government Treasury advice seems 
simply to be (in other words) just ‘ask the Minister’ (The Treasury, 2015).37 
The issues of differing perspectives have been faced in other government 
domains. Ethical issues have become more prominent in decision making 
and actions for medical and related fields of research. Ethical Boards and 
Panels that assess the impact and acceptability of research may provide 
models where independent, informed and dispassionate members of the 
community are able to provide input. The United Kingdom National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is an independent organisation responsible 
for providing national advice (guidance) for clinical treatments and public 
health measures. In 2008 NICE published a paper entitled “Social Value 
Judgments – Principles for the development of NICE Guidance” (National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 2008). This document 
was developed through consultation with a thirty member ‘Citizen Council’ 
who state “Judgments (about guidance) are of two types: scientific value 
judgments are about interpreting the quality and significance of the evidence 
available; social value judgments relate to society rather than science’ 
(2008, p. 4). Social value judgments, it is suggested, are those decisions 
that require consideration of social values and should be made based on 
common understanding and agreement of the Council. Despite this solution, 
                                                          
37 This underlines interview participant data from the chapter on ‘Power’, where the participant 
stated “…just how important these Ministers are…” with the participant stressing how each 
Minister’s personal experiences and preferences will influence policy.  See page 61 for the quote 
and discussion.  
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child injury prevention practitioners argue for the presentation of positive 
cost benefit assessments for child injury prevention interventions. The 
World Report states: 
“Well-targeted financial investments can reduce child injuries and 
deaths considerably. Assessing the costs against the benefits of 
specific interventions and setting priorities accordingly is important 
for all countries” (Peden et al., 2008, p. 153). 
Conclusion 
Securing funding and resources to advance child injury prevention is 
discussed in terms of benefits over cost and the exercise of power. Children 
are difficult to account for in cost benefit models and priorities and attitudes 
to expenditure on children can come into play. Interview participants 
provided examples where both insider obstruction and commitment 
occurred and how these impacted upon child injury prevention projects and 
programmes.   
It was also evident within the interview data that groups and organisations 
working together to promote child injury prevention can alleviate funding 
shortfalls for each other and provide opportunities that otherwise were not 
available. This leads us to the next theme, collaboration.  
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CHAPTER 5: COLLABORATION 
“Individually we could not have made any difference at all, but collectively 
we could” Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Collaboration emerged as a major theme throughout the research data. 
Interview participants discussed the importance of working together and 
provided numerous examples of how individuals, groups and agencies 
successfully collaborated to achieve better child safety outcomes. 
Collaborative activities can be undertaken within and between government 
agencies, and between government agencies and non-government 
agencies, between voluntary organisations and individual members of the 
public. Collaboration might include sharing information and resources, the 
joint development of guidance documents and public messages, the aligned 
and co-ordinated delivery of programmes and projects, joint funding of 
projects and programmes and organisations and groups operating with 
sustained interdependent alliances to achieve shared goals. 
Collaboration is defined in various ways, but most consistently as 
engagement by an agency, group or individuals with others to jointly 
participate in activities. Some definitions of collaboration focus on the need 
to collaborate to achieve challenging outcomes:  
“...collaboration (is) the process of facilitating and operating in multi-
organisational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved 
or easily solved by single organisations (Agranoff and McGuire 2003) 
and (it is important to) add that collaboration can include the public” 
(O'Leary, 2016, p. 7). 
This definition identifies collaboration as a means to overcome difficulty. 
Other definitions of ‘collaboration’ include a wide range of circumstances 
and interactions. Research into collaboration within political and policy 
literature has identified important preconditions for collaboration, including 
community readiness, organisational capacity, supportive strategy and the 
presence of adequate resources (Wolff, 2001). One systematic review of 
twenty-six studies (published from 1980 to 2004) identified fifty-five pre-
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factors important for the success of collaborative activities (Zakocs & 
Edwards, 2006). Other studies link collaborative behaviour and 
programmes with a range of related concepts such as network theory 
(Erakovich, Sipovac, Hart, & Anderson, 2013; Greenaway, Salter, & Hart, 
2007), community partnerships (Finch et al., 2016; Larner & Craig, 2005), 
advocacy coalitions (Weible et al., 2011), and collective impact (Kania & 
Kramer, 2011).  
Kania and Kramer (2011) identify five different types of organisational 
collaborations from simple and loose arrangements to those which are 
complex and long standing. The first type of collaboration simply involves 
information sharing and is when organisations operate or participate in 
social sector networks. Next are multi-stakeholder initiatives where 
organisations and groups individually participate in activities that have a 
common theme or shared overall goal. Funder Collaboratives and Public-
Private Partnerships are examples of types of collaborations where 
agencies, organisations or private companies pool resources, commit 
finances and establish joint contractual arrangements. They primarily differ 
in their degree of contractual and organisational formality, with 
collaboratives being more informal. 
Finally, collective impact initiatives are long term commitments to a common 
agenda by important actors from different sectors. They are supported by ‘a 
shared measurement system, mutually reinforcing activities, and ongoing 
communication, and are staffed by an independent backbone organisation’ 
(Kania & Kramer, 2011, p. 39).  
Injury prevention advocates and researchers have a long history of 
promoting collaboration and injury prevention literature actively promotes 
collaboration, even if goals might be achieved by an organisation or group 
working alone. Collaboration is presented as normative, as the 'better way' 
to behave (Himmelman, 1996; Kania & Kramer, 2011; MacKay & Vincenten, 
2010; Office of Controller and Auditor-General, 2003; Peden et al., 2008; 
Wolff, 2001). 
 127 
 
The use of a collaborative rather than a competitive approach to funding 
and delivering projects is consistent with World Health Organisation (WHO) 
advice to United Nations Member States on how to promote injury 
prevention policy and programmes within their jurisdictions: 
“While violence and injury prevention are not minor or easy 
undertakings, with good collaboration and systematic effort, even this 
oldest of human afflictions can be prevented”  
(World Health Organisation (WHO), 2007, p. 4).  
Similar advice was repeated within the World Report on Child Injury 
Prevention (2008):  
“It is important to have long-term strategies, effective and focused 
leadership, collaboration between a range of agencies, appropriate 
targeting and sufficient time to develop local networks and 
programmes” (Peden et al., 2008, p. 18). 
Interview participants identified many New Zealand organisations involved 
in collaborative activities to promote child injury prevention. Benefits of 
collaborative practices were emphasised by participants who held senior 
roles planning and funding programmes as well as those who delivered 
resources directly to communities. Organisations promoting and 
participating in collaborative activity include the Ministry of Health and other 
central government agencies (Ministry of Transport, the New Zealand 
Transport Agency and New Zealand Police), crown entities (Accident 
Compensation Corporation, Housing New Zealand), local government (City 
and District Councils), non-government agencies (Royal New Zealand 
Plunket Society) and numerous companies and community groups. 
Collaboration was viewed as a goal to be strived for, an ideal practice to be 
achieved in all levels of organisations and across all sectors of the 
community.  
“Child injury prevention is going to be so much better when there is 
collaboration, horizontally and also vertically; when people who are 
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making the decisions, and writing the strategies are collaborating with 
each other and in touch with people delivering at ground level, but also 
across agencies and across sectors as well. There has to be 
collaboration.” Sione (Crown Entity) 
Communicating with other prevention practitioners (getting everyone 
together) was viewed as an important step for establishing collaborative 
programmes. In 2009 Gay Richards, a librarian based in the University of 
Auckland Injury Prevention Research Centre developed an on-line ‘E-
Directory’ compilation of over 400 individuals and organisations working in 
the New Zealand injury prevention sector. This was freely circulated to 
assist injury prevention practitioners to contact each other and create 
collaborative networks. The directory was updated six monthly, though 
routine updates were discontinued in 2010 following a University restructure 
(Injury Prevention Information Center, 2009). One child safety practitioner 
described the importance of 'getting people together' to plan projects. 
“When you get all the people around the table all agreeing and wanting to 
be around the table for the best possible reasons, then you get success.” 
Salesi (NGO) 
However, collaboration was also described as more complex than simply 
sharing ideas and agreeing. Interview participants consistently talked about 
collaboration in the context of providing products (such as car seats), 
promoting safety messages (the need to wear buoyancy aids) and achieving 
other outcomes such as raising awareness and providing information. 
Projects could have greater impact, reach more people and be more likely 
to be successful through collaboration. Collaboration was undertaken in 
order to achieve something that was needed and was acknowledged as the 
most effective way to have a positive impact beyond the scope of a single 
group and their resources (State Services Commission, 2014).  
“Both the ‘car seats’ and ‘safe sleep’ programmes are collaborative 
ventures by their very nature and really depend upon that local sector 
collaboration for their success. So in car seat rental you have a 
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partnership between Midwifery, Tamariki Ora and Police, so you have 
that mix of clinical and community collaboration, for example ensuring all 
infants leaving a delivery suite must leave in an accredited car seat, and 
engagement with enforcement too makes that much more powerful.”  
William (Central Govt.) 
Collaboration subthemes 
Interview participants identified ‘prerequisites’ or ‘preconditions’ they 
considered must be present if collaborative activities to promote child safety 
are to be successful. Preconditions for successful collaboration in the New 
Zealand can be categorised under the following headings:  
• Backbone organisations who undertake brokering  
• Groups that can move from a social network to organisation  
• The presence of contracts that require collaboration 
• Collaborative funding – where groups contribute funding for the same 
purpose or project 
• An operational model that requires/promotes collaborative behaviour  
• Leadership that promotes collaboration 
Interview participants also discussed situations where collaborative projects 
or activities were attempted but unsuccessful. Situations or factors 
contributing to failure included: 
• Competitiveness: unclear boundaries and conflicting 
responsibilities, 
• When alignment between objectives, funding and longevity is 
inadequate, 
• Lack of fidelity to process – when agreed processes are 
abandoned. 
Despite these pitfalls, interview data were rich with examples of successful 
collaborative child injury prevention projects that delivered beneficial 
outcomes for their communities.  
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Backbone and brokering organisations 
Kania and Kramer (2011) identify the need for the presence of ‘brokering' 
or backbone organisations in order for collaboration to be more likely to 
occur. These organisations support and promote collaboration and adopt a 
brokering or mentoring role between parties. Backbone organisations, say 
Kania and Kramer, are those that enable other organisations to collaborate 
with each other though providing funding and other support. Turner et al. 
(2012) looked at broker and backbone organisations identifying common 
activities and finding their value unmistakable. This role included playing a 
part in guiding vision and strategy; building public will; providing practical 
support, such as establishing shared measurement practices; and helping 
groups of organisations align their activities. Broker organisations were also 
involved in advancing the development of policy and mobilising funding 
(Turner et al., 2012, p. 3). 
Data from this research found several New Zealand child injury prevention 
organisations fit Kania and Kramer’s description of a backbone 
organisation. These include the Ministry of Health, ACC and the Safe 
Communities Foundation of New Zealand. While most local government 
agencies are supportive of collaboration it was stressed by interview 
participants that many programmes run by local councils are supported 
primarily by Ministry of Health funding (Coggan & Gabites, 2007).  One 
interview participant stressed:  
“...the (Council) budget for injury prevention isn’t funded from rates; it is 
funded from the Ministry of Health. There is rates funding that does 
support the injury prevention work, I am sure, but predominantly what we 
do within our team for injury prevention is Ministry of Health funded.”  
Maau (Local Govt.)  
Kania and Kramer’s research describes complexity within backbone 
organisations and collaborative projects but does not identify that backbone 
organisations can create other ‘backbone’ organisations, resulting in a 
cascade, or hierarchy of organisations (Kania & Kramer, 2013).  
 131 
 
The New Zealand Ministry of Health is described in this research as acting 
as a ‘backbone organisation’ for the establishment of other ‘backbone 
organisations’. The first example is the Ministry of Health’s work with ACC’s 
Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) secretariat. William described how the 
Ministry would regularly negotiate injury prevention contracts both with 
NZIPS and organisations delivering outcomes identified as important. 
These contracts covered a range of activities.38 
“It (the New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy) was another of those 
collaborations that ‘sort of worked’ and every year I had to re-negotiate 
those relationships with ACC and other parties with an interest in those 
areas” William (Central Govt.) 
Larner and Craig (2005) described the development of New Zealand’s local 
government into the role of a broker for the creation of community 
partnerships and social change. They observed brokering behaviour by 
local government across many activities, including injury prevention and 
suggest this is part of an inexorable process of government formalising (or 
attempting to formalise) social relationships and a professionalisation (and 
commercialism) of local activism. This process involves arrangements 
ranging from the signing of Memoranda of Understanding between 
community organisations, to the negotiation of contracts that mandate 
collaboration. Interview participants also noted the powerful brokering role 
Councils played at the community level. One interview participant shared 
the observation that councils act as brokers to enable other groups and 
community organisations to deliver child injury prevention projects. In his 
role as a senior council manager, Maau commented on Council’s brokering 
role in creating community partnerships, funded by the Ministry of Health:  
“….it would be good to highlight the role of Council as a ‘broker’ for 
community issues, community concerns and themes of community safety.  
...To be able to do that ‘brokering role’ is quite a powerful driver for 
change…” Maau (Local Govt.) 
                                                          
38 See Appendix 2 for the Ministry of Health table of contracts 
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From social network to organisation 
Organisational and community behaviour is often described as dynamic and 
Kania and Kramer also stress the importance of recognising collective, 
collaborative activity as a process: 
“It (collaborative activity) is the process that comes after the 
development of the common agenda in which solutions and 
resources are uncovered, agreed upon, and collectively taken up. 
Those solutions and resources are quite often not known in advance. 
They are typically emergent, arising over time through collective 
vigilance, learning, and action that result from careful structuring of 
the effort...” (Kania & Kramer, 2013, pp. 11-14) 
This was demonstrated in an example where collaborative activity started 
primarily to share information (Kania and Kramer’s ‘Social Sector Network’) 
then evolved into the establishment of an organisation. Salesi explained 
how water safety projects based in Auckland were initially developed and 
delivered through the collaboration of local aquatic agencies coordinated 
and supported by the staff of Water Safety New Zealand’s Northern 
Regional Office. The agencies met together to jointly choose activities to 
support and then shared information and resources.  
 
“This group was set up in Auckland by Water Safety New Zealand’s 
Northern Office and consisted of all the aquatic organisations, Surf, 
Coast Guard, us, we (also) had the College of Education and ...people 
from the Primary School... we met quarterly and everyone put on the 
table what they were doing, and we would all comment and have a chat 
about what was happening...” Salesi (NGO) 
 
When Water Safety New Zealand’s Wellington based Head Office closed 
their Northern, Auckland Office, the social network that had been 
established provided the opportunity for the formation of Watersafe 
Auckland Incorporated (WAI), an independent water safety organisation set 
up to deliver water safety education throughout the Auckland Region 
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(Drowning Prevention Auckland, 2018).39 WAI is recognised as an important 
water safety education provider and is funded through the Auckland 
Regional Amenities Funding Act (2008).  
 
The original group were a simple social network collaboration and when 
circumstances changed the group responded; creating what fits Kania and 
Kramer’s description of a collective impact initiative, where there was long-
term commitment by several organisations to achieve a common agenda 
Contracts that require collaboration 
Interview participants noted the New Zealand Ministry of Health’s 
commitment to providing contracts that promoted a collaborative model of 
injury prevention service delivery. This is consistent with the Ministry’s two 
consecutive New Zealand Health Strategies (Ministry of Health, 2000, 
2016b), both of which identify collaboration as a guiding principle for health 
promotion. Interview participants with local government experience were 
aware of the Ministry of Health’s strategic commitment for both injury 
prevention and collaborative action: 
“...so, in that sense we (the Council) are the vehicle for delivering the 
Ministry’s strategic decisions.” Maau (Local Govt.)  
The Ministry of Health’s commitment to contracting for collaboration pre-
dates the 2000 Health Strategy. In 1995 the Ministry (through what was 
known then as the Health Funding Agency) provided funding for the first 
Kidsafe Campaign.40 This campaign promoted and assisted community 
groups and organisations, government agencies and individuals to work 
together (Safekids New Zealand, 1995, 1996). A more recent (2007) 
                                                          
39 Water Safe Auckland (often referred to as WAI) remains as an important drowning prevention 
service provider, especially within the Auckland Region. It recently changed its name to Drowning 
Prevention Auckland.) 
40 The Kidsafe Campaign as it was initially called in 1996, was a week of awareness raising activities 
run by the Auckland District Health Board Safekids team, with the intention the project could 
operate as a standalone initiative that could be adopted as a national programme and hosted 
independently of the Auckland based service. This never occurred and the Safekids team continued 
to run the campaign. In 2006 the Safekids Ministry of Health contract was changed to enable the 
campaign to operate nationally, at the same time the name of the campaign was changed to the 
‘Safekids Campaign’ and it extended from one week to a yearlong focus (pers com.).  
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Ministry of Health contract with the Auckland District Health Board for the 
Safekids service specified both the development of a safety culture and 
collaboration as part of the contract service specification objectives. 
Contract objectives included the need for the service to ‘...encourage an 
increase in activity and collaboration on specific child unintentional injury 
issues, amongst those concerned with child injury prevention, both 
nationally and in New Zealand communities” and to “foster a positive safety 
culture in New Zealand’ (New Zealand Government, 2007). 
Safekids’ focus on collaboration has continued. In 2015 a sector newsletter 
published by Safekids (Safekids News) showcased the promotion of 
community based, collaborative activities like those undertaken in the 
1990s, where Safekids, working with community groups and organisations 
together, raised awareness of child injury issues. Safekids supported these 
activities by participating in events, providing resources and publicity, and 
also acting as a brokering organisation for the promotion of injury prevention 
within the community (Safekids Aotearoa, 2015c).  
Sione mentioned another Ministry of Health programme designed to 
promote collaboration between local government agencies, called the 
Auckland Regional Pedestrian Safety Strategy. This 2004 Ministry of Health 
contract required Safekids to facilitate collaboration between the Auckland 
Region’s Councils and central government agencies to reduce Auckland 
child pedestrian injury rates.  
“The (Safekids) Regional Pedestrian Safety Strategy was really around 
supporting collaboration between road safety and pedestrian safety 
(territorial authorities) stakeholders across the Auckland Region to make 
changes to improve safety for children.” Sione (Crown Entity) 
Sione continued to note the programme was challenging because of the 
absence of arrangements that would have enabled (or required) 
participating agencies to contribute: 
 
“...where the (Regional pedestrian safety) strategy fell down was that 
people (within their respective organisations) were volunteering their time 
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to it. They weren't under any contractual obligations to support the 
strategy.” Sione (Crown Entity) 
 
The Ministry of Health’s Auckland Regional Pedestrian Safety Strategy 
contract with Safekids stalled but this may also simply have been because 
it was ahead of its time. In 2005 the New Zealand State Services 
Commission released a guide for agencies working with local government:   
“It (the newly revised Local Government Act)... provides an 
opportunity to more effectively promote a social development 
approach through strengthening regional and local collaboration and 
undertaking joint initiatives to improve social outcomes, such as 
improved health and social connectedness...”  (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2005, p. 3).  
Interview participant data consistently noted that New Zealand’s Ministry of 
Health played a role in reducing child injury by both committing resources 
to reduce preventable injury and maintaining its ongoing commitment to 
provide contracts that promote and sustain collaborative, interagency child 
injury prevention programmes. 
Collaborative Funding 
Kania and Kramer describe funder collaboratives where groups of 
organisations join together to fund projects of programmes (2011, p. 39). 
Interview participants also described ‘collaborative funding arrangements’ 
where organisations accessed a number of different funding sources to 
deliver a single project. This included receiving funds from private 
businesses. Chaya provided an example of a falls prevention project, which 
was run by the Council and supported by the Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC) and local businesses. This type of arrangement fits 
Kania and Kramer’s (2011) description of a Public-Private Partnership. The 
project was developed by Council staff to be run over a period of months 
and then finish with a ‘prize draw’. The local Council (who were contracted 
by the Ministry of Health to run collaborative injury prevention projects) 
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provided staff, ACC provided safety resources and local businesses 
circulated the material and contributed items and money for prizes.   
“It was a city-wide programme, so you can understand it was pretty 
expensive. We had some really good sponsors and it was a collaborative 
kind of project with lots of local sponsors, local businesses coming on 
board for the prizes and also promoting safety at work and bits of safety 
equipment during the time that it ran. At that time, there was a significant 
amount of funding from ACC (Accident Compensation Corporation) as 
well...it was a very intense piece of work.”  Chaya (Local Govt.) 
In another example of both collaborative funding and public–private 
partnership was when a backbone organisation was created with funds 
provided by a group of government entities and private companies to 
establish Water Safe Auckland (WAI). Described earlier in this chapter WAI 
was established when a social network was able to access funding and 
establish themselves as a separate entity after their parent organisation 
withdrew support: 
“…. that’s when, five months later the Regional Council, the Harbour 
Master, pulled the group together and he said; how are we going to keep 
working? We will put fifty grand on the table. That was a lot of money all 
that time ago. Who else? The Boat Show, they put ten grand on the table 
and that was seeding money for letter heads and that sort of thing. The 
Manukau, Auckland and Waitakere and the Regional Councils actually 
came on board. Then Sport Auckland, who was based across the road 
here, they gave us an office, for peppercorn rental. Really, really cheap. 
They also organised a Task Force Green person to help.” Salesi (NGO) 
Agencies can beneficially interact by sharing resources, such as staff time. 
In one example a local Council working towards WHO (World Health 
Organisation) accreditation as a Safe Community had stalled due to lack of 
administration staff. Leilani was working to support the local government 
agency to achieve accreditation and described how she contacted a 
colleague in the NZ police and together they facilitated the secondment of 
a staff member to assist the small council complete the process, 
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demonstrating the value of informal networks between individuals and 
agencies. 
“I talked to the Area Commander up there who I know quite well and we 
were having a conversation about what the police could do (to help). Of 
course, it was the usual story for Police they do not have any money for 
anything. They are not a ‘funder’ organisation, but they seconded one of 
the staff across to Council to help them write the application.”  
Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Operating models that require collaboration 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s government agencies were 
increasingly funding injury prevention projects within communities and local 
government.  However, an over-arching, whole of government model that 
would enable organisations to commit to a collaborative approach to injury 
prevention projects was lacking. In 2003 the Minister for ACC released the 
New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) which was “a framework 
for the policy development and service delivery activities of government 
agencies and non-government organisations with an involvement in injury 
prevention” (New Zealand Government, 2003c, p. 1). NZIPS stressed the 
need for collaboration across government agencies, organisations and 
communities. 
Oversight of the Strategy was carried out by a Secretariat. One of the 
principles of the Injury Prevention Strategic framework was “Collective 
Action” described as “the active participation of regional and local 
government, community groups, iwi, businesses, families/whanau and 
individuals working in partnership with central government” (New Zealand 
Government, 2003c, p. 3).  
The Injury Prevention Strategy was prominent in both the health and safety 
sectors. Two interview participants referred directly to the Strategy while 
others acknowledged the provision of ACC funding for injury prevention 
projects and programmes without identifying whether this funding came 
from the Strategy or other budgets from within ACC.  
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The impact of the Safe Communities Foundation of New Zealand in 
promoting local government’s role in child safety and in developing 
collaborative projects was stressed. Leilani observed some territorial 
authorities have child safety included within their extensive, collaborative 
safety programmes:  
“Blenheim (Territorial Authority) has just been accredited (as a Safe 
Community by the WHO audit team). They have one hundred and sixty-
two (safety) projects.  A number of those will be around child injury.” 
Leilani (Local Govt.) 
She commented how working with communities in a collaborative way was 
effective across different cultures and countries, in this case the discussion 
was specifically about the Safe Communities model:  
“...my visits to China have shown me that that a model based around a set 
of criteria that has as its basis getting people together in partnerships for 
a common good, based on evidence, (the Safe Communities model) works.  
Wherever you are.  Yes, there will be slight differences because there are 
particular issues for each of those towns or cities or communities, but at 
the end of the day the basis is the same and it was exactly the same in 
China as it was in Australia, as it is in New Zealand.”  
Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Interview participants commented about how important it is to have 
collaboration between community groups and William and noted how the 
Stanford Collective Impact model was gaining importance as a method for 
promoting collaboration across central government agencies.  
“In terms of the Stanford Collective Impact model, I think understanding 
of that is growing, and collective impact is in some ways the “new black” 
in the Wellington Public Service. People are using the model across lots of 
areas of public service where social change is required. So, it is informing 
purchasing NGO (non-government organisation) services, through 
investing in services for outcomes, and through MSD (Ministry of Social 
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Development).  It is a model we will see a lot more of this year and next 
year.” William (Central Govt.) 
Collective Impact and collaboration were described as a new imperative in 
2015, yet it is evident from earlier interviews that collaboration was a long 
standing and well-established practice within the child injury prevention and 
health promotion sectors. 
Leadership that promotes collaboration 
During interviews many of the participants spoke about individuals who took 
leadership roles to promote collaboration and achieve the success of child 
injury prevention projects. Leadership, Levy (2004) noted, is ‘one of the 
most observed and least understood phenomena on earth’ (p. 11).   
Individuals who contributed to leadership for child injury prevention were not 
spontaneously identified by participants during interviews but were 
identified in response to prompting during the application of ‘snow balling’ 
methodology to recruit interview subjects. Participants also commented 
about how a wide range of individuals needed to support safety projects 
including politicians and employees working in local government, people 
working for non-government organisations and volunteers working in the 
community. The need to find and recruit individuals with the skills and 
commitment to set up collaborative, successful child safety projects 
resonated throughout the interviews.  
Maau highlighted the role of political leadership, and that within a territorial 
authority an elected representative can provide the drive for the adoption of 
injury prevention initiatives.   
“Where it’s (i.e. collaborative, community-based child injury prevention) 
got real strength is where you have a community leader who is passionate 
and clear and working alongside a political party or politician with 
similar concerns. That’s why a lot of our politicians work in the local 
area, because they are focussed on what they can do and how they can 
support their community.” Maau (Local Govt.) 
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Another interview participant, Beth noted the need for individuals to have 
skills in community development and collaboration.  
“You need people within local authorities with expertise about community 
development and then they can do health promotion.”  
Beth (Central Govt.) 
Individual contributions were acknowledged by interview participants, and 
examples were provided: 
 
“...it was a programme that had been run very successfully by the late 
Alan Parsons and Kidsafe Taranaki, the local child injury prevention 
coalition there. Alan Parsons was a real champion because the data 
showed poisoning was high, paracetamol was the most common agent, 
and he really drove the whole project and got funding to take it forward. 
Public Health was very involved, it ran well.”   
Sione (Crown Entity) 
Overall, interview participants impressed on the interviewer that 
collaboration and the collective action of aligned organisations and groups 
are critical to the field of child injury prevention. However, individuals were 
also readily identified as champions for child safety. Contrasted against the 
ethos of the importance of group action was the observation that an 
individual, especially one who works collaboratively, can make a difference.  
When collaboration stumbles: identifying challenges 
“...collaboration is one of those words that Governments like to use, and we 
all say yes, and believe in it, but actually doing it proves to be quite 
challenging…” William (Central Govt.) 
Collaboration, as a mechanism for delivering child injury prevention is 
challenging to implement and difficult to deliver and measure. At the same 
time, it is acknowledged as best practice for facilitating and achieving 
widespread support for the provision of effective child injury prevention 
programmes. The collaborative approach acknowledges the importance of 
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positivist research, while also emphasising and drawing upon the 
contribution of social science research (Hemenway, 2009).  
In 2014 the State Services Commission undertook an audit of collaborative 
initiatives within the public sector which identified 125 collaborative projects 
and activities occurring within the public sector at that time. Sixty-six of these 
were collaborative activities set up to deliver products or services, while the 
remainder were focussed on collaboration to deliver back office functions 
and document development. Although collaborative activities were 
supported in principle, the audit reported challenges in maintaining 
collaborative projects, including difficulties in managing funding contributed 
from different departments and challenges when collaborative projects, 
although considered worthwhile, did not easily fit departmental 
responsibilities and delivery targets. This conflict was also noted by 
Tenbensel in the health sector and Larner for community-based 
partnerships (Larner & Craig, 2005; State Services Commission, 2014; 
Tenbensel, Mays, & Cumming, 2011).  
Collaboration between organisations was described by interview 
participants as never certain due to a wide range of issues that included 
challenges in measuring success, lack of funds, competing interests and 
lack of fidelity. William had long term experience with Ministry of Health 
contracts and commented that while collaboration is recognised as an 
important approach for service delivery, achieving collaborative activities 
through the provision of public health contracts is not a simple task. While 
the Ministry may contract one party to adopt a collaborative approach, it 
cannot specify that other parties, particularly those with whom it has not 
contacted, will participate.  
“You can’t get one party to collaborate if the other one doesn’t want to...  
As they say, “it takes two to tango”. So the art of constructing and 
rewarding relationships, or incentivising relationship, that is the word we 
use these days, is really challenging. But it is a challenge worth 
pursuing.” William (Central Govt.) 
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Challenges measuring outcomes when contracts require shared 
responsibilities has been recognised by others as a potential stumbling 
block for collaborative projects (Scott & Boyd, 2016). Interview participants 
also reported that evaluation and measuring outcomes of collaboration can 
be difficult. William continued:  
“...in a lot of contracts, we have a requirement to collaborate and a 
requirement to co-ordinate and other things like this, but we are lousy at 
measuring those. We don’t know what performance measures to put on 
them.” William (Central Govt.) 
When collaborative projects impair the ability of an agency to deliver 
essential outputs or responsibilities they are usually stopped. One project, 
described by an interview participant, fell outside each individual agency’s 
primary responsibility and when there were reductions in available 
discretionary funding the agencies collectively withdrew funding.  
“...we had a deal with ACC (the Accident Compensation Corporation), 
police, MSD (Ministry of Social Development) and health, all putting some 
money in. But then when the squeeze come on all of our budgets we all 
started to draw back and say, well I can only fund what I am mandated to 
fund, I can’t find extra money for something like this. So, it wasn’t because 
any of the players thought this was a waste of money, it was because we 
were not mandated to do it.”  William (Central Govt.) 
Another interview participant, Jivin noted two agencies working in child 
injury prevention have similar mandates, raising questions as to how these 
two organisations should function.  
“I think there has historically been some debate between Plunket and 
Safekids around whose role is to do what. There has also always been a 
tension between Safekids as an Auckland or national organisation. There 
has been a tension around Plunket being focussed on under-fives then 
what is Safekids doing playing around in the under-five space. So Safekids 
should focus on the five upwards. Then there is the issue of their (Safekids) 
‘cut off point’.  Is it fifteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen or twenty-five? 
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You’ll get different answers depending on who you talk to. Some of these 
tensions have never been resolved.” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
When collaboration involves groups and agencies sharing information, it 
needs to be appropriately accessed and attributed. There is an expectation 
participating organisations will voluntarily adhere to agreed processes with 
fidelity. This is not always the case. Agreements collectively entered into 
need to be met, including process agreements. One project that was 
supposed to deliver a collaborative approach for teaching water safety 
across a large geographic area was never implemented due to failures in 
the process by the organisation tasked by the group with being the ‘broker’. 
One example was described by Salesi;  
“We had several meetings where we agreed all the things that should be in 
the plan, if we are going to develop anything it had to include ‘learn to 
swim’, ‘water safety education’ and ‘critical thinking’. These three things 
all have to be there...  Then we all were sent copies of what he developed, 
and he must have sent us five different versions, and of those five probably 
three were completely different from each other, a whole new approach...” 
Salesi (NGO) 
The result was those volunteering time and participating (in good faith) 
stopped attending because of uncertainty and lack of transparency. The 
attrition of participants led to the project being abandoned. 
“There were three meetings... everybody was at the first meeting; but only 
a small group was at the second meeting. Oh yes, that’s right, half the 
people who came to the second meeting were the operators who were 
going to be paid to deliver and do the project.  And the final document had 
nothing (in it) that was raised in the first meeting" Salesi (NGO) 
The abandonment of this project through the actions of one individual 
highlight the power of individuals to support and advance projects but also 
to sabotage and stop them.  
 144 
 
Realistic goals are also important. The effort to develop a child safety 
pedestrian strategy was described as having ‘fallen down’ because it was 
too ambitious, implying a more focussed project would have had more 
likelihood of succeeding. The next comment reflects the need for ensuring 
goals and objectives are consistent with resources and time available: 
“The Regional Strategy for Auckland was only supported by people and 
agencies delivering child pedestrian safety in an ad hoc fashion, so it was 
quite difficult to push it forward. Personally, I think it was a little over 
ambitious. There were thirteen objectives to try and achieve. It should 
have had a much narrower scope” Sione (Crown Entity) 
The need for longevity and continuity of programmes and funding is 
highlighted in the literature. In 2004 Towner systematically reviewed the 
literature for the most effective methods for promoting child injury prevention 
and concluded: 
“...important aspects of community based approaches are long term 
strategy, effective, focussed leadership, multiagency collaboration, 
involvement of the local community, appropriate targeting and time 
to develop a range of local networks and programmes” (Towner, 
Dowswell, Mackereth, & Jarvis, 2004). 
ACC was reported as having difficulty maintaining longevity in its projects, 
a factor viewed as a significant drawback for ACC’s effectiveness at 
establishing longer term collaborative partnerships. 
"...ACC flip-flops and don’t seem to be able to maintain a strategic 
direction for more than about six months. At some subsequent point they 
thought they would get into community projects they pulled them all after 
about nine months I think." Beth (Central Govt.) 
There is a propensity for collaborative projects to strike problems when 
mandated through contractual arrangements, yet interview participants did 
not identify, or discuss the presence of any government guidance about how 
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to collaborate, despite instruction to collaborate being included within State 
Services publications (Office of Controller and Auditor-General, 2003) 
Conclusion 
Collaboration has been at the heart of child injury prevention. This was 
underpinned by academic research supporting its effectiveness for 
achieving best possible outcomes. Recommendations for a collaborative 
approach to child injury prevention were made internationally. Collaboration 
was promoted in a purposeful way, as the preferred strategic approach 
within the sector and became a long-standing feature of injury prevention 
and child safety. Collaboration was evident within Ministry of Health 
contracting, in local government programmes and in the ‘hands-on’ delivery 
of community programmes. It also occurred across academic disciplines, 
organisations, community groups at all levels of governance, resource 
development and programme delivery (Coggan & Gabites, 2007; MacKay 
et al., 2006; Towner & Downswell, 2002).  
When agencies, community groups and individuals are encouraged to work 
together, more people are involved, resulting in the wider adoption of 
information and attitudes that promote the safety and well-being of children. 
Multiagency collaboration and engagement with local networks become an 
integral part of the safety culture approach to promoting child injury 
prevention.  
Collaboration is an important foundation for the development of a child 
safety culture, it is a strategy that engenders community and social 
commitment to promote the safety of children. Collaborative activity requires 
organisations, groups and individual to be aligned, seek to attain shared 
goals, set aside differences and maintain fidelity to their processes and 
agreements. When this happens, working together to keep children safe 
from preventable harm becomes hegemonic and the public discourse 
becomes that “this is the way things are done around here”.41  
                                                          
41The word ‘hegemony’ is usually used in a geopolitical context. First promoted by Italian 
sociologist, Antonio Gramsci, hegemony was used to identify and describe culturally dominant 
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ideologies (Finocchiaro, 2002). The term is used here to describe the more specific circumstance 
of a prevailing view about injury prevention and child safety.  
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CHAPTER 6: PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND 
SUPERVISION  
Woven throughout interviews were interview participants’ comments about 
how people spoke about safety and supervising children in public and 
private. These comments were made in less obvious (but no less 
compelling) ways than comments that were made about power and 
collaboration (MacKay et al., 2006; McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004).  
Public discourse about safety and ‘how to supervise children’ are complex 
and challenging issues for injury prevention. Furthermore, the sociological 
proposition of modernity as ‘risk society’ (with accompanying negative 
connotation), sits uneasily alongside positivist, public health analyses of the 
cause and effect relationships between belief, safety practices and 
preventable injury and death (Beck, 1992a; Mare & Papps, 2002; Soole, 
Lennon, & Haworth, 2011; Towner et al., 2004).42    
The normative interpretation of injury prevention is that all injury should be 
prevented when possible, and everyone should be able to live free from 
avoidable harm. This goal requires the participation and support of more 
than injury prevention academics and practitioners, and injury prevention is 
framed in ways that will facilitate wide social acceptance and the 
establishment of a safety culture. 
Safety Culture 
Safety culture refers to the presence of widespread community 
understanding and appreciation of the need for safety and measures to 
keep people safe (McClure, Stevenson, & McEvoy, 2004). This approach 
urges injury prevention academics and practitioners to use language and 
narrative (discourse) about injuries and their prevention that will resonate 
positively with decision makers and the wider community. In 2008 the 
                                                          
42 Sociology has traditionally been sceptical of using the ‘big data’ epidemiological approach (such 
as the Global Burden of Disease studies) to interpret society or determine societal dynamics. 
Recent commentary has sought to bring differing approaches closer together. Halford and Savage 
(2017) propose a ‘symphonic Social Science’ approach where ‘Big Data’ researchers and 
sociologists come together for a different mode of practice.  
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Centre for Disease Control (CDC) published a ‘how to’ guide for framing 
injury prevention issues, recommending ways injuries might be portrayed to 
media and the wider public (Center for Disease Control, 2008).  
A safety culture is said to be present when there is the acceptance and use 
of safe behaviours in public and private, and the 'safety interventionist' is 
framed as integral part of the community. The promotion of safety through 
collaborative projects is part of this approach. It seeks overall acceptance 
of safety measures, with the expectation this will empower all individuals 
and communities to undertake activities more safely and achieve the 
widespread promulgation and adoption of safety messages and practices 
into everyday public and private life (Nilsen et al., 2004).  
The acceptance of a safety culture and the use of safe behaviours are 
especially applicable when adults are caring for children, or undertaking 
what is referred to as the supervision of children (MacKay et al., 2006).  
The New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS) set goals of achieving 
a ‘positive safety culture’ and ‘creating safe environments’ within New 
Zealand. These were normative, ‘ideal states’ to be achieved, and were 
defined as New Zealand society attaining: 
“...a shared set of beliefs, attitudes, values and ways of behaving that 
support the prevention of injury” and… 
“safe environments are social and physical surroundings or 
conditions that support the prevention of injury” (New Zealand 
Government, 2003c, p. 14).  
Public belief about safety 
The introduction of NZIPS prompted research into New Zealanders' 
knowledge and attitudes to injuries and safety behaviours to set ‘baselines’. 
Projects explored the prevalence of the belief that injuries are due to ‘fate’ 
(unavoidable) as such beliefs have been found to impact negatively on 
actions people might take to avoid unintentional injury (Hooper, Coggan, & 
Adams, 2003). These studies into public attitudes toward injuries had varied 
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results. In a 2003 study, 84% of questionnaire respondents agreed with the 
statement that accidents ‘can be prevented’ while a later 2007 study that 
asked a similar question found that fewer respondents (between 68% and 
77%) believed this statement (Freyer, Honeyfield, Kalafetelis, & Palmer, 
2007; Hooper et al., 2003).  
Epidemiological reports can illustrate discrepancies between perceptions of 
safety (or risk) and reality. Individuals have been surveyed about their belief 
about “where injuries happened” and their responses compared to 
surveillance data showing where and how injuries had happened. These 
studies showed a wide discrepancy between what was believed and the 
data. In 2003 research indicated that although 55% of respondents thought 
their homes were the ‘most safe place to be’, ACC data showed a third 
(35%) of serious (life changing) injury occurred in homes. In a 2007 study 
over half of respondents believed injuries were most likely to occur on the 
road, yet ACC data showed only 5% of claims were the result of road traffic 
crashes (Freyer et al., 2007; Hooper et al., 2003; Kalafatelis, Magill, & 
Jones, 2011). This difference between perception and reality challenges 
injury prevention practitioners to publicise the causes of injury and promote 
interventions to prevent them.  
Debates about 'how much safety' 
An accepted orthodoxy within injury prevention discourse is that ‘most’ 
injuries can be prevented. An Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
report noted that;  
“...around one in two (people) believed that injuries in all domains 
could be prevented, with the exception of sport/recreation, which was 
much lower (about one in four). This was despite evidence that 
most injuries can be prevented or minimised” (NZIPS 
Secretariat, 2012, p. 29) - (emphasis added). 
More conservative estimates propose the preventability of far fewer injuries 
than all or even ‘most’ (Stone & Pearson, 2009; Tingvall & Haworth, 1999).  
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Emphasis on injuries (which are counted) transfers across to the concept of 
safety. Belief that safety can be quantified into an amount such as ‘most’ 
may arise from the positivist science underlying much of injury prevention.43 
This may also be related to increasing requirements for government to 
measure the impact of policies and increasing imperatives to demonstrate 
return on investment. The narrative shifts from claiming children 'have a 
right' to be safe, to asking how much should we 'invest' to achieve 'how 
much' safety and what trade-off might be involved. In these situations, 
economic interests come to the fore, including arguments about private 
property rights and public investment. There are acknowledged difficulties 
in the valuing of the lives of children and recognition that such debates are 
often unproductive (Wren & Barrell, 2010).  
The idea that ‘all serious injuries are preventable’ varies within each area 
(or sector) of injury prevention. The prevention of all serious road injuries 
has been internationally accepted as a visionary if controversial goal. In 
1997 the Swedish Government introduced “Vision Zero” legislation that 
states by 2030, “No-one shall be killed or seriously injured within the road 
traffic system” (The Vision Zero Initiative, 1994). 
“Vision Zero” policy has been adopted by transport authorities across 
America and in Europe. New Zealand's Government has adopted a version 
of Vision Zero through the Safe Systems approach within its Road Safety 
2020 strategy. The Safe Systems approach acknowledges human 
propensity to make errors, but asserts transport systems within New 
Zealand can (and should) be designed in such a way as to ensure such 
errors do not cause any serious harm or loss of life (Elvik, 1999; Johansson, 
2009; Ministry of Transport, 2010). 
There is no equivalent Vision Zero concept for child safety and debates 
about ‘what injury is acceptable’ are complex and ongoing. These debates 
highlight the heterogeneity of injury circumstances and that prevention 
interventions are specific to types of injury, sometimes even individual 
                                                          
43 In Chapter One, 'Injury prevention as science and community', it is noted ‘safety’ is described as 
a ‘human right’ which can also be reified and is subject to argument about its desirable ‘quantity’.  
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circumstances. Jivin, a senior advisor in child safety, commented that 
practitioners and advocates need to remain aware of this heterogeneity 
when working within the field of child safety.  
“It (safety promotion) is different for specific topic areas, so how it plays 
out for the child quad bike issue is different for what is happening in the 
child playground and safety space” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
The assertion of safety as a child’s right under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) sidesteps argument about 
whether it is desirable to prevent all childhood injuries, or only some, or 
most, or just the more serious ones and what trade-offs might exist and are 
acceptable. Phrases such as 'bubble wrap children' and 'nanny state' are 
used to express disapproval of safety measures that are believed to inhibit 
personal freedoms or intrude on privacy. More pejorative terminology is 
sometimes directed at injury prevention workers. Concern about a 
supposed trade-off between a safety measure and other goals sometimes 
results in the misrepresentation of safety programmes and the promulgation 
of safety myths that misrepresent or exaggerate safety measures (Bundy et 
al., 2011; Hope & Doughty, 2010; New Zealand Government, 2016c).44  
Child injury prevention organisations are circumspect when talking about 
how many injuries can be prevented. Promoting the preventability of ‘all’ or 
even ‘most’ childhood injuries is not supported by all injury prevention 
advocates. Safekids Worldwide side-steps the issue with a somewhat 
circuitous mission statement that says: "The important thing to remember is 
that preventable injuries are preventable” (Safekids Aotearoa New Zealand, 
2018). On a local level the Ministry of Health funded child safety programme 
Safekids Aotearoa state; “Our goal is to reduce the severity and incidence 
                                                          
44 In 2015 the New Zealand Government released the Rules Reduction Taskforce "Loopy Rules 
Report” which identified that many so called 'loopy and overzealous safety requirements' did not 
exist in legislation and were myths. These included myths that children were supposed to wear a 
safety harness while on a playground and that the organisers of a lolly scramble could be 
prosecuted if a child was hit by a lolly (page 32). The authors stated "It was a surprise to us to find 
out that a number of the so-called loopy rules are in fact just myths. They are misinterpretations 
and misunderstandings that have been repeated so often that they have taken on the status of 
facts" (New Zealand Government, 2016c).  
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of unintentional injuries to children in New Zealand" (Safekids Aotearoa New 
Zealand, 2018). Such statements are tacit acknowledgement that not all 
unintentional child injuries can be prevented and that the focus of child injury 
prevention activities is not to stop all injuries, rather it is to reduce their 
severity and incidence.  
Injury prevention as a battle 
Some injury prevention advocates talk about injury prevention (and safety) 
as a 'thing' about which a 'battle' should be fought, a ‘fight’ where 'ground 
can be lost and gained’ and stances taken over the issue of how much injury 
prevention should (or should not) happen. This was demonstrated several 
times during interviews, in one example Hans said he experienced injury 
prevention as a change process that required a ‘fight’ to make progress;  
“Some people would see it differently and see it as an inexorable process, 
but to see it as a fight is the way I see it.” Hans (Central Govt.) 
Another participant, Jivin made cautionary comments about promoting child 
injury prevention in a way that would result in 'losing ground' in the way one 
would lose ground in a battle.   
"... I think we need to re-engage and re-think our arguments because I 
think we are in a space where we are going to lose stuff that we have 
gained over the past twenty years, particularly around pool safety and 
around playground safety." 45 Jivin (Crown Entity) 
The presentation of injury prevention as a battle evokes images of injury 
prevention as a polarised debate with hostility between opposing factions. 
In another example, Salesi warned that referring to 'let children play’ in a 
draft title for this thesis would engender emotional and negative responses 
because it unhelpfully implied individuals advocating safety took an 
oppositional attitude to ‘letting’ children play.  
                                                          
45 This comment was provided prior to the Government repealing the Fencing of Swimming Pools 
Act (1987) and replacing it with legislation that is believed to provide a greater risk of children 
drowning (see Chapter Eight). 
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"Your (draft) title "Let kids play" suggests the whole issue of the “Safety 
Nazis” and infers you are on the other side of that (argument). At one end 
are the “Safety Nazis” and at the other end is the title “Let kids play” which 
is open ended, they can do what they like. I don’t think you will get 
anywhere, and you will end up with emotional debate...” Salesi (NGO) 
Public discourse about safety and injury prevention sometimes engenders 
hostile and accusatory language toward injury prevention practitioners. The 
origins of antagonism against injury prevention appear complex.  
Stevenson (2004) notes that before the 1950s accidents were considered 
mostly the outcome of chance or fate. Modern injury prevention advocates 
apply epidemiology to argue injuries are not the outcome of chance, 
reinforcing an innuendo that when injuries happen, they are the result of 
fault, a perception which infers judgement and negativity. During the debate 
about removing the term ‘accident’ from BMJ publications Girasek noted the 
term ‘injury prevention’ infers injury is the result of the absence of 
prevention, which implies negligence (Girasek, 1999).   
There is a perception that injury prevention discourse includes an 
unpleasant authoritarian approach which is directed toward limiting and 
constraining children's activities. Hostility toward injury prevention 
practitioners seems particularly evident when they become involved in child 
playground safety discussions. Jivin reported how a small group of 
attendees at a playground seminar engaged in heated and antagonistic 
comments about child safety and directed the term 'Safety Nazi' towards 
him. The use of this term inferred an accusation that child injury prevention 
workers seek to impose disproportionate constraint on children while they 
are using playgrounds.  
“I organised a playground safety symposium and a whole bunch of 
Aussies came over to it and it was really interesting. It was the first time I 
have had the label "Safety Nazi" thrown at me....it got me going, I can tell 
you, I managed to hold my tongue, but I have never forgotten..."  
Jivin (Crown Entity) 
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Questions about whether child safety advocates and practitioners are 
supportive of children’s play (or whether they are perceived to be less 
supportive of play) than other sectors of society have been widely debated 
by child injury prevention practitioners. In 2013 a Canadian Injury 
Prevention and Safety Conference held a seminar entitled "Can child injury 
prevention include healthy risk promotion?" Seminar organisers noted the 
topic generated heated debate and despite the well qualified audience, 
arguments for and against the premise rested entirely upon anecdotal 
comment and hearsay. There was a call to differentiate 'risk' from 'hazard' 
in order to prevent a 'drift into unreasonableness' on all sides of the debate 
(Brussoni et al., 2014, p. 3 ).  
The phrase 'nanny state' is also used to show disapproval of safety 
promotion activities and to attribute government with unacceptable 
intrusion, constraint or imposition of expense. The first mention of the term 
during research interviews was by Rick, who had years of experience as an 
elected politician, and who identified it as important for political decision 
makers to be aware of, as its use was an accusation that might lead to (or 
indicate) the loss of political constituency. 
"Take something like child safety. The mood became for a while, that 'we 
are sick of the nanny state'. Because they felt we had years and years of 
people telling us how to do it, when to do it, and what with. And so, there 
is kick back against what could be quite a sensible policy"   
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Jivin also used the term 'nanny state' in the context of describing an 
unwarranted intrusion of privacy by individuals who have the authority of the 
‘state’ to support their actions. There is also an element of rejection of the 
injury prevention practitioner’s perceived encroachment on parental 
authority. 
"...in one sense this particular issue is of government action into the 
private realm. We have ‘nanny state’ stuff around now. It's “I don’t want 
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the government telling me what to do in my private space so what is the 
government doing telling me about those things...” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
The focus on injury surveillance and quantification of injury is promoted as 
an important part of effective prevention (Peden et al., 2008) but may also 
contribute to these negative societal responses. The focus on quantification 
leads commentators to reify injury prevention. Safety and injury prevention 
become a measurable, discrete thing which is imposed upon individuals and 
extracts a deficit because it displaces something believed to be more 
desirable, such as fun and excitement or important developmental 
knowledge about risk. This portrays injury prevention and safety as a deficit 
state, suggesting when there is safety, something is lost. In this view, the 
injury prevention worker (or advocate) is an individual seeking to deny or 
remove benefit from others and due to such negative attributions, become 
subject to vilification and hostility.  
The alternative proposition is the premise of ‘safety as a right’ that exists as 
a state of being and an aspiration for all of society to adopt and embrace. 
This view was demonstrated when Hans noted a news item that referred to 
someone praising the value of child car seats. He observed that twenty 
years ago child restraints were far less likely to be in the car (or that their 
presence would not have been commented on or praised) and second, it 
was 'not a safety person' who had praised the car seats for protecting these 
children.  
"I love seeing things like this because twenty years ago it would have been 
absolutely unheard of for someone to say this, but in the tornado... did you 
read it? Some kids were in a car that was lifted up by the tornado, above 
building height, and then dumped on its top. The kids were in restraints 
and were safe. Some guy, not a safety person, was reported in the paper 
saying, (in the vernacular) 'Yay for child restraints'"  
Hans (Central Govt.)  
This situation demonstrated the ideal achievement in the development of a 
safety culture, it showed a person who was promoting a safety product (the 
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car seats) was not a specialist injury prevention advocate, nor even an injury 
prevention collaborator or worker, but was an ordinary member of the public. 
Parenting and supervision 
Injury prevention practitioners have long sought to understand how to inform 
families about the safe supervision of children. The provision of supervision 
is considered important because a link has been identified between lapses 
in the supervision of children and their serious and fatal injury (MacKay et 
al., 2006; Schnitzer, Dowd, Kruse, & Morrongiello, 2015). 
Historical, ideological and societal influences around how supervision is 
perceived make it a complex issue to research and apply to injury 
prevention. There are contested and contradictory expectations about what 
is acceptable for parents and caregivers to do when caring for children. 
Compounding the challenge of finding acceptable ways to provide families 
with information about supervision, is awareness that providing such advice 
is known to be less effective than promoting passive methods such as 
installing swimming pool fences and smoke alarms (Peden et al., 2008). 
Despite the existence of many well used supervision messages applicable 
for specific circumstances, such advice is often met with hostility.46 Many 
practitioners seek to ameliorate oppositional responses by identifying with 
parents and acknowledging the universal fallibility of parenting, as one 
interview participant, Imia explained:  
"As parents, we all think we supervise our children. But it just doesn't 
happen.... we lose contact with them, we think they are doing something, 
but they are actually doing something else." Imia (Local Govt.)   
Furthermore, messages to supervise children run the risk of sounding 
simultaneously vague and authoritarian while often being associated with 
moral judgements about parenting (Thomas, Stanford, & Sarnecka, 2016) 
                                                          
46 Water Safety New Zealand publishes safety advice for parents supervising 'under-fives’ in and 
around water that states ‘Keep under-fives within arm's reach at all times':  
www.watersafety.org.nz   accessed 10/09/2017  
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and victim-blaming (where the parent is the victim) behaviour (Petrass, 
Blitvich, & Finch, 2009; Roberts & Coggan, 1994; Schnitzer et al., 2015).  
Consequently, child injury prevention researchers, practitioners and 
advocates have been challenged to define supervision and describe how 
and when it is best (or even appropriate) to convey advice about supervising 
children (Morrongiello & Schell, 2010; Saluja et al., 2004). 
Defining supervision 
There is considerable discussion about defining the term 'supervision'. 
Morrongiello suggests supervision is generally accepted as knowing what a 
child is doing and being in proximity to the child, within sight, hearing and 
contact (Morrongiello, 2005). Beyond this definition there are many and 
varied discussions about how and why supervision might lapse and how 
advice might be acceptably presented without counter-productive overtones 
of authoritarianism or judgement (Petrass, Blitvich, & Finch, 2011; Schnitzer 
et al., 2015).  
The Government's newly established Ministry Oranga Tamariki (Children’s 
Ministry) provides New Zealand's legal requirement for supervision. 
Supervision, according to this Ministry, is whether children have been left 
alone, without an adult present and rests on an assessment of 
reasonableness:  
"...it is against the law to leave children under 14 without making 
reasonable provision for their care and supervision. What is 
considered 'reasonable' takes into account the circumstances in 
which children are left alone and the length of time they are alone. 
Parents are required to assess all the circumstances and make sure 
that any child left alone, or in the care of another child or young 
person is safe and not in danger" (Oranga Tamariki, 2018).  
The term 'reasonable' is used in criminal law and implies the presence of 
common sense meaning the behaviour in question would be found 
acceptable by wider society (Burton, 2007). Yet consensus about parenting 
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changes over time. Bryder’s history of the Royal New Zealand Plunket 
Society provides several examples of parenting behaviours that were 
previously considered reasonable but are no longer acceptable or thought 
safe, such as leaving children in play-pens, or permitting them to stand on 
the front seat of a car (Bryder, 2003).  
Another problem with this definition is that what some people may consider 
reasonable parenting, others may consider unreasonable or negligent. One 
example was the New Zealand Police prosecution of Mr Gavin Vanner. The 
Police Prosecutor stated in court that "the prosecution was brought because 
a little girl was killed in circumstances that are killing kids on farms every 
year" (TVNZ, 2006). The practice of allowing very young children to drive 
quad bikes has been widespread in rural communities (Campbell, 2009) and 
Gavin Vanner's behaviour was considered reasonable by his supporters, 
whereas the Police action to prosecute a grieving father was considered 
unreasonable. In the outcome, the jury acquitted Mr Vanner of the more 
serious charge of manslaughter, leaving the lesser charge of criminal 
nuisance (TVNZ, 2006).  
Injury prevention researchers have explored the contribution of supervision 
to child injury by setting aside social and moral implications and adopting a 
positivist approach that codifies attributes of children, adults and social and 
physical environments into discrete variables. Morrongiello (2005) proposed 
a conceptual model with supervision deconstructed into nine separate 
variables (or factors). Each of the variables Morrongiello explains, is shaped 
by socio-cultural context and how they jointly influence child injury risk. 
These variables, which include such things as attitudes, distractibility and 
feelings, are attributed to both the adult (caregiver) and the child and are 
assumed to function as described.47 This positivist research attempts to 
define and objectify supervision as a researchable concept while side-
stepping the messy and unpredictable issues of real world responses, 
subjectivities and interpretations. It was hoped the use of these variables 
                                                          
47 See Appendix 3 for a diagram of how supervision can be deconstructed into factors.  
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would facilitate research into how the concept of supervision could be better 
used within safety messages (Morrongiello, 2005). 
This reductionist analysis of the caregiver/child relationship seeks to 
facilitate diagnoses of inadequate supervision and once identified, permit 
the development of specific interventions to fix the undesirable or aberrant 
variables that might lead to injury. Such research contrasts sharply with the 
safety culture approach which directs energy toward framing positive 
discourse about the promotion of safety, seeks collaborative relationships 
and sets out to build widespread coalitions who share safe behaviours and 
practices (Center for Disease Control, 2008; Istre et al., 2011). 
The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Child Abuse and 
Neglect has also grappled with defining supervision for the immediate 
reason of assisting clinicians determine whether a child presenting with an 
injury was subject to misadventure or required protection from neglect or 
abuse. In 2006 they published advice to help paediatricians identify children 
who were subject to ‘supervisory neglect’ defined as “whenever a 
caregiver’s supervisory decisions or behaviours place a child in his or her 
care at significant ongoing risk for physical, emotional, or psychological 
harm” (Hymel, 2006, p. 1296). Despite stressing the need to be vigilant for 
abusive or negligent behaviour, the Committee also acknowledges the 
normality of childhood accidents, urging practitioners to be wary of pre-
emptive or punitive judgement about the adequacy or otherwise of 
supervision:  
“Remember that some child injury risks are unpredictable or 
unavoidable; caregivers may underestimate the supervisory 
requirements for some children, and even the most careful caregiver 
may experience a brief lapse of supervisory attention, proximity, 
and/or continuity that leads to childhood injury” (Hymel, 2006, p. 
1297). 
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Moral judgement 
“…they say to me… ‘I supervise my children, are you calling me a bad 
parent?’"  Imia (Local Govt.) 
The link between the absence (or presence) of supervision and the death 
or serious injury of a child prompts some observers to ascribe negative 
attributes and blame to either the injured child or their parents (or care-
givers). In these situations, child injury is ascribed to poor parenting which 
adds complexity to the difficulties of providing safety advice (Campbell & 
Cowley, 2015; Roberts & Coggan, 1994).48  
There is evidence that adults engage in moral judgement about parents' 
choices while supervising their children. In 2016 University of California 
researchers found interview subjects said they believed adults who left 
children alone in dangerous situations were behaving in an immoral way. 
Furthermore, when scenarios were adjusted to describe adults leaving 
children alone intentionally, the children were in more danger than in the 
same scenarios where adults were described as leaving them alone 
inadvertently. The authors noted: 
"Our findings suggest that once a moralized norm of ‘no child left 
alone’ was generated, people began to feel morally outraged by 
parents who violated that norm. The need (or opportunity) to better 
support or justify this outrage then elevated people’s estimates of the 
actual dangers faced by children. These elevated risk estimates, in 
turn, may have led to even stronger moral condemnation of parents 
and so on, in a self-reinforcing feedback loop" (Thomas et al., 2016, 
p. 12). 
The moral outrage described in research interview scenarios is more 
complex in real life situations where it is not usually considered acceptable 
                                                          
48 Roberts and Coggan (1994) described how language used in the investigation of the death of a 
child pedestrian consistently identified the child as being at fault for 'dashing heedlessly' onto the 
road. Other factors, such as the road design, absence of a safe crossing facility and traffic speed 
were not mentioned.  Roberts and Coggan suggested this was not co-incidental but represented 
the power differential between the child and the interests of those using the road for economic 
purposes. 
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to publicly direct blame or moral outrage toward parents of an injured child. 
Different situations (such as leaving a child alone in a car or at a beach) 
might be considered reasonable by some adults ('we did that when we were 
young and were just fine’) but only because there were no negative 
consequences on that occasion and they were unaware of severe 
consequences occurring elsewhere from the same circumstances. Another 
reason is that the adults hold beliefs about children's ability to keep 
themselves safe that are inconsistent with evidence about children's 
cognitive or developmental capabilities.49 In those situations, when the 
injury of a child has been deeply traumatic for the adults involved, rather 
than being someone’s fault the injury becomes attributed to bad luck and 
comments are made that the injury 'could not have been foreseen'.50 
Supervision advice 
Conveying information to adults about supervising children is seen by injury 
prevention practitioners as both important and challenging. The term 
supervision refers to a 'parenting practice' and its presence implies ideal 
parenting (or caregiver) behaviour, while inadequate (or absent) supervision 
is considered negatively, as a failure of parenting or care giving. 
Furthermore, messages about supervision can appear ambiguous and 
contradictory. Parents are expected to supervise their children in some 
circumstances and not in others. Permitting children to walk to and from 
school independently is promoted as healthy and desirable, while leaving 
children (who are the same age) alone at home is not (Chillon, Evenson, 
Vaughn, & Ward, 2011; Collins & Kearns, 2005; New Zealand Government, 
2008b; Wallis et al., 2014). Parents and caregivers seek and are 
encouraged to provide new and exciting experiences for their children yet 
                                                          
49 Teaching very young infants to swim was initially misleadingly promoted to parents as a way of 
'drown proofing' toddlers, leading to tragic events. In 2003 the American Academy of Pediatrics 
issued a statement "Parents should be reminded that swimming lessons will not provide ‘drown 
proofing’ for children of any age." (American Academy of Pediatrics: Committee on Injury and 
Poison Prevention, 2003) 
50 See Page 164: Disagreement about whether or not an event could have been foreseen was an 
important factor behind the public debate when the New Zealand Police brought a prosecution 
against a father following the death of his child on a quad bike. The police decided the event was 
predictable, therefore should have been preventable. 
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are criticised and penalised when those experiences vary tragically from 
expected outcomes (Campbell & Cowley, 2015; Thomas et al., 2016; TVNZ, 
2006).  
Parenting is considered a private activity but is subject to public scrutiny and 
perceived (or believed) failure to supervise children adequately can result 
in public censure. One interview participant (Salesi) described a situation 
where a parent's behaviour (supervision of his children) was considered 
inadequate by the police, who prosecuted following the death of the 
children. Salesi noted the undesirability of subjecting a grieving parent to 
legal process: 
“There was a drowning incident with a couple of young children on 
Bethels Beach the year before last and basically the parent was sitting on 
the sand watching the children being swept out to sea. He didn’t realise 
what was happening. The police decided he did not take reasonable steps 
to ensure they were safe or try and save the children. He managed to save 
one but not the other of the two children, which is quite a gut-wrenching 
thing for a family. Not only have they had a loss, but they have been going 
through the criminal process.” Salesi (NGO) 
Injury prevention researchers have for many years noted that ‘passive’ 
measures to prevent injuries are more effective for preventing injury than 
'active' methods, such as providing messages to 'supervise' children (Peden 
et al., 2008).51 This is particularly relevant to home swimming pool fencing. 
Advice to ‘supervise your child’ to prevent them drowning in home pools has 
been aligned with narrative which emphasises individual responsibility and 
promotes the idea that as children are the private property of their parents 
and government should have little or no role in their protection.52 
Requirements to fence home swimming pools is referred to as an 
‘unjustified’ infringement of private property rights. Some continue to argue 
that supervision of a toddler is the most effective way to prevent pre-
                                                          
51 See also page 48 for an explanation of 'active and passive’ measures for injury control.  
52 See Chapter Eight for an in-depth discussion of supervision in the debate about fencing of home 
swimming pools. 
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schoolers drowning in home swimming pools, despite extensive evidence 
to the contrary (Hassall, 1989; Swish Automation Ltd., 2018).53 The 
repeated failure of educational programmes to prevent such drownings is 
ignored (Department of Building and Housing, 2008; New Zealand House 
of Parliament, 1986, 1987; Paediatric Society of New Zealand, 2013; 
Williamson, 2013c).  
Normative and judgemental inferences are implicit in the question of 
whether adequate (or inadequate) supervision might contribute to 
unintentional child injury. Such implications are linked to both the specifics 
of potentially life threatening situations (such as leaving a child alone playing 
with a cigarette lighter in a car) and wider discourse about parental rights to 
both privacy and choice in how they care for their children (Thomas et al., 
2016). Jivin linked responses to advice provided about supervision to the 
degree of personal control an individual might feel they have over the 
circumstances of an injury.  
“This also comes back to people’s perception about how much of this was 
really an accident and whether it’s a case of 'something I could control', 
versus 'something I could not control'.  Where they (the public) have little 
control, but the risks and consequences are high, they are willing for more 
to be done. Where they believe the consequences are relatively low and the 
personal responsibility is high, then they don’t want government to do 
anything.”  Jivin (Crown Entity) 
Jivin also pointed out that child parenting practices, beliefs about 
supervision and expectations of child behaviour change over time. This is 
reflected in Zelizer's observation of the changed status of children from 
providing an economic contribution to families as workers to becoming 
dependent members of society who are protected and viewed as priceless 
(Zelizer, 1985). 
                                                          
53 The owner of Swish Automation Ltd, a company that makes and sells automatic sliding doors, 
stated on the company website that it is his objective is to get the lack of parental supervision 
recognised as the ’prime contributor’ to child drownings and that parental supervision, not fences 
should be the first method used for prevention (Swish Automation Ltd., 2018). 
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"...with the development of the industrial revolution we see the advent of 
child safety becoming an issue as children were used as donkeys in the 
mines and children working and injured in the cotton mills. ...The reality is 
that child labour and child safety have always been there for hundreds, 
perhaps thousands of years, it is just that it has become more conscious in 
our times." Jivin (Crown Entity) 
Lindsay and Dempsey (2009) describe how social attitudes toward 
parenting exert powerful pressures on individuals. Not only is a child no 
longer expected to provide an economic contribution to the family but caring 
for them is considered a full-time activity that requires sacrifice and 
commitment. In the context of parenting being a sacrifice (and full-time 
commitment) it is unsurprising that advice to ‘supervise your child’ (which 
can be perceived as a directive to be a ‘better’ parent) is provided with 
caution and sometimes responded to with hostility.  
Barriers to adopting injury prevention measures 
Child injury prevention is based on the normative assumption it is best to 
prevent the avoidable death and injury of children.54 Based on this 
assumption injury prevention researchers and practitioners expect parents 
will use child safety equipment (such as child car restraints) and follow 
recommended practices (such as staying within reach of the child when they 
are in water). When the behaviour of families differs from this, it is presumed 
parents were prevented from engaging in safe behaviour by some sort of 
obstruction or barrier.  
Injury prevention research has attempted to identify barriers that might 
explain why injury prevention advice and resources are not used as 
anticipated. Many projects focus on individual safety issues, such as what 
might make the use of child restraints or cycle helmets less likely. Other 
research identifies more generic barriers that prevent parents and families 
providing care required to keep their children healthy, such as peer 
pressure, financial barriers, where the actual (or perceived) cost of safety 
                                                          
54 This is discussed in greater depth in Chapter One. 
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equipment was thought to make it unobtainable, negative attitudes toward 
injury prevention, such as fatalism (the ‘accident prone child’) or the belief 
such devices (such as car seats) are unnecessary or too inconvenient to 
use. Others include environmental constraints, such as living in rental 
accommodation without smoke alarms or in neighbourhoods with few safe 
pedestrian or cycle pathways. (Gibbs et al., 2005; Howard, Snowdon, & 
Macarthur, 2004; Scholtes et al., 2016; E. Simpson, Moll, Kassam-Adams, 
Miller, & Winston, 2002; J. Simpson, Wren, Chalmers, & Stephenson, 2003; 
Smithson et al., 2010).   
Lack of legislation that mandates the use of safety equipment coupled with 
the lack government resources providing advice were also identified as 
barriers to the use of safety equipment and practices (Wilson, Chambers, & 
Hamill, 2013). 
Smithson et al found that inadequate communication provided a barrier for 
families receiving injury prevention advice (2010). Chaya recounted 
difficulty while working as a volunteer distributing information leaflets on a 
range of health issues. She wanted to also include leaflets providing injury 
prevention advice but found there were few resources about injury 
prevention and limited opportunities for distributing those that she could find. 
Injury prevention was seemingly not prioritised by health sector agencies 
engaging with families. 
"...It became really obvious that getting information to people who need it 
is really difficult.  It’s really, really difficult. They had so many access 
points for health issues and even for education issues, there are plenty of 
access points, but the priority is not ever on preventing injuries."  
Chaya (Local Govt.) 
Consistent with Smithson’s list of barriers, Josephine identified the cost of 
safety equipment and poverty as reasons some New Zealand families did 
not use child car restraints.  
"...there is never enough money. It is a huge contention for those working 
in the area. That alone puts barriers up and we have to look at the big 
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picture, why are people not using car restraints, or why are they not using 
them correctly. It comes down to poverty issues..." Josephine (NGO) 
Josephine also identified the importance of adolescent choice about fashion 
as a barrier to her teenage son wearing a cycle helmet. Both the teenager 
and parent were aware of the law requiring a helmet be worn when riding a 
bike and the teenager found a way of circumventing it (by riding a 
skateboard, where a helmet is not required). 
“... he (interview participant’s teenage son) said, ‘I don’t want to ride my 
bike, because I don’t want to wear my helmet because one: a helmet is not 
cool and two: it's going to ruin my hair’. So, he went from not riding a 
bike any more, to riding a skateboard because there’s no law that says you 
have to wear a helmet when you are using a skateboard."  
Josephine (NGO) 
The tendency of teenagers to seek risky situations (and reject injury 
prevention advice) is recognised as a barrier to safety and has been linked 
to an increased incidence of adolescent serious injury and death. The Child 
& Youth Mortality Review Committee's Fifth Report directly links adolescent 
driver crashes with the presence of peers in the vehicle and notes that along 
with steps taken to prohibit peers in vehicles, there is also a need for a broad 
approach for addressing risk seeking behaviour by this cohort (Child and 
Youth Mortality Review Committee, 2009, p. 24).  
"...findings of these studies imply that risk-taking during adolescence 
is also embedded within the social and emotional environments 
young people find themselves in. This means that while risk-
reduction driver education may be feasible, education alone will do 
little to reduce youth risk-taking in the absence of a wider social 
developmental approach" (Child and Youth Mortality Review 
Committee, 2009, p. 25). 
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Risk and supervision in injury prevention 
Risk, like the concept of supervision, has varying interpretations and 
applications. Statistical and epidemiological risk calculations identify 
variables and then sample populations to calculate the statistical probability 
of the occurrence of those variables. Public health practitioners have noted 
the importance of social determinants of health, such as poverty and 
ethnicity in the likelihood (or risk) of adverse health events (Marmot, 2005; 
Mills et al., 2012; Ministry of Health, 2002). Studies in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand show injury risk (i.e. the occurrence of injury 
hospitalisation) is related to social determinants (Baker, 2010). Towner 
(2005) and Craig (2012) have shown that poor children are more likely to 
be seriously injured than those in higher socio-economic groups. This is 
consistent with an earlier study by D’Souza (2008) who used counter-factual 
modelling to show New Zealand's child injury rates would be reduced if 
poverty were reduced. Others have focussed on parental perceptions of 
risky play and the wider health implications of restricting risky play 
experiences (Brussoni et al., 2014; Morrongiello, Corbett, McCourt, & 
Johnston, 2005). 
Epidemiological studies do not provide an indication of dangerousness per 
se, nor will epidemiological studies indicate any given individual's risk of 
injury at any given time or in any situation, which creates a paradox in 
perception and response (Campbell & Cowley, 2015; Kary, 2014). It is 
possible for families to be within a 'high risk' group, yet who are not 
representative of their demographic regarding their safety behaviours. It is 
also possible for others who are within a low injury risk 'demographic group' 
to engage in higher risk activities, such as motor bike racing or horse riding. 
From the safety culture perspective, risk is related to belief. People might 
believe they are safe in situations (such as at home) when injury 
surveillance data show high numbers of injury events happen in those 
circumstances, and vice versa (Kalafatelis et al., 2011). Morrongiello’s 2005 
supervision model can be applied to show the factors (or determinants) that 
might influence how injury risk might be perceived. Studies show parents 
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make decisions about how much they supervise children in traffic and in the 
water, based on their knowledge of the environment and judgment of their 
child's developmental ability (Dunbar, Hill, & Lewis, 2001; Eszenyi, 2011; 
Pitcairn & Edlemann, 2000; Soole et al., 2011). Salesi noted that her 
perception of the safety of her local beach was significantly revised following 
the unexpected (and largely unexplained) drowning of three children and an 
adult.  
“Most parents would think that beach was safe. ... They (interview 
participant’s children) played on that beach for years and years and years 
and I had no worries, I felt that they were safe, yet if I had known there 
were those sorts of rips there, it would have been different.” Salesi (NGO) 
Risk can also be about a private 'trade off' between two undesirable 
activities. Balancing the risk of one activity against another includes 
balancing the risk of injury against the risk of other adverse circumstances. 
Campbell (2009) described how mothers working on farms took their 
children with them on quad bikes as passengers, against quad bike 
manufacturers’ recommendations, in the full knowledge this is a 'risky' 
activity. However, their choice to do so was balanced against their 
judgement that the alternative of leaving the child alone in the house without 
an adult carer is a riskier behaviour. This provides an example of private 
decision making where alternatives have been weighed and safer strategies 
(such as arranging child care) have been ruled out as unobtainable. 
Green (1997) pointed out children use exposure to hazardous events, risk 
and excitement as one basis for their construction of their social identity. 
The interpretation of the value of ‘hazardous’ events frames injury 
prevention (or the pursuit of safety) as a ‘deficit’, something that is provided 
at the cost of another ‘thing’. Leilani commented on the occurrence of a 
perceived reduction in skills, which was associated with a reduction in risk-
taking play:  
"I remember in China when we were there, they just developed a 
programme with the University of New York, and a couple of other people, 
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and what they were finding was that with the “One child policy” these 
kids were growing up in cotton wool and never taking a risk.  So they have 
to run these programmes for five year olds, to teach them how to do risky 
things. I don’t mean silly risky things I mean actually being able to take a 
risk, simple things like sitting on a mat and sliding down a slope.  They 
had no idea how to do any of that". Leilani (Local Govt.) 
Jivin also focussed on this aspect of child injury prevention, noting that this 
is a debate that has yet to be fully explored.  
“Where is the trade-off between necessary development of risk assessment, 
and physical and psychological development and decision making? I am 
not hearing any child injury prevention advocates engaging in this debate 
and it needs to be debated amongst the community.” 
Jivin (Crown Entity) 
A systematic review on the relationship between children engaging in risky 
outdoor play and their health has been published since this comment was 
made during research interviews. The review, covering eighteen studies 
and 21 papers, defines risk in the context of various types of risky play, and 
notes “The findings overall suggest positive effects of risky outdoor play on 
health” (Brussoni et al., 2015, p. 6445).This research sets the scene for 
further debate and critical analyses of how injury prevention interventions 
might influence play experiences in unanticipated ways. 
In 2013 Johnston and Ebel discussed the additional conundrum that 
possible injuries present themselves as immediate threats to be avoided, 
while equally devastating unhealthy effects of inactivity may not emerge 
until years later. A further complexity, they suggest, is ensuring there is 
adequate understanding of injury risk in specific situations;  
“…unfortunately some of these minor injuries are caused by 
mechanisms that could just as easily have resulted in something 
more serious” (Johnston & Ebel, 2013, p. 1).  
They continue: 
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“Our challenge (as injury prevention advocates) is thus to provide a 
realistic assessment of injury risk, work to create environments, 
products, and patterns of behaviour that drive this risk as low as 
possible, and restore a perspective that demands activity be made 
safer, not that activity be avoided” (Johnston & Ebel, 2013, p. 6). 
Conclusion  
Injury prevention workers, researchers and advocates promote the adoption 
of a safety culture, while at the same time emphasising the need for 
positivist research that counts and quantifies injuries, activities which have 
the effect of reifying safety into something that can be counted and 
measured. In this view safety and risk, rather than being socially defined 
phenomena, are viewed as objective realities that can (and should) be 
assessed, measured and managed. This provides the opportunity for the 
negative perceptions of safety, viewing it as a deficit, where more safety (or 
less risk) will (or can) result in individuals experiencing less of something 
else more desirable.  
‘Perceptions of safety and supervision’ are also themes that traverse both 
public and private discourse. They include observations and comments 
about the ways safety and safety advice is discussed and responded to, in 
public and within the private sphere of parenting. Normative and moral 
arguments about caring for children are often involved and there are public 
and private debates about the 'trade-offs' between safety and other societal 
or parenting goals. These debates not infrequently invoke hostile and 
defensive interactions between members of the community and those 
promoting child safety interventions.   
Making progress to reduce the incidence of preventable harm to children 
requires individuals and organisations to 'speak up' and actively engage. It 
is essential for practitioners to be cognisant of the nature of the debate and 
issues within public and private discourse about both safety generally, and 
child safety. This leads to the next themes that emerged from participant 
interviews: those of advocacy and lobbying.   
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CHAPTER 7: ADVOCACY AND LOBBYING 
This chapter examines how interview participants discussed advocacy and 
lobbying for child safety policies and programmes, along with associated 
literature. The words advocacy and lobbying were not used frequently by 
participants, but they were discussed in ways distinct from other activities 
and emerged as separate themes within this thesis.  
Participants described advocacy and lobbying as actions taken to advance 
child safety, yet many actions promoting child safety were referred to 
without being attributed to either term. Advocacy and lobbying were said to 
be undertaken by individuals, groups and organisations that were both 
inside and outside of government. 
Advocacy activities were described in several ways. Participants spoke 
about having access to resources and the opportunity and ability to act (i.e. 
the power). Sometimes child injury prevention advocacy was the completion 
of simple activities funded by others (such as distributing child safety 
information or convening a meeting about child safety), at other times 
advocacy was allocating financial resources for child safety (such as flying 
individuals between cities to attend meetings), while on other occasions 
child safety advocacy was achieved through an individual taking the 
initiative, at an opportune time, to enact a major policy change.55  
Definition and differentiation 
Participants used the terms advocacy and lobbying loosely and 
interchangeably. This interchangeable use of the terms reflects wider 
literature on the topic, which provides little firm definition. Beth provided an 
example typical of the way the terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘lobbying’ were used, 
as though they might be different, yet related activities. This was despite 
                                                          
55 For example, Child and Youth Mortality Review Committees were established when the 
Minister added a clause to associated legislation, second the activities that resulted in the 
passing of the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act (1987). 
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general acceptance that advocacy is approved of, while lobbying is frowned 
upon.56  
“…certainly, his advocacy and lobbying got that issue a long way up the 
list…” Beth (Central Govt.) 
Advocacy and lobbying have been extensively studied and discussed within 
political and policy science and sociological theory. Machiavelli’s 16th 
century work ‘The Prince’ is acknowledged as a primary treatise on 
exercising the art of political influence (Machiavelli & Viroli, 2008). Political 
science identifies Dahl’s study of New Hampshire local government as a 
landmark exploration of community influence over political decision makers 
("Who Governs?" Dahl, 1961) and since initial publication, Advocacy 
Coalition Theory (Weible et al., 2011) and Network Theory (Honeycutt & 
Strong, 2012) have generated a proliferation of papers, establishing these 
as major theories that provide analysis and insight into how individuals and 
groups can become more influential when they set out to work together.  
Mai Chen’s 2012 “Public Law Tool Box” is a comprehensive guide to New 
Zealand Public Law. Rather than defining advocacy, or differentiating it from 
lobbying, Chen describes advocacy in the widest possible terms as 
encompassing many and varied interactions between government and 
groups, stressing its importance for economic progress, a robust society 
and democratic government. Chen notes diverse examples of successful 
advocacy over many years, from New Zealand’s suffrage movement 
achieving the first vote for women, to farmers achieving legislation for 
improved governance within the New Zealand dairy industry (Chen, 2012).  
Advocates and/or lobbyists working collectively are often referred to as 
‘interest groups’ or ‘pressure groups’ which are collaborations between 
individuals, groups and organisations, usually working outside of 
government. Such groups are considered an important vehicle for 
influencing government. Many are credited with achieving positive social 
                                                          
56  Adding to the confusion, the word advocate can be used both as a noun and verb: “an 
advocate can lobby for a cause” and “a lobbyist can advocate”.  
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outcomes, while others seek to influence the political agenda to advance 
their own interests (Chen, 2012; Kingdon, 2003; Kypri, Wolfenden, 
Hutchesson, Langley, & Voas, 2014; R. Miller, 2010). Kingdon also 
sidesteps defining or differentiating the terms advocacy and lobbying, 
choosing instead to describe the activities of groups and individuals, noting 
their impact on government. He states: 
“Interest group pressure does have a positive impact on the 
government’s agenda and does so with considerable frequency. A 
group that mobilises support, writes letters, sends delegations, and 
stimulates its allies to do the same can get government officials to 
pay attention to its issues.” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 49). 
Drawing upon his extensive political experience, Rick was keenly aware of 
this process:  
“…things come onto the agenda because there is a committed person, or 
group, who agitate and agitate, and work over Ministers and work over 
opposition and build up public momentum and make a thing happen...”  
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
For those seeking to advocate successfully, the challenge remains to 
identify the best ways to ‘agitate’ and ‘work over’ politicians to achieve 
desired results.  
Morality - advocacy and lobbying 
While advocacy and lobbying are difficult to differentiate there is a vastly 
different moral understanding allocated to each. Advocacy involves implicit 
moral approval, lobbying does not. Advocacy (in contrast to lobbying) is 
considered a ‘responsibility’ that carries overtones of moral approval, 
carried out in the pursuit of a better outcome than the status quo. Advocacy 
is required within the legislation of several Government departments and 
agencies. The Children’s Commissioner Act (2003a), for example requires 
the Children’s Commissioner “…to act as an advocate for children’s 
interests, rights, and welfare generally…” (New Zealand Government, 
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2003a Part 2: Section 12 Clause (f)). Safekids Aotearoa, a service within a 
Crown Entity, describes advocacy as; 
‘…the truthful presentation of information to decision makers in order 
to promote the adoption of specific government actions or policy’ 
(Safekids New Zealand, 2007b).  
The Safekids definition of advocacy presumes advocates have integrity (are 
truthful) and expertise (information) about the field or issue for which they 
are advocating. They are, in this view, individuals with ‘moral authority’ (and 
sometimes legal responsibility) to speak up on a topic or issue that involves 
promoting the public good (Friedlaender & Winston, 2004).  
Lobbying is perceived as incorporating secrecy and possibly corrupt 
behaviour to acquire private benefit. Lobbyists are usually experts in 
government and political processes who are employed by specialist 
agencies (lobby firms) and companies for convincing governments to deliver 
policy objectives that are commercially beneficial (Parliamentary Library, 
2012; Walters, 2017; Young, 2003). 
New Zealand, like other constitutionally similar countries, has no legislation 
about lobbying and few constraints on the activities of lobbyists, apart from 
a Parliamentary Services requirement for lobbyists to be listed on a public 
register and record their movements when accessing Parliament’s precinct 
(Parliamentary Library, 2012; Walters, 2017). Such requirements are linked 
to the notion that lobbyists are ‘outsiders’ with vested interests who should 
be monitored and constrained when working with politicians (James, 2014; 
New Zealand Government, 2008a; Parliamentary Library, 2012).  
The New Zealand Government’s Cabinet Manual (2008a) does not provide 
any definitions of lobbyists, or advocates, but differentiates the two groups, 
warning that while Ministers might ‘advocate’ for particular groups or view 
points on issues, care must be taken to avoid association with ‘lobby’ 
groups. The Cabinet Manual clearly identifies lobbyists as ‘outsiders’ 
engaging in activities that should be constrained. It states:   
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“Ministers do not act in isolation from their political, constituency and 
community networks. Indeed, some Ministers are elected to 
Parliament because of their close association with and advocacy for 
particular interest groups ... Ministers should take care, however, to 
ensure they do not become associated with non-government 
organisations or community groups where: 
(a) the group’s objectives may conflict with government policy; 
(b) the organisation is a lobby group; 
(c) the organisation receives or applies for government funding.”  
(New Zealand Government, 2008a, p. 27).  
Lobbying is thought of as an ‘outsider’ activity, though it is one that relies on 
insider access to government politicians and knowledge of parliamentary 
systems (Walters, 2017). This was discussed during interviews. William 
described a public health expert as an effective ‘lobbyist’. He commented 
the individual was credible (well informed and dependable) and although 
outside of political and government institutions, was effective at “getting 
alongside” politicians and advancing issues.  
“…one who has done much better at getting alongside and establishing 
credibility with the sector and with politicians is [name withheld] of the 
New Zealand Drug Foundation. He has been quite effective as a lobbyist.” 
William (Central Govt.) 
Despite the differences in moral standing between advocacy and lobbying, 
interview participants described individuals and organisations as ‘lobbying’ 
and in one example, the term lobbying was used by Steffi to describe one 
(highly respected) organisation’s activity to promote child health: 
“Sometimes they help with the police reports as well, and on all sorts of 
aspects of young children’s health and safety lobbying.” Steffi (NGO) 
This comment underlined how interview participants perceived both 
advocacy and lobbying as important ways of advancing child safety and 
wellbeing. It also indicates the very fluid definitions of the terms that exist in 
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the public mind and the ready acceptance of lobbying when it is being 
carried out for what are viewed as socially beneficial purposes.  
Barriers to the adoption of injury prevention policy 
Differences in child injury and mortality rates have been linked to differences 
between jurisdictions’ implementation of injury prevention measures and 
governments’ failure to implement known, evidence based child safety 
measures (Philippakis et al., 2004).  
Situations where injury prevention measures are not implemented have 
been the subject of scrutiny so that ‘barriers’ to the adoption of these 
measures can be identified and removed. In 1998 the New Zealand Ministry 
of Health surveyed 50 organisations and individuals involved in child injury 
prevention to identify barriers to the adoption of injury prevention measures. 
Responses provided a comprehensive overview of reasons which included 
lack of evidence about injuries (data); low prioritisation of injury issues (by 
both individuals and organisations); and negative attitudes about injuries 
(victim blaming and fatalism). Political and policy factors included the 
absence of safety legislation or regulation and where these were present, 
inadequate or non-existent enforcement strategies, which rendered them 
ineffective (Tuohy, 1999).  
Although some advocacy efforts by medical practitioners have been highly 
successful, attempts to set ‘policy prescriptions’ within medical publications 
can be counterproductive. Bland (2011) and then later, Shepherd (2013) 
published papers which identified child injury prevention policy measures 
that, if implemented, would “result in a significant reduction in the child 
mortality and morbidity rates of New Zealand children” (Shepherd et al., 
2013, p. 470). Although persuasive, neither article prompted policy 
responses from government agencies. Waterston (2012) noted that the 
absence of public policy expertise in paediatric training may impede 
effective advocacy and more recently the New Zealand Government’s Chief 
Science Advisor, Sir Peter Gluckman (also a paediatrician by training), 
when speaking at an international policy convention, warned that:  
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  ‘“Scientists needed to appreciate that political ideology, financial 
and diplomatic constraints, and “electoral constraints” also had to be 
taken into account by politicians…  …Otherwise trust in advice can 
be lost as it becomes perceived as advocacy,” he (Sir Peter 
Gluckman) argued…’ (Matthews, 2017) 
Gluckman’s inference is that advocacy, in some circumstances might have 
a negative impact for achieving the policy changes sought. Matthews 
continues, to quote the editor-in-chief of Science, Jeremey Berg, saying 
that: 
“…academics have too often ventured into giving policy 
prescriptions, rather than just explaining the evidence…” (Matthews, 
2017) 
Coggan and Gabites (2007) studied City Council applications for World 
Health Organisation ‘Safe City’ accreditation and concluded that “to improve 
community safety it is necessary to develop partnerships and networks 
between individuals and organisations and other providers” (2007, p. 94). 
This conclusion suggests the importance of building relationships in order 
to advance child safety policy.  
Lyons et al (2013) set up an “Advocacy in Action” mixed method study to 
identify and explore barriers to the United Kingdom’s local government 
adoption of child road safety measures. This study sought to discover if 
there would be statistically significant differences in public expenditure on 
safety between local government areas where local politicians were 
provided with information about local pedestrian injuries, and those where 
they were not.  
Disappointingly to the researchers, no statistically significant expenditure 
differences were found. The authors attributed this result partially to the 
short time span of the study (just under two years), as opposed to much 
longer-term council funding processes. In the qualitative component of the 
research, politicians reported institutional factors (council structure) and 
attitudes (lack of political will and negative attitudes of officials) as barriers 
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to allocating funds for injury prevention projects. Further study was 
recommended (Lyons et al., 2013).  
Advocacy and leadership – Individuals 
Advocacy is often described as leadership and advocates as committed 
people who speak up, set the discourse and create momentum for change 
(Devakumar, Spencer, & Waterston, 2016, p. 596). The description of 
advocates as individuals who ‘speak up’ aligns with Kingdon’s identification 
of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ described as ‘individuals within the policy and 
political environment who seek to influence decision makers, so change can 
occur’ (Kingdon, 2003, p. 122). Interview participants repeatedly 
commented on how the actions of individuals advocating for child safety 
have made an impact: 
"...in terms of seeing how issues are championed or advocated for, or 
enabled, a lot of this will rest upon individuals...." Maau (Local Govt.)  
Hans also acknowledged individuals who have been associated with 
significant improvements in New Zealand’s child safety policy: 
“We have had in the past the fireworks lady and the cycle helmet lady and 
the various people who become recognised crusaders for particular 
causes and then they have a place in the firmament in their own right.” 
Hans (Central Govt.) 
Paediatricians have for many years prompted their colleagues to lead child 
health advocacy. Waterston, a United Kingdom paediatrician, urged his 
colleagues to be actively involved in advocacy, which he described as 
"speaking out in a cause" and using "persuasive communication with 
targeted actions in support of a cause or issue that seek to change policies, 
positions or actions" (Waterston, 2012, p. 181). Waterston noted individual 
paediatricians have achieved major improvements in child health, 
identifying the introduction of child resistant medicine containers and the 
reduction of hot water tap temperatures to prevent scald burns (Waterston, 
2012). However, this work is challenging. A systematic review of the 
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literature led Woods (2006) to conclude that medical staff often undertake 
advocacy with considerable success but face challenges, such as lack of 
resources and inadequate (or absent) training in politics and policy, which 
makes the task daunting. 
Medical professionals in New Zealand (including paediatric intensivists and 
surgeons, paediatricians and public health specialists) have adopted active 
and high-profile roles advocating for injury prevention, including working 
with Plunket, establishing and working with Safekids New Zealand, 
publishing research papers, presenting at conferences, attending meetings 
and being available for numerous media interviews, both nationally and 
internationally (Bryder, 2003; M. Johnston, 2016a; Teague, 2014).  
Insider advocacy 
The separation of the public service from the political and public realm is a 
well-accepted principle of Westminster democracy. Public servants are 
considered insiders who work within government, responding appropriately 
to the wishes of democratically elected parliamentarians, who in turn 
respond to the wishes of their electorate. Theoretically, politicians provide 
guidance about the overall strategic direction while the public servants are 
expected to offer politicians ‘evidence-based’ advice provided without ‘fear 
or favour’. Such advice is expected to promote public good over sectoral or 
political interests (Chen, 2012; Kibblewhite, 2016). James succinctly 
describes the idealised understanding of the relationship between New 
Zealand’s public servants and politicians: 
“Public servants’ role is to disinterestedly examine, test and critique 
the ministers’ wishes and offer advice on that, or an alternative 
course of action, then work out how to give effect to ministers’ final 
words on the subject and do what they are lawfully told to do” (James, 
2016, p. 1). 
The political neutrality of public servants, and their separateness from 
politicians, appears to be an illusion that does not withstand examination of 
the everyday experiences of those working within government. The 
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assumption that policy decisions and initiatives flow from politicians to the 
public service can also be challenged. A major study interviewed over a 
thousand public service managers across Australasia and found that far 
from being the independent, neutral public managers of popular perception, 
public servants regularly interact with elected politicians and act in a political 
manner. Hartley’s study describes how public servants found it important to 
interact with political decision makers and often chose to recruit support for 
predetermined policy proposals (Hartley et al., 2013):  
“...overwhelmingly, the respondents underscored the significance of 
securing a mandate in order to be able to do their jobs" (Hartley et 
al., 2015, p. 203).  
Hartley et al also found that public servants, far from being the 
stereotypically passive administrators of political will, actively advocate for 
policies (Hartley et al., 2013). Interview data confirmed New Zealand public 
servants actively interact with political decision makers to gain a mandate 
for child safety proposals. Rick noted:  
“Officials will pop up, often times with policies, year in and year out, 
election after election until someone says yes. So they have, if you like, 
their agenda that they are putting in front of their Minister. And usually 
it’s pretty thoughtful, pretty smartly thought out and it might be something 
like this particular aspect of safety legislation has got a bit tired and 
‘needs a look at’ and would the Minister be happy doing this?”  
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 
Research participants commented that public servants sometimes act within 
their official roles to advance child injury prevention, even when the child 
safety projects are not part of the official agenda determined by cabinet, 
agency leadership or council. Interview participants emphasised how public 
servants can (and do) act within the 'official' parameters of their work roles 
to promote programmes to political decision makers. Leilani described how 
she worked to ensure child safety would be included on the agenda in local 
government in ways that were unofficial and marginally acceptable.  
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“Whenever I got a chance I’d bang off at a council member or two. You 
can’t write that down and say that is a strategy, because you would get 
told off about that.” Leilani (Local Govt.)   
Interview participants also disclosed some projects were funded ‘under the 
radar’ using discretionary funding (see Chapter Three on Power) and 
through an individual’s actions. Sione noted an instance of someone 
delivering child safety activities without them being officially part of their role. 
“We were running the paracetamol poisoning prevention programme and 
... somebody left or something happened and there was nobody to roll it 
out and the local Road Safety Co-ordinator ended up doing it. Poisoning 
is not in a Road Safety Coordinators’ role even by any stretch of the 
imagination. There is nothing you can do to be creative about it. But he 
made time and did it.” 
Sione (Crown Entity) 
Interview participants who worked within government also spoke about 
singular opportunities to have policies adopted and projects provided with 
funds and resources. ‘Insider information’ appeared to be a major factor for 
identifying these ‘opportunities’. This supported the importance Kingdon 
placed on taking advantage of 'singular, short term opportunities for 
advancing a policy initiative' described as ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 2003, 
p. 166).  
“...there was a one-and-a-half-hour opportunity to have the strategic 
approach for (the strategy) to adopted or abandoned.” Jivin (Crown 
Entity) 
The same interview participant marshalled resources and arranged for 
advisors with authority, credibility and long-term experience to attend a 
meeting. The meeting fits Kingdon’s description of a ‘policy window’ 
opportunity for the adoption of a policy.  
“Now I know for a fact that the public health component of the (…) 
strategy is only there because I had the nous to say “(1st Professor) I will 
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fly you up from Otago; (2nd Professor) you also need to be there, I will fly 
you down from Auckland. I need you. I can give you a fifteen-minute slot 
in front of six Ministers. 
They (the experts) said to me, why do you need us there? (I responded) 
One, because you have the mana, the credibility, you know the subject 
area and second, I need you there, so I can get the draft (….) strategy that 
I have in front of these guys through. And the decision will be made out of 
this one-and-a-half-hour meeting...” Jivin (Crown Entity)  
Beth also described how she brought injury information into a decision-
making forum within the Ministry of Health.  
“… had done an analysis of New Zealand’s child injury rates compared to 
other OECD Countries with lots of graphs and so on, which didn’t put us 
in a very good light. I started off with that. I wasn’t supposed to, but I just 
did it, making the point that injury was entirely preventable, and we 
needed to do something about it. The money we got from that year, when it 
was the top priority, was used to initiate a range of programmes that are 
still going.” Beth (Central Govt.) 
This research data showed child injury prevention has been advocated for, 
supported and advanced by employees working within public sector 
agencies and a 2009 directory of New Zealand’s injury prevention workforce 
showed almost all were employed within government organisations (Injury 
Prevention Information Centre, 2009). Child injury prevention, it can be 
argued, was strongly advocated for from within government.  
Insiders are individuals with ‘deep knowledge’ about their area of expertise 
and government processes. Insiders also have access to political decision 
makers and decision-making situations. Yet research suggests these 
factors alone are insufficient in the absence of supportive coalitions and 
overall agreement about the importance of the issue and its justification for 
the use of resources and expenditure.  
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Despite the importance of insider advocacy, individuals and groups outside 
government also have power and are important for creating awareness 
about child safety measures and determining which measures are proposed 
and supported by government. In addition to identifying his role as an 
insider, Jivin drew attention to the fluidity of interactions between 
government and the community, identifying this interaction as a ‘dance’ and 
the importance of ‘outsiders’. He commented: 
“…it’s (the interaction of community with government) a constant 
weaving. It’s a ballet dance between them all. And that is why I don’t buy 
into artificial academic debates between whether it is just government or 
community. It is not either or, it is a social trade off, there is a constant 
communication…” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
This comment draws attention to the ways in which outsiders influence 
government though petitions, submissions and engagement with all forms 
of media.  
Outsider voices, petitions and submissions 
Outsiders in this context are individuals or groups working outside of 
government organisations (or government funded organisations) to achieve 
policy changes. Being outside of government they have different 
opportunities to influence policy making, including through publishing their 
issues in media, making submissions or creating petitions (Chen, 2012).    
The media was referred to only briefly by two interview participants but plays 
an important part of drawing attention to issues and motivating political 
decision makers to focus on issues. Chaya stated:  
“…those stories were in the media and people noticed. So, I think it is a 
combination where there is a significant event and if the media picks that 
event up, then yes, you will get an awful lot of change.”  
Chaya (Local Govt.) 
Advice on how to encourage and manage media commentary is published 
for the injury prevention sector. In 2008 the USA based Centre for Disease 
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Control (CDC) published a guide “Adding Power to our voices: A Framing 
Guide for Communicating about Injury” which is a ‘how to manual' for talking 
with media about the issue of injury. (Center for Disease Control, 2008).57  
Despite the potential for media to promote child injury prevention measures, 
this does not always occur. Recent research examined media articles 
describing New Zealand child injury events and found many were without 
associated prevention messages, suggesting there were missed 
opportunities for increasing public knowledge and awareness (John & Kool, 
2017).  
Social media is increasingly important as a means of creating discourse and 
shaping public opinion. Josephine commented: 
“Some people think it’s a good thing, some people think not so good, but 
one thing that social media is about is that it does get the message out 
there, it does make people aware, it starts that conversation…” 
Josephine (NGO) 
The submission process was mentioned by interview participants as an 
important mechanism for outsiders to present child injury issues to both 
central and local government agencies. Chaya identified the advantages of 
personal relationships with decision makers, but where this was not 
possible, submissions were also available.  
Sometimes you need to engage with the politicians, and sometimes that is 
through the submission process, or sometimes it’s possible to develop 
personal relationships. Some structures allow you to have them, some 
don’t. Chaya (Local Govt.) 
There is little research on submissions provided to New Zealand 
government and little guidance about what factors contribute to their 
                                                          
57 Advice on framing was popularised in the writing of George Lakoff, who wrote a 2004 best seller 
‘Don’t think of an elephant’. Framing is discussed again in Chapter Six (Perceptions of safety) and 
Chapter Eight (case study on swimming pool fencing) and Chapter Nine, (Discussion) (Lakoff, 2014).  
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effectiveness (Kypri et al., 2014). Yet contributing submissions is 
considered an important activity, as Chaya noted: 
“We as an organisation submitted submissions on that; we also did oral 
submissions, so that is our way of, where we can, advocate. It is how we 
work for child injury.” Chaya (Local Govt.) 
One project examined submissions to a Private Member’s Bill for alcohol 
law reform, comparing submissions from Non-Government Organisations 
(NGOs) and community advocacy groups (who supported the proposed 
policy changes) with industry submissions (who opposed the proposal). 
Submissions for and against the proposal were almost evenly split (74 in 
support to 72 against), but those from industry were described as more 
coherent and organised than those from the community, whose 
submissions were disorganised and often poorly written. The outcome was 
government voting to reject the Private Members Bill and support industry 
recommendations.  
Study authors recommended that pecuniary interests should be taken into 
account when government considers submissions and that processes 
should provide a greater opportunity for those with fewer resources than 
others to have a coherent ‘voice’ within submission processes (Kypri et al., 
2014). 
Submissions to the National Government’s Building (Pool) Amendment Bill 
(2016) differed to those in Kypri’s study. Only approximately 15% of 
submissions were in support of the government’s proposed legislation, 
almost all of which were provided from company owners and industry 
representatives. Most of the other submissions were from families and 
health and child safety organisations and groups who were opposed the 
government proposal.58 These were well written, with most including 
evidence to support their arguments. Yet none of the recommendations for 
                                                          
58 A small group of submitters (less than ten percent) were ambiguous about their support or 
opposition. 
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increased (or maintained) safety were adopted (New Zealand Government, 
2016a, 2016b).59 
The common theme between these examples of submissions to 
Government was that the policy outcome in both cases aligned with and 
supported industry policy preferences over those from health and 
community advocacy groups. Tenbensel and Gauld describe a range of 
approaches to policy making, one of which he describes as the neoliberal 
approach, in which policy makers consciously and actively operate a bias 
for advancing policies to achieve smaller government, business (market) 
interests and strengthened private property rights over and above all others 
(Tenbensel & Gauld, 2001). Further analyses of the submissions in both 
these cases may provide empirical evidence to support the presence of 
such bias.  
Petitions are another way for individual ‘outsiders’ to provide government 
with an indication of popular support for their sought after policy outcomes 
and are used with varying success (Chen, 2012). The pool fencing case 
study (Chapter Eight) identifies a notable child safety petition when in 1975 
“J Callagher and 800 others” presented a petition to government that 
requested home swimming pools be fenced. There is little published about 
the efficacy of petitions seeking policy changes for New Zealand child safety 
improvements. 
Advocacy and leadership – groups 
New Zealand organisations and groups working to improve child safety vary 
widely in their structure and how they operate. Some are within government 
yet appear to be ‘outside’ of the public service. Safekids New Zealand is 
sometimes considered to be separate from government (sometimes 
describing itself as a ‘child safety organisation’) but is funded by the Ministry 
of Health and is a service within the Auckland District Health Board 
(Safekids Aotearoa, 2014). The Office of the Children’s Commissioner has 
its own legislation and receives funds from Parliament, and at the same time 
                                                          
59 Detailed further in Chapter Eight on swimming pool fencing  
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the Commissioner is required to speak publicly and advocate for children, 
sometimes critically of government policy (Barrington, 2004).60 
Some child safety organisations and groups are outside of government, 
receive no government funding and focus on a specific child safety issue in 
the hope (expectation) their actions will achieve policy change. One 
example is a group advocating for a reduction in vehicle speeds outside of 
schools (Rees, 2009). This fits closely with Shaw and Eichbaum’s 
description of interest groups as voluntary organisations ‘outside‘ of 
government, rather than being part of government (Shaw & Eichbaum, 
2011, p. 206).  
Weible et al (2012) argue that parties outside of government who are 
seeking to make changes to policies need to look toward developing deep 
knowledge of their subject area, build wide networks and relationships and 
participate for extended periods of time. Weible posits that these activities 
will ‘increase the odds’ of achieving a desired policy outcome (Weible et al., 
2012, p. 1).   
Jivin noted the importance that politicians place on interest groups and 
community organisations who lobby and advocate, commenting such 
groups can provide politicians with valuable information about constituents’ 
potential responses to an issue or proposal: 
“…what those organisations say does actually matter - in the sense that 
they are leaders and voices of the community. Politicians want to know 
that, they absolutely want to know that. They want to know, ‘is this policy, 
or regulatory change going to be supported or not? How many votes am I 
going to lose?’” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
This comment suggests (and underlines) that there is a complex reciprocal 
relationship between political decision makers and child safety interest 
groups, advocates and lobbyists. It suggests there are situations where 
                                                          
60 Some government agencies, such as the Department of Conservation have a special 
requirement to advocate for their issues included in their legislation, for example see the 
Conservation Act 1987 (New Zealand Government, 2017).  
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information is shared, and mutual benefit is gained through contact between 
these organisations and politicians.   
Interview participants mentioned several organisations who contributed 
significantly to child safety in New Zealand. These were the Royal New 
Zealand Plunket Society (Plunket) and Safekids New Zealand – Aotearoa 
(Safekids NZ). A third organisation mentioned during interviews was the 
now defunct Child Safety Foundation. The impact of these organisations 
was noted by Jivin:  
“Ministers do listen to organisations… the public stances of Safekids, 
Plunket and AA (Automobile Association) are important and more or less 
so at different points in time.” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
New Zealand child safety organisations, whether they are outside of 
government or working closely with government, have been well placed to 
advocate for child injury prevention policies due to their longevity, well 
established networks and knowledge of the issues.  
The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society 
The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society (Plunket) was founded in 1908 and 
has a long history of providing government funded infant and child health 
care and successful advocacy. Plunket is a non-government organisation 
(NGO) whose professional child health service (staffed by Plunket Nurses) 
contracts with government to deliver health services for children under five 
and their caregivers.  
Plunket has a community-based volunteer governance structure. This 
section of Plunket advocates to government for improvements in child and 
family healthcare and raises funds for activities not funded by government. 
Plunket was at the forefront of research participants’ comments about child 
safety in New Zealand.  
“...when it was set up the prominent women in Plunket were the wives of 
Prime Ministers and Governors’ General etcetera; and that is how they 
exerted influence – which was considerable. They were able to ensure 
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certain things were done which suited them, just through that influence. 
This was how it was done in those times.” Hans (Central Govt.)  
Hans also commented that in addition to patronage from the “higher levels” 
of New Zealand society of the early 20th century, the structure of Plunket, 
with its system of volunteer committees and office holders provided 
opportunities for women to develop new skills and participate in public 
affairs.  
“Plunket was a deliberately set up with big name people heading it 
because that was how things were done, but it was also of course a grass 
roots organisation of people who wanted to see things were done to the 
best for their children. It was sort of an altruistic thing but of course it was 
also a means by which women who otherwise had not much opportunity to 
get involved in public affairs were able to do this.” Hans (Central Govt.) 
The value of establishing and maintaining long term networks for advocacy 
was identified in Weible’s work on advocacy coalition networks (2011) while 
Kingdon had earlier also noted the way politicians on Capitol Hill actively 
sought to establish connections with community networks (Kingdon, 2003).  
Plunket’s structure provided a network of individuals focussed on working 
together to advocate for child health and women participating in Plunket 
gained experience in the delivery of community services. Chaya described 
how her first involvement with child safety activities started through a 
volunteer role carried out for her local area Plunket branch.  
“I started as a Plunket Mum volunteer in my local area doing just my role. 
My role was that I volunteered to update the notice board and information 
for parents and putting things up about child injury prevention. So when I 
was connected into my local Safekids Coalition group through that, it was 
a good link, then it followed on that I would be working in the car seat 
rental scheme. It was very, very small beginnings and it was ‘learn as you 
go’, basically.” Chaya (Local Govt.) 
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The types of child safety interventions and programmes delivered by 
Plunket have changed over the years. Since its beginnings Plunket has 
played an important and ongoing role advocating for the introduction of 
safety measures across a range of areas including home safety, the 
provision of child car restraints and the prevention of drowning. Home safety 
was an early focus and during the 1940s Plunket advocated home safety 
equipment such as ‘play pens’ and guards for stairs, electric kettles and 
fireplaces.61  
During the 1980s Plunket’s focus changed from restricting children’s activity 
(recommendations to use play pens were quietly stopped) to modelling the 
provision of child safe environments by establishing suburban houses that 
demonstrated child safety features. Plunket’s volunteers also successfully 
advocated for safety changes such as the mandatory installation of 
tempering valves for hot water cylinders, which contributed significantly to a 
reduction in the number of hot water burns (Bryder, 2003). 
“We have seen work on falls prevention through provision of guards to 
stairs and steps; work on hot water modulation and I think the partnership 
with Housing New Zealand has been very fruitful. Plunket have led the 
way, along with Safekids.” Robert (Central Govt.)  
Plunket’s advocacy for child car occupant safety in New Zealand has been 
substantial and long standing, but in recent years has decreased (Bateson, 
2016; Royal New Zealand Plunket Society, 2006, 2009). In the 1950s New 
Zealand and Sweden were noted to have approximately the same mortality 
rate for child car occupant injuries, yet by the 1970s it was reported Sweden 
had more than halved its rate of child mortality due to this cause, while New 
Zealand’s rate had more than doubled.  
In response Plunket launched education programmes to alert people to the 
danger of children travelling in vehicles without specially fitted child 
restraints. At the same time the cost and limited availability of children’s car 
                                                          
61 Play pens are lightly constructed, four-sided wooden rail fences that can be placed within a 
living area and a child can be placed within it (usually depicted as accompanied by toys) in order 
to restrict their movement.  
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seats were quickly identified as major problems preventing families 
accessing and using child restraints.  
In 1981 Plunket launched New Zealand’s first car seat rental programme in 
Dunedin and by 1982 most Plunket branches across New Zealand had also 
moved to provide rental schemes (Bryder, 2003).  
“…car seats had been around for a wee while, but this was a means of 
popularising that babies and your children should be in car seats and 
making them available in a cheap rental programme, so that this was the 
(Plunket) car seat rental scheme.” Hans (Central Govt.) 
Plunket’s child restraint rental programme operated both as a partnership 
between government and community (which was initially well supported by 
government agencies) and as a ‘business’ that generated funds to enable it 
(ideally) to be commercially self-sustaining (Brown, 2006). The Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) and New Zealand Transport Agency 
(NZTA) provided Plunket with funding for child car seats, educational 
programmes and training for child car seat technicians (McLaren C, 2009).  
“NZTA have been good for providing resource at no cost. They have 
offered (Plunket) things to order, store and distribute internally. So… they 
might get 16,000 of something that they can take into storage at no cost 
for the production of the resource, which is good” Steffi (NGO) 
Plunket also worked closely with the New Zealand Police to inform the 
public about the need for child restraints, provide enforcement advice and 
to support their distribution to low income families. Robert commented on 
the success of the Plunket child car restraint rental programmes. 
“Car seats are probably the success story, and really the success lies in 
those two arms of effective enforcement by police and provision of car 
seats through Plunket.  … Police, particularly recently, have partnered 
well with other community agencies in a number of areas, and car seats is 
a good example of that. Where you have car seat enforcement you usually 
have Plunket or another provider there at the same time to make those 
seats available at very low cost to families.” Robert (Central Govt.) 
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Despite this success, by 2012 government funding for child car seat 
programmes became intermittent and was largely withdrawn. In 2014 ACC 
child car seat funding was partially re-established, but only for a limited time 
(Accident Compensation Corporation, 2014b).  
In 2015 Plunket ceased the provision of rental child car seats to the public. 
Plunket’s Council announced that due to changes in child car restraint 
products, and the fact they are now widely available online, in specialist 
baby shops and retail chains, the provision of rental seats for short term use 
was no longer a sustainable business practice (Bateson, 2016). Steffi 
commented:  
“There are different players coming into the manufacture and distribution 
of car seats, different costs and so over the years that has changed the way 
the Plunket society has been involved in child restraints. I guess change 
has happened in the way child restraints use is promoted.” Steffi (NGO)  
Plunket’s involvement in preventing child drowning has also been 
significant. In 1976 New Zealand had a drowning rate of 9.5 per 100,000 
children, while the international average was 4.9. Plunket was invited to join 
the newly formed Water Safety Council and in the 1980s began to lobby for 
the compulsory fencing of swimming pools (Bryder 2003).  
In 1980 a Local Government Amendment Act permitted local authorities to 
pass pool fencing by laws. However, by 1984 only 50 of the 232 local 
authorities had enacted a By-Law. Meanwhile Plunket’s activism for 
swimming pool safety continued. In May 1983 Plunket volunteers 
interviewed 8,430 parents of one to three-year olds, finding that 36% of 
these children had immediate access to home pools either on their own 
property or at the home of a neighbour, and that 63% of these pools had no 
safety features (Bryder, 2003, p. 228). The development of drowning 
prevention policy is discussed further in chapter eight.  
The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society with its professional workforce of 
qualified child care nurses coupled with (and supported by) a nationwide 
network of volunteers has proven an enduring and successful formula for 
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advancing child health issues, and its advocacy and collaboration with many 
organisations firmly fits the profile of a child safety ‘backbone’ or ‘broker’ 
organisation’ (Kania & Kramer, 2011).  
Safekids Aotearoa/New Zealand 
Safekids Aotearoa/New Zealand (Safekids) is an Auckland District Health 
Board service funded by the Ministry of Health to deliver child injury 
prevention services within New Zealand. 
New Zealand’s comparatively high incidence of preventable paediatric 
trauma to children under the age of 14 years had been noted for many years 
and in 1994 when New Zealand’s first specialist children’s hospital opened 
thoughts soon turned to identify or develop programmes to address this 
issue and in the early 1990s a New Zealand paediatric surgeon travelled to 
Washington DC to observe an organisation established to reduce 
preventable child injury in the USA. (Teague, 2014).62  
Safekids USA was founded in 1988 by Dr Marty Eichelberger (a paediatric 
trauma surgeon) and was supported by philanthropic contributions from 
USA corporate sponsors (primarily Johnson and Johnson and FedX Ltd.). 
The organisation adhered to the idea that a child injury prevention service 
needed to have close links to acute hospital care and the ability to draw from 
evidence-based research, which it should provide for individuals and groups 
who wished to promote child safety within their local communities. Safekids 
USA covered the safety of children from birth until the age of fifteen, ran an 
annual awareness raising campaign and supported local communities to 
deliver their own child injury prevention programmes.  
A small group of senior Starship medical staff saw this model as suitable for 
New Zealand and successfully sought Ministry of Health funding to start a 
local Safekids programme. In 1994 a Safekids New Zealand office was 
opened within Starship Children’s Hospital.  
                                                          
62 See Chapter One: A 2001 UNICEF report ranked NZ 22nd of all OECD Countries for the 
prevention of child injury. 
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Safekids’ early initiatives were to establish a library of child safety 
references; regularly publish items about child injury prevention activities 
(within its own quarterly magazine, Safekids News and in other magazines 
and newspapers) and run an annual child safety promotion campaign 
(Hanifan & Coggan, 1999; Safekids New Zealand, 1995, 1996, 2000). More 
recently Safekids has provided submissions to government agencies 
(Chambers, 2010) and hosted information workshops for the public 
(Safekids, 2004; Safekids New Zealand, 2002a, 2002b, 2007a). Sione 
noted Safekids’ contribution in providing resources: 
“The educational resources Safekids produces as well, the position 
papers, the fact sheets, the height charts, those sorts of things, where have 
they gone, and what was the value of them, what have they added. I think 
one of the comments I can make is that when things are well packaged, it 
is much easier for people to pick it up. If you want people to pick 
something up, particularly when it is not their core work and that is the 
difference.”  
Sione (Crown Entity)   
The annual child safety campaign was initially referred to as the “Kids Safe 
Campaign” which ran as a week of high profile media focussed activities to 
raise awareness of child safety issues called: “Kidsafe Week”. These 
activities were supported by contributions from several government 
agencies, which would provide small amounts of funding, staff time to 
support the campaign and/or create and supply resources with their 
departmental logos for distribution on the campaign. Each year the 
campaign focussed on one of the major causes of trauma within New 
Zealand such as burns, child pedestrian injuries or cycle injuries (Safekids 
New Zealand, 2000). In 2005 the Kids Safe Campaign changed its name to 
the Safekids Campaign and become a year-long focus supported by a 
funding from the Starship Foundation, industries and government agencies 
(New Zealand Government, 2007).  
One interview participant commented on the value of providing resources 
and being present in the community and for child safety debates:  
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“…it’s about constantly being there, turning up to the debates, having your 
information ready, having it well written, recruiting your stakeholder 
support.” Sione (Crown Entity) 
Safekids Aotearoa/New Zealand maintains a team of approximately eight 
staff based within Starship Children's Hospital. Sione commented on its 
reliance on others within communities to present child injury issues. This 
creates a difficult situation, where Safekids must decline invitations to 
present at events for local communities but is also reliant on such 
communities to promote child safety issues.   
“Safekids doesn’t have the capacity to deliver. When someone in a 
kindergarten rings up and says can someone please come out and do a 
presentation to our Mums, … Safekids is in the unfortunate situation of 
saying, look we just cannot make it. Another thing is that I don’t know if it 
would be good for Safekids to be involved in the local community like that, 
they are a national service. So, I think it is better for local people to 
deliver to their local community.” Sione (Crown Entity) 
Nearly thirty years after it was established Safekids continues to be Ministry 
of Health funded service of the Auckland District Health Board and 
publishes a quarterly Safekids News magazine, produces ‘fact sheets’ and 
‘position papers’ on child injury issues, delivers child safety workshops 
around New Zealand. The practice of routinely hosting high profile child 
injury awareness raising events no longer occurs, but Safekids still 
maintains a presence in media and engages high profile individuals to 
promote safety messages (New Zealand Government, 2007; Safekids New 
Zealand, 2006, 2007a, 2011, 2013). 
In 2015 Safekids carried out a comprehensive review of New Zealand’s 
child unintentional injury data and concluded that unintentional child injury 
rates had reduced significantly and were continuing to remain lower than 
previous decades. This report was published in the New Zealand Herald 
(Johnston, 2016a; Safekids Aotearoa, 2015b).  
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Child Safety Foundation 
The Child Safety Foundation was mentioned during interviews as an 
organisation that promoted child injury prevention in New Zealand. The 
Foundation was a charitable trust established during the mid-1990s to raise 
funds and provide child injury prevention resources for both sale and 
complimentary distribution to schools, libraries and community 
organisations. Its establishment was attributed to the commitment of one 
person, who set up the organisation and ran it as Chief Executive Officer, 
with the assistance of a Trust Board.  
“She (the CEO) was an interesting character, strong individual, passionate 
about child safety. There were tensions between her and Safekids, which 
was with (the manager at that time). So once again the personal 
relationships become important.” Jivin (Crown Entity) 
The Child Safety Foundation created and sold child safety information for 
communities and worked with ACC to deliver a child car seat technician 
training programme called ‘Safe2Go’ (Brown, 2006; Royal New Zealand 
Plunket Society, 2006). The Child safety Foundation also established a 
group called the Driveway Run-over Prevention Group (DROPP) which 
created and sold driveway run over prevention resources. In 2010 the 
Foundation closed, citing the non-renewal of a contract it had held with an 
unnamed government agency as the reason (Langson, 2010; NZPA, 2010).  
Other organisations that promote child safety 
The Paediatric Society of New Zealand was established in 1946 to provide 
a collegial network for New Zealand’s Paediatricians (latterly widened to 
include other child health professionals) and as a vehicle for establishing 
policy preferences and making submissions to government. The Society’s 
Child and Youth Epidemiology Service has contributed data and evidence 
based reports to inform decision makers (Craig et al., 2007). Other 
organisations have advocated for child safety improvements, including 
Rural Women (notably school bus safety) and Water Safe Auckland (now 
Drowning Prevention Auckland); Water Safety New Zealand and the Safe 
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Communities Foundation (including child safety as part of the Safe City 
accreditation process).  
Conclusion 
Advocacy and lobbying are poorly defined, yet participants considered them 
important for advancing child safety policy. Although interview participants 
sometimes used the terms interchangeably, advocacy (rather than 
lobbying) was most often used to describe activities and actions by 
individuals and organisations. Lobbying was ‘done’ now and then, when 
necessary. The focus of lobbying is narrow, primarily on political decision 
making. In contrast advocacy includes a wide range of actions, including 
those mandated by government (required in legislation); carrying out 
research into injury prevention (such as Plunket’s research into pool 
fencing) and ‘speaking up’ (through submissions, petitions and in the media) 
about injury issues.   
The presence of individuals and organisations speaking up and publicly 
discussing child injury prevention creates public discourse which, interview 
participants acknowledged, influences political decision makers. However, 
this strategy has risks. An attempt to establish a new hegemony of child 
safety by engaging in advocacy through public discourse can be counter-
productive. Literature suggests barriers to the adoption of child safety policy 
exist, for example the lack of political awareness, or commitment to the 
issue. The development of collaborating relationships and partnerships 
between agencies, groups and individuals is likely to provide better 
outcomes.  
Advocacy and lobbying involve the dissemination of public and private 
discourse that can shape social attitudes to safety and influence decision 
makers, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively. When the dominant 
discourse supports safety, this can create a ‘safety culture’ where there is 
widespread understanding and acceptance of child safety. Conversely, 
advocacy and lobbying can successfully promote discourse that generates 
challenges to, and dissatisfaction with, long standing safety measures and 
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contribute to their rejection and retrenchment, as the next chapter 
demonstrates.  
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CHAPTER 8: CASE STUDY: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
SWIMMMING POOL FENCING  
This chapter describes and explores the New Zealand Government’s 
legislative measures requiring the fencing of home swimming and spa 
pools. Events around the Fencing of Swimming Pool Act’s repeal and 
replacement with the widely criticised Building (Pools) Amendment Act 
(2016a) are described (Chambers, 2015; Davidson, 2016; Hon Te Ururoa 
Flavell & Marama Fox MP, 2016). 
The Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987 (New Zealand Government) is 
acknowledged as having been an extremely successful child injury 
prevention measure which, over its forty-year life, resulted in a significant 
and sustained reduction in the numbers of children drowning in home 
swimming and spa pools (Paediatric Society of New Zealand, 2013; Royal 
New Zealand Plunket Society (Inc.), 2015; Wynn, 2015).  Despite its intent 
(to prevent the drowning of small children), when the legislation was 
introduced it was considered highly controversial and was passed by 
Parliament as a conscience vote with only a small majority. Although the 
legislation was successful, opposition to its provisions remained. In 2016, 
the National-led government repealed the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 
(1987) and replaced it with the Building (Pools) Amendment Act (2016). 
This chapter tracks the process of policy change and in doing so identifies 
how themes from the interview data are manifest in a real-world example. It 
is argued here that oppositional discourse to mandatory swimming and spa 
pool fencing coupled with the insistence supervision should be referred to 
as the main drowning prevention method, had been ongoing, crossed 
government and community boundaries, recruited political (insider) support 
and was eventually effective in achieving legislation which reduced pool 
fencing compliance requirements. An extensive chronological table of policy 
events is provided in appendix 5. 
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The problem of small children drowning 
During the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s the 
occurrence of young children drowning in home swimming and spa pools in 
New Zealand went from being a relatively rare event, to becoming 
alarmingly common (Atkins & Laugesen, 1982; Local Bills Committtee, 
1983).  
The 1982 Report of the Committee on Child Health noted that in the five-
year period from 1973 to 1978 the percentage of children dying from 
drowning in home swimming and spa pools, as a proportion of all child 
deaths, had more than doubled. This trend continued. In 1983 the Local Bills 
Select Committee reported that from 1973 to 1982 the numbers of children 
drowning each year in home swimming pools rose from an average of 5 
deaths a year to thirteen (1983) and at  the end of 1981 the New Zealand 
Water Safety Council reported 17 children had drowned in home swimming 
and spa pools during that year alone (Atkins & Laugesen, 1982). By 1982 
New Zealand’s home swimming pool drowning rate for preschool children 
was 9.5 per 100,000, nearly twice the reported international rate of 4.9 per 
100,000 for similar countries (The Board of Health Commitee on Child 
Health, 1982, p. 146).63 
This was a problem associated with increasing affluence. In July of 1987 Mr 
John Terris MP (Western Hutt - Labour) commented in the House of 
Parliament on the steady increase in these types of drownings during the 
1970s and 1980s. The problem was emerging, it was suggested because 
increasing affluence meant more people could afford to build swimming 
pools in their back gardens (New Zealand House of Parliament, 1987). 
 
There is an important distinction between drowning that happens in home 
swimming and spa pools, and drowning that happens in public spaces, such 
                                                          
63 Until 2002 the term ‘drowning’ was only used to refer to a fatal event due to someone being 
immersed in (usually) water. Non-fatal events were ‘near drownings’. In 2002 the World Health 
Organisation adopted a definition of drowning that states “Drowning is the process of experiencing 
respiratory impairment from submersion/immersion in liquid”. This definition includes fatal and 
non-fatal drowning. See (van Beeck, Branche, Szpilman, Modell, & Bierens, 2005, p. 853) 
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as at the beach, in public fountains or in rivers and lakes. First is the 
difference in location. Pre-school child drownings in home swimming or spa 
pools happen when a child falls into a man-made water-filled hole which is 
in and around a home, a place most adults would assume can be safely 
accessed by unsupervised children. These ‘holes’ are usually built for 
swimming and include home swimming pools, spa pools, and temporary 
paddling pools. Garden ponds that unsupervised preschool children can 
access also present a danger, as do unattended buckets of water left at 
ground level (Hassall, 1989).  
 
Drownings in public places, such as at beaches and in rivers and streams 
are quite different and well described. These locations are away from 
homes, in public spaces. For many reasons (not just for preventing 
drowning) adults normally accompany preschool children while they are in 
public places and drowning events in these circumstances are usually the 
result of a breakdown of such arrangements (Langley, Warner, Smith, & 
Wright, 2001).  
 
It is commonly asserted that pre-school children can be effectively 
admonished to stay away from water. It is also claimed that children drown 
in home pools because of inadequate supervision. This stance infers these 
events are caused by negligent parenting, creates an unpleasant innuendo 
of blame and suggests that increasing (or providing ‘better’) parent 
education will be effective in preventing future death. In contrast, parenting 
advice stresses small children cannot be watched continuously while they 
are in a home environment and that such expectations are unrealistic 
(Hassall, 1989).  
 
Extensive education and public awareness programmes have been 
delivered by agencies such as Plunket and the Water Safety Council, with 
little or no impact on the numbers of children drowning in home pools and 
spas (Gardiner, Smeeton, Koelmeyer, & Cairns, 1985). Another narrative is 
that small children (under the age of five), can be ‘drown proofed’ by being 
‘taught’ to swim. This misconception is developmentally inappropriate and 
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even dangerous. Attempts at ‘drown proofing’ toddlers and babies have now 
mostly been abandoned (Meyer, Theodorou, & Berg, 2006). 
 
Alternatively, when drowning is not attributed to inadequate parenting, 
claims are made that these events are ‘inevitable’ and ‘unavoidable’ (Local 
Bills Committtee, 1983; New Zealand House of Parliament, 1987). 
Extensive investigation into the narratives of individuals who were present 
at this type of drowning event strongly indicates the reality is otherwise. In 
a 1977 study of sixty-six home swimming pool drownings in Queensland, 
researchers Pearn and Nixon addressed the idea of the ‘inevitability’ of this 
type of drowning by stating:  
 
“It is commonly said, with some vehemence, that children will still 
drown even though adequate fences are built. We can find no 
supporting evidence whatsoever for this view. We have yet to 
discover a fatal swimming pool accident in which an effective fence 
(with a self-closing and locking gate) has been present” (Pearn & 
Nixon, 1977, pp. 432-437). 
 
Pool owners without children living in the home sometimes claim pool 
fencing is unnecessary for their circumstances. Pearn and Nixon also found 
that 50% of the children who drowned, or nearly drowned (non-fatal 
drowning), did so in pools that were not in their own back gardens. This 
supports advice for all pools to be fenced, not just those in the homes of 
small children.  
 
In 1985 an examination of the circumstances of sixty drownings of Auckland 
children (younger than seven) found:  
 
“The unfenced or inadequately fenced domestic swimming pool was 
the most common hazard (for drowning). The household bath and 
partially filled buckets represent further though less frequent 
dangers. The study reaffirms the need for legislation making the 
fencing of domestic swimming pools mandatory. Elsewhere, children 
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playing in or near water need constant supervision” (Gardiner et al., 
1985, p. 579).  
 
In 1989 the circumstances of thirty-six consecutive cases of under-five-year-
old domestic swimming pool drownings in New Zealand were reviewed and 
the findings were published by the Medical Director of the New Zealand 
Plunket Society, Dr Ian Hassall, who noted:  
 
“Ten of the drownings occurred on properties where pre-schoolers 
were not ordinarily present” ...and...  “The availability of a pool cover 
did not prevent five of the drownings, which reinforces the point that 
safety measures that do not operate automatically will at times fail. 
Covers can contribute to the risk of drowning by preventing the 
missing child from being seen by searchers..." (Hassall, 1989, p. 
146). 
By the late 1980s it was recognised by many that something more than 
public education was needed to stop the drownings, which on average were 
happening monthly and steadily increasing in number. Legislation, child 
safety advocates and health professionals said, was required (Gardiner et 
al., 1985; Hassall, 1989; New Zealand House of Parliament, 1986).  
Hard won: The Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987 
The first public policy attempt to reduce the numbers of pre-schoolers 
drowning in home swimming pools was a petition delivered to Parliament in 
1975 by petitioners identified as “J Callagher and 800 others” requesting 
legislation for mandatory swimming pool fencing (1975). In 1979 parliament 
passed the “Local Government Amendment Act” (s 684(34)) that enabled 
Local Councils to create a By-Law that would require compulsory swimming 
pool fences within their jurisdictions (New Zealand Government, 1979). In 
1980 the Standards Association of New Zealand published a ‘Model 
Swimming Pool Fencing By-Law’ that Councils could adopt and implement 
within their jurisdictions (Standards Association of New Zealand, 1980).  
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By 1980 Plunket had joined the newly formed Water Safety Council in their 
call for compulsory home swimming pool fencing and together these groups 
actively promoted research projects and produced and published 
educational material.64 
However, opposition to the introduction of mandatory fencing for home 
swimming pools was strident from some quarters, even in the face of 
continued and increasing numbers of child drownings. Such objections 
prompted the then Medical Director of Plunket, Dr David Geddis to 
comment:  
“The issue is a simple one of little toddlers, mostly under the age of 
three, falling into man-made holes in the ground and drowning. Yet 
some have seen in the proposed campaign to prevent such tragedies 
a threat to the basic fabric of our free society” (Bryder, 2003, p. 228)  
In 1979 an Australian ergonomic study explored the effectiveness of various 
types of fences for preventing children accessing pools. Five hundred and 
fifteen children aged between one and seven years of age were tested for 
their climbing ability over a variety of fences. The researchers found that: 
 
“eighty percent of 2-year olds, the modal age for child drowning, 
cannot climb a 60cm fence” suggesting that fencing is effective for 
preventing children in this age group accessing a swimming pool 
area” (Nixon, Pearn, & Petrie, 1979, p. 260) 
In 1979 legislation was passed that permitted Councils to pass a Standards 
Association Model Pool Fencing By-Law, should they wish. It quickly 
became apparent that New Zealand local councils were reluctant to require 
mandatory pool fencing through a By-Law and legislation was required 
(Local Bills Committtee, 1983; Standards Association of New Zealand, 
1980). 
                                                          
64 These included educational publications and drowning reports by the Royal New Zealand 
Plunket Society, the New Zealand Water Safety Council, Parent Centres and the (then) Health 
Department.  
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In 1982 the first Private Members Bill requiring the mandatory fencing of 
home swimming pools was tabled in the House by Mr John Terris, Labour 
Member of Parliament (MP) for Western Hutt. This Bill was referred to a 
Select Committee for a report and was permitted to lapse. Despite the Bill 
lapsing due to standing orders, a report was tabled in 1983. The Local Bills 
Committee Chairman, (Mr Geoff Thompson, Horowhenua MP National 
Party) reported that only 35 Councils (of 135) had voluntarily required 
mandatory swimming pool fencing and stated that: 
“Reliance on education alone would achieve very little in reducing the 
number of pre-school drownings in private swimming pools” and… 
“Pre-school drownings in private swimming pools are preventable 
and pool fencing is the most effective means of achieving this” (Local 
Bills Committtee, 1983).   
In 1984 the National Government of Sir Robert Muldoon was defeated, and 
the fourth Labour Government commenced its first term. A second version 
of the Fencing of Swimming Pools (FOSP) Bill, also sponsored by Mr Terris 
MP, had its first reading on 4th June 1986. It was referred to the Internal 
Affairs and Local Government Select Committee who reported back to the 
House on the 11th of March 1987. On the 15th of July 1987 the Bill was tabled 
for third and final reading. At this reading there was an attempt by National 
Party Opposition Members to refer the Bill to another committee for further 
debate and postponement. The motion was defeated, and the Fencing of 
Swimming Pools Bill passed into legislation with a majority of thirty-one 
Members of Parliament (Labour) in support, to twenty MPs (National) in 
opposition. The FOSP Act officially commenced on 20th July 1987 (New 
Zealand House of Parliament, 1987). It required all home swimming pools 
to be fenced and local Councils were given the responsibility of ensuring 
this occurred (New Zealand Government, 1987). 
A key feature of the FOSP Act was its simplicity. From 1988 swimming pools 
and ponds deeper than 400mm were required to have a fence of no less 
than 1.2 metres in height. It was primarily the pool owner’s responsibility to 
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ensure their pool was fenced. Anyone building a home swimming pool or 
installing a pool that fell within the Act’s description was required to inform 
their Territorial Authority, who was also required to “take all reasonable 
steps to ensure the Act is complied with within its district” (Section 10). 
Territorial Authorities were also empowered by the Act to enter properties 
to inspect pools (Section 11 New Zealand Government, 1987). The 
Schedule to the FOSP Act informed Territorial Authorities of the 
construction detail required for pools to comply with the Act. This included 
information as to what was acceptable to use as a pool fence, what sort of 
gates were to be used and that any doors entering a pool from a house 
should be self-closing and automatically latch securely (Schedule to the Act 
Clause 9.1). Delegating responsibility to Territorial Authorities for 
enforcement (as a regulator) was a suitable strategy because home 
swimming pools are often integral parts of home building projects and these 
agencies have the major responsibility for enforcing building regulations.  
A wide variety of commentators acknowledge the FOSP Act contributed to 
a significant reduction in child drowning, including government agencies and 
researchers. Each year after the FOSP Act was passed the numbers of 
children drowning in swimming pools steadily reduced. By 2008 the average 
number of small children drowning in home pools had reduced from ten to 
three per year, in the context of a huge increase in the number of pools. 
Drowning events that did happen were almost exclusively in pools that were 
noncompliant with the FOSP Act at the time (Auckland Regional Public 
Health Service, 2015; Child and Youth Mortality Review Committee, 2009; 
Gulliver, Chalmers, & Cousins, 2009).  
After many years of advocacy, the battle to achieve this reduction in 
fatalities through the introduction of pool fences with lockable gates seemed 
to be won. 
Collaboration on pool fencing 
The FOSP Act 1987 provided impetus for collaborative activities and 
advantage was seen in local councils working together on swimming pool 
safety. Collaboration, defined as working together to create a shared 
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dialogue and achieve agreed goals, was a major emergent theme from 
participant interviews within this research and are discussed more fully in 
chapter five. Collaboration, it is noted, creates the opportunity for an 
organisation to have greater impact, reach more people and be more likely 
to be successful (Coggan & Gabites, 2007; Kania John & Kramer Mark, 
2011).  
Collaborative projects included sharing information leaflets (referred to as 
the “Your Pool - Your Responsibility” project); the 2009 publication of the 
Pool Fencing Safety Standard: NZS8500; holding collaborative meetings; 
and the establishment of a training programme for pool inspectors 
(Department of Internal Affairs (DIA), 1999; Standards New Zealand, 2006).  
During 1999 an initiative known as the Auckland Regional Pool Safety 
Group was started. This group provided a forum for pool inspectors from 
each of the seven local Councils in the Auckland Region (who had a 
regulatory role in pool fencing enforcement) to meet and discuss 
enforcement issues. The group also included representatives from the pool 
building industry and the child safety sector.  
Not all Councils participated initially, but eventually the Regional Pool Safety 
Group became accepted as a useful forum for pool fencing enforcement 
discussions. A consistent, ‘core group’ of Councils attended and a senior 
Water Safe Auckland staff member chaired the meetings. These 
collaborative activities created agreement and shared understandings 
between group members.65 
Imia worked as a senior Council employee during the early 2000’s. During 
her interview she commented on this project;  
“Water Safe Auckland and I, through my contact with the Watersafe 
Auckland CEO, instigated bringing together the seven territorial 
authorities in a regional pool safety forum. Initially there were only five 
(of us). Two Territorial Authorities were reluctant to share their 
                                                          
65 During the years 2007 and 2008 I was an invited attendee to meetings of this group, in the role 
of child safety policy advisor at Safekids NZ.  
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experiences or look for a co-ordinated approach to pool fencing across 
the region. Thankfully they joined a couple of years later. There was a lot 
of pressure coming on from Water Safe Auckland which is a great 
organisation to have on board, because they were working in a regional 
way and could deal with each of the authorities individually, as well as 
collectively. Through that process of having all the TAs (Councils) on 
board there were a lot of gains.” Imia (Local Govt.) 
Teuila was part of a non-government organisation and attended these Pool 
Safety Group meetings. She commented on the value of the parties coming 
together around the table at regular times:  
“I (as a Water Safe Auckland representative) chaired the monthly 
meetings where we generally had about twenty, sometimes more there, 
including pool compliance staff.  So that communication was really 
working well, and everyone wanted the same things. We all talked about 
the key issues, how some home owners were having trouble getting 
compliance; the key issues for compliance (pool inspection) staff; and the 
key issues that were causing any of the drownings” Teuila (NGO) 
The benefits of having Auckland’s disparate and sometimes warring 
Councils working together had long been noted elsewhere. In November 
2010 a major restructure of the region’s local government infrastructure 
amalgamated Auckland’s Councils (Lewis & Murphy, 2015). This heralded 
a quiet end for the Regional Pool Safety Group. With amalgamation, they 
could now operate as one team under a single management structure. This 
reportedly had a positive impact, with Teuila noting:  
“Yes, Council have got to the stage where, in the past it was almost like 
you were dragging them up, now it has got to the stage where they are 
there, and leading. It is a different way now.  ... (Water Safe Auckland) 
relationship with Council is really, really worthwhile.” Teuila (NGO) 
The “Your Pool Your Responsibility” programme provides another example 
of collaboration to promote safe pool fencing. Hamilton City Council first 
delivered a programme of information leaflets and posters under the tag line 
 209 
 
‘Your Pool - Your Responsibility’ in the of summer 2002. It was well received 
and caught the attention of Water Safe Auckland and the Regional Pool 
Safety Group, who moved to adopt it. Photos, diagrams and text were 
added, and the programme extended to other areas of New Zealand. Two 
research participants commented on this programme during their 
interviews. 
“Hamilton had a “Your Pool - Your Responsibility” project, so …(we) 
contacted them and said, “Can we steal your idea and use your 
resources?” …and they said ‘yes, of course and off you go’” 
Teuila (NGO) 
Imia descried the programme as becoming popular very quickly.  
“...the information was provided in a pamphlet form, with checklists such 
as the height projections, the climbable fences, gate maintenance and what 
have you.  It was something we readily provided to the home owner and is 
still being delivered throughout the Auckland area.  On the back of that 
about seven other territorial authorities have picked up the 'your pool your 
responsibility' package and have tailored it for their own areas. These 
include four Councils on the West Coast of the South Island, Thames/ 
Coromandel DC, Hamilton, Far North DC, Whangarei DC, Buller DC, 
Manawatu DC, Nelson DC and quite a few others. There are twelve or 
thirteen in total. So quite a few utilise the concept, this includes the 
brochures and the messages that go out.” Imia (Local Govt.)  
 
Two years later, in 2014, the programme was continuing to be adopted 
around the country, with Teuila commenting: 
“We had the seven Councils in Auckland and now about another 17 
councils around the country have bought into the concept by taking the 
resources and removing everyone else’s logos but leaving “Supported by 
Auckland Council” or having their own logo put on the resource they 
distribute.” Teuila (NGO) 
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The programme was described as a major success, in part because it 
provided easy to read information for retailers and home owners. It also 
enabled Councils to reproduce the leaflets with their own contact details and 
logos and was considered successful because it provided an opportunity for 
local government agencies to work together. Such collaboration is identified 
as a recurring feature of successful and effective child safety projects (Kania 
& Kramer, 2011; MacKay et al., 2006). 
Seeds of discontent and dispute 
Local Authorities responded to being given responsibility for pool inspection 
in a wide variety of ways. After the FOSP Act was passed some councils 
took to the task readily, operating routine pool inspections with a well-
informed, established pool inspection team and running rigorous systems to 
revisit properties where pools did not comply. Others took to the task lightly, 
infrequently checking pools in their area and using strategies such as aerial 
photography to check pools were fenced. Some ran careful cost recovery 
programmes for pool fencing applications, while others subsidised the 
programme through general rates, enabling them to operate a simpler 
system with fewer records. Robert noted this variability when commenting 
about his involvement with pool fencing safety:   
“Hastings has a strong history of enforcement. I have been actively 
involved in that, even to the extent of being asked by local government 
enforcement officers to go to a house to provide an expert opinion about 
whether a particular safety feature was scalable by a small child and why; 
and even having to provide evidence in court to that effect. Obviously in 
other councils, you have the Napier City Council right next door, with 
effectively no, or almost no enforcement of pool fencing legislation.” 
Robert (Central Govt.) 
Evidence of the variability of local council pool inspection regimes was 
published by researchers in 1999 and again in 2009. The first report, funded 
by the Water Safety Council showed that in 1997 only 28% of councils were 
undertaking regular checks of swimming pool fences and of those pools 
checked only 44% were compliant at the time of checking (Morrison et al., 
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1999). By 2009 a second report showed this number had increased. In 2007 
(at the time of the survey) 63% of Territorial Authorities were checking 
swimming pools. The increase was noted as positive by the authors, but the 
result still indicated a substantial number of pools remained unchecked by 
any regulatory agency. The authors expressed concern that those 
unchecked pools were very possibly non-compliant (Gulliver et al., 2009). 
Despite the steadily dropping drowning rate for pre-schoolers and the 
increase in regulatory activity by local government agencies, dissatisfaction 
about pool fencing enforcement rumbled on in both local government and 
parts of the community.  
Regulations affecting the form and structure of built environments influence 
property values. Pool fencing is an area of council regulatory responsibility 
that is susceptible to this type of dispute, fuelled by conflicts between pool 
owners and local council enforcement staff about the safety of the home 
owner’s pool fencing provisions. Debates frequently ignite when council 
compliance officers require property owners to make changes to their 
homes, or gardens. Disagreements result in litigation. One council in West 
Auckland was accused of excessive enforcement and a small group of 
individuals led by a disgruntled pool owner created the ‘New Zealand Pool 
Owners Action Group’ website, posting media releases that challenged the 
methods used by local Council staff to enforce swimming pool fencing 
regulation. The website described pool fencing requirements as ‘punitive 
measures against pool owners’.66 The group raised funds and sought a High 
Court judgment over definitions in the FOSP Act and Building Code. In a 
Reserved Decision Justice Randerson found lack of clarity about the 
definition of the ‘immediate pool area’ was an issue and recommended the 
matter (and legislation) be brought back to Parliament (Waitakere City 
Council v Hickman, 2004).  
Dissatisfaction was also expressed by Councils unhappy at the need for 
their involvement in what they saw as additional regulatory activity. At the 
                                                          
66 The Pool Owners Action Group website is no longer in existence. The site, www.poag.org.nz/ 
was last accessed 20 /12/2016.  
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2004 Annual General Meeting of the representative body for Local 
Government, (Local Government New Zealand) a remit was passed that the 
organisation should approach the Minister of Local Government (and ACC) 
to request issues related to swimming pool fencing be addressed. The 
issues included problems with definitions in the Act; who was liable under 
the Act; the legality of having doors that provide direct access between the 
house and the pool; and the responsibility of councils to enforce the fencing 
of garden ponds and portable pools (pers. com 2004).67 
Although prescriptive, the FOSP Act included a disputes process should 
home owners believe their circumstances adequately provided safety for 
children without complying with the letter of the Act’s requirements. This 
process was called an ‘Exemption’ and permitted home owners to appeal to 
their local politicians to be the final arbiter on whether the compliance 
requirements being imposed by council staff were acceptable (FOSP Act 
section six). Pool owner’s applications to their local council for exemptions 
are numerous but difficult to locate, with each territorial authority having a 
different method of processing exemptions and different processes for 
recording the outcomes. Auckland Council, for example delegated the 
processing of Exemption applications to specially convened subcommittees 
within Local Board Areas. In one month alone (June 2014) the Ōrākei Local 
Board Pool Fencing Committee considered nine applications for 
exemptions, approved six and declined three (Ōrākei Local Board, 2014).68 
On 20th October 2006 oversight for the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 
moved to the Department of Building and Housing from the Department of 
Internal Affairs and provisions for pool fencing compliance became included 
within the Building Code (Department of Building and Housing, 2008).  
                                                          
67 One of the research participants provided the researcher with a PDF copy of a letter written in 
2004 apparently by the Local Government New Zealand President at the time, Basil Morrison. The 
letter stated these issues and was addressed to the Ministers of ACC and Local Government. Local 
Government New Zealand (LGNZ) was contacted as part of this research and asked if they would 
corroborate the authenticity of the letter but they declined to comment or provide AGM minutes 
for that year.  
68 At the 2013 census the population of the Ōrākei Local Board was 79,539 people, which was 
5.6% of the total population of Auckland at that time (Auckland Council, 2018b).  
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The Department of Building and Housing is authorised to issue 
‘Determinations’ about pool fences. This is a formal, quasi-judicial process 
and parties usually employ a lawyer, or barrister to present the case on their 
behalf. Determinations are used less frequently than the Exemption process 
and are primarily a method of resolving conflict between parties (for 
example a home owner and a council) over interpretations of the Building 
Code. Determinations apply only to the situation under consideration and 
do not set precedent (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 
2014b).  
In 2012 the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) became part of the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) and provided 
records of Determinations as a searchable online national data-base 
(Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2018a).69  
In January 2017 the Determinations database was searched by this 
researcher using key words related to pool fencing. These were: ‘hot tub’, 
‘spa pool’ and ‘swimming pool’. The total number of Determinations each 
year ranged from one, to the maximum of seven in 2010. The words ‘hot 
tub’ on their own, showed no results. 
The words ‘spa pool’ provided records of two applications which were 
declined. One in 2002 was to use a lockable cover to secure the spa pool, 
instead of a fence and was declined. The other one requested permission 
to use sliding doors to secure the spa pool and was declined.  
The next key search term entered was ‘swimming pool’. This search found 
41 requests for determinations. Of these determinations eight were outside 
the scope of this topic (these included questions about disability access to 
public pools). The remaining 33 cases were applications for a determination 
before the law changed in 2016. Of the pool fencing applications; 
                                                          
69 The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) was created in 2012 by the 
merger of the Department of Building and Housing (DBH), the Department of Labour (DoL), the 
Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and the Ministry of Science and Innovation (MSI). 
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• three requested the use of an infinity edge as a pool barrier and were 
declined;70  
• four requested the use of automatic sliding doors between the house 
and the pool and were declined; and  
• one requested the use of a pool cover instead of a fence and was 
declined. 
The remaining 25 applications dealt with other details of property layout; 19 
were declined and 6 were approved, including one that used a landscape 
design rather than a fence (see appendix 4). 
Each declined Determination (and Exemption) represented a proposal for 
the arrangement of someone’s property that was considered unacceptable 
by the council and MBIE, and each represents a constituent potentially 
disaffected with how the provisions of the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 
(1987) impacted on their property. 
This reflects the opinion that some people consider that pool fencing 
involves the unreasonable intrusion of government into private space. 
During his interview Jivin raised the importance of such discourse:  
“It comes back to, in one sense this particular issue of government action 
into the private realm. We have ‘Nanny State’ stuff around now (that 
says): ‘I don’t want the government telling me what to do in my private 
space so what is the government doing telling me about fencing my 
playground and my pool at 400 mm depth or 300mm depth, and what is 
the government doing telling me how to bring my children up.’” Jivin 
(Crown Entity) 
In 2016 media commentary around the proposed revision of the legislation 
included objections to the existing legislation which replicated those 
promulgated originally in the 1980s, these included the inevitability of 
children drowning in swimming pools, the claim that better supervision will 
                                                          
70 An ‘infinity pool edge’ is where the pool edge is a thin wall which provides a vertical drop to a 
much lower surface. Pool water flows over the edge, creating a waterfall into a lower trough and 
providing the edge of the pool with a visual illusion of the water disappearing.  
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prevent children drowning in pools and that any requirement for swimming 
pool fencing imposes an ‘unreasonable burden’ on home owners.  
Despite research to the contrary, one pool industry company website posted 
that it is ‘failure of supervision’, rather than the absence of a barrier that is 
the reason children drown in swimming pools. Paraphrasing the ‘Your pool 
- Your responsibility” tag line, the website states “Your child - Your 
responsibility’, echoing an orientation toward personal responsibility and the 
perspective of children as private property. The website owner posts: 
“(Company)… initiatives since 2008 have had the objective to get the 
lack of parental supervision recognised as the prime contributor to 
child drownings and the first line of prevention” (Swish Automation 
Ltd., 2018). 
Alongside the claim that supervision prevented drowning, not fences, 
industry figures also accused the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act of stifling 
commercial opportunity because of the additional cost of fences (Stock, 
2015). Others complained the Act did not permit certain products to be used. 
Emails released under the Official Information Act (1982) show that between 
the years 2010 and 2012 one business owner repeatedly emailed the 
Minister of Building and Construction (often copying emails to other public 
figures involved in pool fencing compliance). These emails requested the 
Minister remove local government from its pool fencing regulatory role and 
requested fencing rules to be redrafted to increase the range of products 
that could be used for barriers, so that products sold by the company 
(automatic sliding doors) could become an accepted way of fencing a home 
swimming pool.71 These emails also asked the Minister to direct officials to 
accept the business owner’s standing as a technical adviser in the 
development of any new legislation or regulation (2010-2012). 
                                                          
71 The Department of Building and Construction had issued four Determinations which declined 
permission for sliding doors to be used as part of a pool fence barrier. (Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment, 2018b). These decisions were based on MBIE’s interpretation of the 
law, which did not permit the use of sliding doors of the type manufactured and sold by the 
business owner.  
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Continued correspondence achieved one sought-after response. On 10th 
February 2010 the Minister for Building and Construction wrote to the 
company owner saying: 
“I am also considering asking the Department of Building and 
Housing to hold meetings with representatives from the pool industry, 
local councils and water safety organisations to help inform 
legislative changes. I will send your letter to officials in the 
department and ask that they include you in any such meeting” 
(Williamson, 2011).  
The existing Act was also questioned by others for not being safe enough. 
In 2002 an investigating Coroner called for more clarity in the clauses that 
required the fencing of spa pools (NZPA, 2002; Waitakere City Council v 
Hickman, 2004). Imia, who had worked in pool fencing compliance 
programmes commented on coronial recommendations:  
“... if you take the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act, for argument's sake, I 
can remember about nine or ten coroner's recommendations calling for 
the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act to be revamped, calling for it to be 
changed. There have been some consultation documents released recently 
but we are now twenty years down the track and maybe ten years later 
some coroners had called for an upgrade of that legislation.”  
Imia (Local Govt.) 
The purpose of the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act, which was to prevent 
small children from drowning, was mired within ongoing arguments about 
individual rights, parental responsibility, definitions, permission to use 
products and litigious activity over fencing designs and architectural plans. 
Those same arguments had been evident in the 1980s and were defeated 
but had persisted. Now, under the leadership of a Minister seemingly 
responding to business lobbying, change was imminent.  
Spa Pools and hot tubs – a flash point 
Spa pool fencing was contentious. One recurring argument had been about 
whether smaller pools such as spa pools and hot tubs needed the same 
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fencing provisions required for swimming pools. Spa pools and hot tubs are 
manufactured products of varying types which can be installed in a variety 
of ways, with some installed at ground level, while others have raised sides, 
with or without step ladders. Often referred to as ‘small heated pools’ they 
are usually less expensive to install than swimming pools, and more 
numerous. This differs from home swimming pools, which are usually ‘in 
ground’ structures incorporated into a house building or renovation project.  
Spa pools and hot tubs are sold with lockable (or latch-able) covers, that 
while important for conserving the heat of the water, are also considered by 
some as safety devices, an opinion not universally shared. This caution is 
based on drowning narratives which indicate spa pool covers are ineffective 
as a method of preventing drowning (Hassall, 1989). The inadequacy of spa 
pool covers as a safety mechanism was tragically demonstrated in 2002 
when a Coroner found that an 18-month-old child drowned after the child’s 
father (during his search for her) replaced the cover of the spa pool he had 
recently been using, inadvertently trapping her beneath. The Coroner 
concluded that the absence of a fence or closed door contributed to the child 
drowning (NZPA, 2002).  
The efficacy of using covers, including swimming pool, spa pool and hot tub 
covers as the only safety mechanism (barrier) for preventing drowning was 
examined in 2006 by the Swimming Pool Fencing Standards Committee. 
This Committee (which included industry representatives) considered the 
wide variety of products available and ruled out accepting covers as ‘stand-
alone’ safety devices because they did not consider them to be safe 
(Standards New Zealand, 2006).  
Disagreement about Council’s role as a safety inspector for small heated 
pools has persisted. In 2009 an Auckland City Council Committee attempted 
to circumvent the FOSP Act by passing a resolution to establish a ‘blanket 
exemption’ so spa pools and hot tubs within the Auckland Council area 
would not need to be fenced or inspected. This attempt to circumvent the 
FOSP Act was later revised by Council into an application to government 
for a law change (Auckland City Council, 2009). 
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Differences of opinion about spa pool safety were evident between Councils 
and their representative body, Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ).72 
Auckland Council’s 2015 submission to parliament stressed routine spa 
pool and hot tub inspections should still be carried out to ensure safety 
measures were being maintained (Auckland Council, 2015). At the same 
time their representative organisation submitted to both the Building Pools 
Amendment Bill and Government Regulations Review that spa pools and 
hot tubs should be fully exempt from local government inspections, tersely 
noting “this amendment has been discussed since 2006 and again in 2013 
and still has not been implemented” (Local Government New Zealand, 
2015, p. 21).  
Dismantling safety 
In October 2016 the National-led government repealed the FOSP Act and 
replaced it with clauses within the Building Act (2004). This section looks at 
government discussion documents, regulatory impact statements, cabinet 
papers, parliamentary debates, submissions, and media articles about the 
Building (Pools) Amendment Act 2016. 
The first major review of the FOSP Act occurred in March of 2008, with the 
distribution of a discussion paper signed by the Acting Deputy Chief 
Executive, Sector Policy of Building and Housing, rather than the Labour 
Minister of the time, the Hon Shane Jones. This was not unusual. Rick 
commented on the way policies sometimes become part of a government 
agenda is through their advancement by officials:  
“Officials will pop up, often-times with policies, year in and year out, 
election after election until someone says yes. So, they have if you like, 
their agenda that they are putting in front of their Minister.  
Rick (Central Govt. Politician) 73 
                                                          
72 LGNZ describes itself as the national organisation of local authorities in New Zealand. They 
represent the national interests of councils and lead best practice in the local government 
sector. LGNZ provides advocacy and policy services, business support, advice and training to 
our members. All 78 councils are members. 
73 This comment was also mentioned in Chapter Seven, Advocacy and Lobbying.  
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This 2008 discussion document stated the purpose of the review was to 
assess risks posed under the current Act, improve uniformity of Territorial 
Authority interpretation, provide more certainty for pool owners and increase 
public awareness of pool owner responsibilities (Department of Building and 
Housing, 2008, p. 4). 
In November of 2008 a general election occurred, and a National Party 
minority coalition government became the 49th New Zealand Parliament. 
The Hon Maurice Williamson was appointed as Building and Construction 
Minister and held the portfolio for six years from 2008 until 2014.  
In March of 2013 the Minister released a second discussion document on 
pool fencing called “Making pool fencing easier”. This document took a 
different approach to the preceding 2008 document. It discussed the need 
to ‘balance’ child safety with ‘reducing cost' and providing ‘efficiencies’. In 
the foreword the Minister stated the ‘inevitability’ of pre-schoolers drowning 
in pools, stating; “Remember, there will always be a risk of drowning as long 
as we have swimming pools” (Williamson, 2013b, p. 4). The argument that 
drowning in pools was ‘inevitable’ had been raised and refuted thirty years 
earlier, both in debates in the House and research (New Zealand House of 
Parliament, 1987; Pearn & Nixon, 1977).  
The 2013 consultation document proposed a raft of changes to the Fencing 
of Swimming Pools Act, including removing any mandatory requirement to 
fence swimming pools, an online process for owners to confirm their home 
pool was fenced (rather than visits by regulators) and narrowing down the 
scope of the Act to allow the building of deep unfenced, bodies of water 
within gardens, as long as they were not used ‘primarily’ for swimming 
(Williamson, 2013b).   
The consultation document received 392 submissions. Submitters were 
permitted to identify themselves only by predetermined categories, shown 
on the table below.  
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Table 3: Summary of submissions
 
(Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2013b, p. 7). 
In an initial summary MBIE noted that although ‘safety groups’ made up only 
3% (n=11) of submitters, they included the Royal New Zealand Plunket 
Society and the Paediatric Society of New Zealand, who have large 
memberships (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2013b). 
This description was one of the forced choices in the consultation and 
diminished the roles and standing of these organisations in a way that did 
not accurately reflect the numbers of their members, functions or status as 
legal entities.74 
Despite this acknowledgment, the associated Cabinet report 
disenfranchised and minimised the views of the members of those 
organisations, claiming safety ‘groups’ contributed only 3% of submitter 
input, in contrast to ‘private individuals who owned a pool’, who were said 
to be 39% of submitters (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 
2013b).     
In November 2013 the Minister tabled three documents, a Consultation 
Summary, Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) and Policy Proposal at the 
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee. These documents 
included a raft of recommended changes to the pool fencing policy regime. 
Child safety, originally the main purpose of the original Act, was reduced to 
become only one part of the policy proposal. The Minister stated: 
                                                          
74 The Starship Trauma Service is a service team within Starship Children’s Health; however, both 
Plunket and the Paediatric Society are legal entities and established organisations with large 
memberships. They would not usually be referred to as groups.   
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“I propose amending the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1897 (the 
Act) to reduce the compliance burden the Act currently imposes on 
pool owners and Territorial Authorities (councils), while maintaining 
child safety’ (Williamson, 2013a).75   
The Minister continued to reduce the standing and representation of 
submitters who were concerned about child safety.  In the Policy Proposal 
tabled at Cabinet the Minister stated: 
‘Some safety groups – Plunket, Paediatric Society and Starship 
Trauma Service - advocated restricting access to all water hazards 
outside the home that are dangerous to young children. While this 
approach could avoid an estimated four drownings every ten years, 
it would cost $40 million (NPV) to apply the Act to all garden ponds” 
(Williamson, 2013a).76 
The Minister’s claim that these organisations made submissions to 
‘…restrict access to all water hazards outside the home…’ was misleading. 
None of these submissions included any statements that could be 
interpreted in this way. The author of this thesis was involved in the 
preparation of the Starship Trauma Service submission (and is familiar with 
its content) and the other two are available online (Paediatric Society of New 
Zealand, 2013; Royal New Zealand Plunket Society (Inc), 2013). This 
statement stereotyped those organisations as unreasonable and inferred 
‘safety groups’ made irresponsible financial demands in their responses to 
the consultation.77 
The Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) also had notable shortcomings. 
First, it firmly stated there are “unknown quantities” of garden ponds, then 
ascribed a cost ($40 million NPV) to their supposed fencing (Ministry of 
Business Innovation and Employment, 2013c). Next, it omitted any mention 
of the fiscal cost or social or personal impact of paediatric drowning 
                                                          
75 Italics added for emphasis.  
76 ‘NPV’   refers to the term “Net Present Value”. 
77 The Plunket submission to this consultation is no longer the Plunket website, but should be 
available from MBIE on request under the Official Information Act (1982). 
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morbidity, substantially under-estimating the potential fiscal impact of the 
policy (Auckland Regional Public Health Service, 2015; Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment, 2013c).  
The only technical advice on pool products referred to within the RIS (on 
automated sliding doors and pool alarms) was provided by the owner of the 
company distributing them and who had repeatedly emailed, called and met 
with the previous Minister during the years 2011 and 2012 (Ministry of 
Business Innovation and Employment, 2013c, p. 10). 
Advocacy for child safety was minimised and misrepresented while 
business opinion was sought and referenced. This behaviour is consistent 
with Tenbensel’s description of neoliberal political decision making: 
(Neoliberal) “…models have been branded exclusionary, in that they 
seek to disenfranchise and exclude all but an elite of neo-liberal 
proponents from decision-making processes” (Tenbensel & Gauld, 
2001, p. 39).  
Tenbensel notes that proponents of neoliberal policy are principally 
concerned with economic freedom and performance, arguing that the 
economy should take precedence over all other considerations (Tenbensel 
& Gauld, 2001, p. 36). The Minister’s focus on fiscal and economic issues 
was also evident in the 2013 consultation document, where in the foreword 
the Minister invited the public to “…balance child safety with reducing cost 
and providing efficiencies”.  
The minimisation of input from a child safety perspective is also evident 
within public service documents. Emails sent in 2013 and released under 
the Official Information Act appear to show an MBIE Senior Policy Advisor 
providing little time for policy colleagues in other agencies to read relevant 
documents, minimising their input. An email sent at 14:43pm on the 18th of 
September 2013 had three documents attached for discussion in a meeting 
scheduled for the next morning at 9:30am. When staff in the other agencies 
commented on the short time they were given to prepare for the meeting, 
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they were assured by MBIE officials that they ‘did not need to worry’ or read 
the documents. The email states:  
“I don’t expect you to have read any of the documents before the 
meeting, because at the meeting I will brief you on the cabinet 
paper…See you tomorrow” (Ministry of Business Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE), 2013). 
This email was provided under the requirements of an Official Information 
Act request and was provided without context and so may not be, as it 
appears, an attempt to manage or reduce opportunity for other agencies to 
fully contribute to this policy development.78 
Despite shortcomings in the RIS, the Minister was successful in gaining the 
Cabinet Committee’s permission for the policy proposal’s advancement to 
the status of a draft bill (Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure 
Commitee, 2013). This policy was moving forward.  
Not all went smoothly for the Minister in other respects. In May 2014 he 
resigned and the portfolio was passed to a second National Party Minister, 
for whom MBIE prepared another briefing (Savage, 2014). 
This was the second time in two years the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment (MBIE) had produced a Briefing for an Incoming Minister 
(BIM). The first was in 2013 (for Housing) and the second in 2014 for the 
new Minister (for Building and Housing).79 Neither Briefing document 
mentioned the FOSP Act, or swimming pool drowning as an issue that 
required addressing, yet the new Minister continued with the legislative 
process for this policy (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 
2013a, 2014a). There is little research that examines how consistently the 
content of BIMS reflects current departmental work programmes or 
subsequent government policy. 
                                                          
78 One research participant noted that public servants sometimes engage in ‘gaming the system’ 
to advance their ideas or proposals. See Page 77.  
79 This portfolio appears under two different names. In some instances, it is referred to as the 
Department of Building and Housing, on other occasions it is referred to as the Department of 
Building and Construction.  
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The new Minister continued to pursue the introduction of replacement 
legislation for the FOSP Act. A new Act, the Minister announced, would 
permit ‘performance-based assessment’ of swimming pool barriers and be 
more practical and flexible, while at the same time maintaining safety. Any 
requirement for spa pools to be inspected for safety would also be removed 
(Smith, 2015b). 
The move to stop inspecting spa pools was described by the Ministry of 
Health’s Chief Advisor, Child & Youth Health as likely to ‘increase the risk’ 
of children drowning. In November 2015 Dr Tuohy sent a strongly worded 
email: 
“The Minister and MBIE should consider that they are at the same 
time introducing legislation around the fencing of swimming pools 
which may actually INCREASE their liability for children drowning or 
being brain damaged from near drowning” (Tuohy, 2015) (emphasis 
present in original email). 
The Minister dismissed these concerns in press statements and 
correspondence (Smith, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a). An article in the business 
section of an online newspaper praised the changes, noting the cost of 
installing spa pool should be reduced because of the removal of any need 
for fencing or safety inspections (Jones, 2015).  
In July 2015 a second RIS and Policy Paper on pool fencing were tabled at 
a Cabinet meeting. These documents sought permission to repeal the 
FOSP Act in its entirely and requested several technical changes to the 
original proposal, not related to child safety. All requests were agreed and 
the Cabinet Minute invited the Minister for Building and Housing to proceed 
with the Bill and issue drafting instructions to the Parliamentary Counsel 
Office (Cabinet Office, 2015). 
In September 2015 the Building (Pool) Amendment Bill was introduced into 
the House for its first reading and referral to the Local Government and 
Environment Select Committee. One hundred and eighty-three written and 
thirty-one oral submissions were provided on this Bill. One hundred and fifty-
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five of submissions (85%) opposed the proposed legislation either 
completely or in part, while 28 (15%) were supportive. Those who advised 
the government against adopting the new strategy for preventing child 
drowning included child health and water safety organisations, private 
individuals including the mother of child who had drowned in a swimming 
pool (Radio New Zealand, 2016); Auckland Regional Public Health Service 
(2015); Plunket (2015); Water Safety New Zealand (2015); the Paediatric 
Society of New Zealand (2015); and the Office of the Commissioner for 
Children (2015a). 80 
Submissions supporting the legislative changes were provided from 
industry figures, and pool owner representatives, including a hot tub 
manufacturer, the Swimming Pool Builders Guild and the Pool Owners 
Action Group. Industry support centred on the capacity of the new rules to 
permit additional products and different pool designs. This was because the 
FOSP Act had provided one set of compliance requirements within its 
schedule. The Building Act (2004) differs because it added many other 
methods to achieve compliance to the Building Code. These are referred to 
as acceptable solutions, alternative solutions and waivers.  
Some submissions, such as one from Auckland Council, supported parts of 
the Bill, such as the provisions for issuing fines to pool owners and 
increased powers of entry into homes. The Council also emphasised the 
need for spa pools to continue to be routinely checked for compliance 
because child proof covers are found to deteriorate over time and become 
noncompliant (Auckland Council, 2015).  
“The (Auckland) Council’s view is that given the similar risks that spa 
pools, hot tubs and portable pools can pose for young children, the 
exclusion of those pools from the periodic inspection regime will not 
result in the best outcomes” (Auckland Council, 2015, p. 6: section 
3.10.15). 
                                                          
80 In emails circulated to Members of Parliament during 2015. 
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Conflicting messages were evident. In contrast to the concern expressed 
within Auckland Council’s submission, Auckland Council’s Manager for 
Building Compliance was at the same time quoted saying the law change 
to remove spa pools from fencing and inspections was a “long awaited step 
that has been requested by territorial authorities and the judiciary for many 
years” (Jones, 2015).  
Lobbying continued during the passage of the Bill. In November 2015 an 
open letter from a pool industry representative supporting the Bill was 
circulated to Members of Parliament and other pool industry individuals. The 
letter again requested the removal of Territorial Authorities from pool fencing 
regulatory activity and the use of new technologies, such as pool alarms 
and covers. The author stated: 
“Gentlemen, we in the pool industry have everything to be proud of 
and it is time, as an industry we all stand up and challenge the PC 
crap that our nation is currently bombarded with especially in regard 
to the evils of owning a home pool....” (Hole, 2015) 
The Minister defended the Bill in the media and House of Parliament as 
being a more ‘practical and pragmatic’ approach to pool fencing that 
permitted greater flexibility, while maintaining child safety. The Minister 
claimed to have provided ‘child safety’ by the clause in the Bill that required 
all Councils to have an inspection regime, rather than ‘take reasonable 
steps’ to identify pools in their areas, as in the FOSP Act (New Zealand 
House of Parliament, 2015; Smith, 2015b). Comment from Councils about 
this was muted.81 Most Councils already operated regular inspection 
regimes and the exclusion of spa pools and hot tubs from any inspections 
meant the mandatory requirement for inspection was not necessarily an 
overall increase in regulatory activity. 
The Select Committee Report and a revised version of the Bill were returned 
to the House in September 2016. Changes recommended by Government 
                                                          
81 An exception was Hamilton City Council who objected to mandatory inspections on the 
grounds of cost to the council and rate payers (Gardner, 2015).    
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MPs included shorter times for mandatory inspections (three yearly rather 
than five yearly), and provisions for introducing “Independent Pool 
Inspectors”, but otherwise leaving the same (lack of) safety provisions as 
previously. Because the Select Committee could not come to agreement, 
the Green and Labour Parties provided an alternative report with wide 
ranging changes (New Zealand Government, 2016b). This was ignored by 
the Minister.   
Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) are the last opportunity to change a 
Bill during its progress through the House. Three SOPs were tabled, one 
from the Minister that made changes related to regulatory powers for Local 
Government, one from the Labour Party with changes to the way doors 
could be latched closed, and a comprehensive SOP from the Green Party. 
The SOP tabled by the Minister was supported by the Government and its 
support parties (but not the Maori Party). SOPs tabled by Opposition 
Members were not. At the time it was passed, the law change generated 
only a small amount of critical media coverage and an article from the 
Minister defending the changes (M. Johnston, 2016b; Smith, 2015b). 
On 28th of October 2016, the Bill was tabled in the House for its third and 
final reading. There were 73 votes in support and 43 votes against. It was 
supported by the NZ National Party (59 votes), Act (1), United Future (1) 
and New Zealand First (12). The Maori Party (2), Labour (29) and Green 
Party (14) voted against. The Building Pools Amendment Bill (2016) was 
passed. 
Conflicting discourse, insider knowledge and oppositional frames 
Consistent with the critical and normative orientation of this thesis, we can 
ask if there are lessons to be learned from this repeal of successful child 
injury prevention policy. Questions such as, why and how did swimming 
pool fencing policy came to the fore at that time? What factors led to health 
and water safety organisations and child safety experts becoming 
marginalised in legislation directly related to their area of expertise?  
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Views opposing pool fencing often include claims that small children are 
obedient, can be taught to prevent themselves from drowning at the same 
time they learn to walk and can be continuously supervised while they are 
in a home (Webber, 2016). Homes are also considered private spaces and 
it is expected that intrusions, despite good intentions, into that space will be 
limited. Rules requiring mandatory swimming and spa pool spa fencing are 
seen by some to intrude onto that privacy (Simpson, 2010). 
Conflict and discontent about the regulatory process also persisted. Such 
opposition may have been fuelled in part by the Fending of Swimming Pools 
Act. It was perhaps the best (possibly only) policy option at the time it was 
introduced, but inspections were the responsibility of many and diverse 
individual regulators (councils). Central government politicians largely 
ignored threats to industry interests and recurring issues with Council 
enforcement practices. The standardisation of compliance requirements 
was left to voluntary collaboration by Councils and the philanthropy of 
private interests (Standards New Zealand, 2006).  
Compliance responsibility was left almost entirely to private home owners 
and the policy created options for lengthy and expensive disputes 
processes, including litigation. Exemptions were being provided by local 
council politicians, and challenges to the regulators were happening on a 
frequent, if not daily basis (Ōrākei Local Board, 2014). 
In response, individuals and groups who were focussed on removing 
mandatory pool fencing recruited politicians with a market focussed 
orientation to help ‘fight the cause’ against pool and spa fencing regulations, 
and against councils working as regulators. These individuals shared the 
everyday perspectives of those seeking fewer regulations and ways to 
achieve increased profit (and a living) from the swimming pool and spa 
industry. The interests of councils could also be served by reducing their 
regulatory burden. The politicians involved had insider access to legislative 
processes and were experienced political combatants. They were motivated 
to respond to the constituents who contacted them regularly and provided 
information. These constituents were provided with such a degree of access 
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and influence that officials identified them in government papers as 
‘technical advisors’ (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 
2013c, p. 10).  
In contrast, the Minister stated in the House he had met with “paediatricians 
and advocates for child safety” to discuss the Bill, but when asked for details 
of those meetings (under the Official Information Act) the request was 
declined on the basis the Minister met ‘so many hundreds of people’ during 
his work that no records were kept (Smith, 2016b). 
During the 2000’s child health and water safety organisations framed the 
Fencing of Swimming Pools Act (1987) as a success that could be improved 
with more enforcement and regulation (Newman, 2015). These groups 
worked closely together across many child health issues and in the 
infrequent event of a drowning could present united messages in the media 
as ‘concerned child health professionals’. However effective this seemed as 
a strategy, the repeated use of the same messages and spokespersons set 
the scene for those collaborating organisations to become vulnerable to 
being stereotyped and marginalised (Ministry of Business Innovation and 
Employment, 2013c). 
During the new Bill’s progress, there were few opportunities for interaction 
between MBIE, the industry, regulators, disgruntled pool owners and child 
safety organisations and little exchange of information. A submission from 
the Pool Owners Action Group to government characterised child health 
advocates as an unreasonable and intransigent opposition (Weikart, 2015). 
During the drafting of policy documents, by either design or accident, MBIE 
appears to have given ACC and Ministry of Health staff even fewer 
opportunities (and less time) to become expert (or even familiar) with the 
details of their proposed swimming and spa pool compliance policy 
proposals (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE), 2013).   
The eventual repeal of Fencing of Swimming Pools Act was ultimately 
determined by those opposed to the policy being more effective at justifying 
change and recruiting political insiders than those within the child safety 
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sector were at upholding the safety provisions. The dominant political (and 
Ministry) discourse became that the pool fencing compliance regime was 
no longer required in its entirety (drownings are now rare); fostered conflict; 
extracted undue economic cost and delivered repeated affront to the private 
property rights of multiple constituents (Smith, 2016c). The Building Pools 
Amendment Act (2016) was offered as the solution to these issues and 
opposition to it was framed as impractical and unreasonable.  
Foucault warns of ‘problematisation’ becoming ‘polemics’ where, (as Gray 
[2004] also describes) groups fail to adequately engage with those 
presenting opposing discourse, considering the persons confronted as “not 
a partner in search for the truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong”. 
Polemics, Foucault notes, denies the credibility of the opposition and is a 
corrosive force against achieving the best outcomes. Polemic debate is 
especially evident within the political realm (Foucault, 1984 in Rabinow, 
1998).  
The Fencing of Swimming Pools Act, and its success in preventing drowning 
had been widely acknowledged, and child safety advocates seemed to hold 
conviction of the rightness of their position. Despite their confidence, child 
safety advocates needed vigilance, engagement and to undertake 
deliberate actions that would prevent ongoing arguments opposed to the 
policy from becoming adopted politically.  
Once the argument that many pool fencing safety measures were no longer 
required (such as garden pond fencing) had reached the political realm the 
dominant polemic became that the public would benefit from government 
repealing the existing pool fencing legislation and replacing it with an 
alternative policy. 
To counter this, equally compelling objections from child safety advocates 
were required. Child safety advocates needed to convince the wider 
community of the unsuitability of the proposals, provide solutions other 
stakeholders accepted, recruit significant insiders and sway political 
decision makers against the proposed policy changes. This did not happen. 
Policy changes which reduced child safety were adopted.   
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The ‘status quo’ for pool fencing? 
The government replaced successful standalone child safety legislation with 
a series of clauses within the Building Act that are acknowledged as 
providing less safety than the previous policy regime (Tuohy, 2015). Safety 
concerns with the new policy include: 
• The removal of any requirement for pool fence gates and doors 
leading from within the house to the pool area to ‘latch’ closed.82  
• Garden ponds are no longer included, so deep and unfenced ponds 
can be built on private property, provided they are not ‘normally’ used 
for swimming.  
• Spa pool and hot tubs no longer have any requirement for a fence 
and are excluded from any on-site safety inspections; and  
• Spa pool and hot tub retailers are required to hand out safety leaflets 
at point of sale without evidence of the effectiveness of this approach 
for improving safety.   
The effectiveness of the new legislation for reducing either child drowning, 
or property owner dissatisfaction is yet to be demonstrated.  
  
                                                          
82 It is noted that the ‘Acceptable Standard’ produced by MBIE in 2017 requires a latch. An 
Acceptable Standard is a detailed direction for compliance. It is unclear where this can be 
enforced without the provision being present in the Building Code Schedule to the Act (F9). 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
This research set out to better understand the development and 
implementation of New Zealand’s child safety policies. Several questions 
were asked. These included “who sets the government’s child safety 
agenda, why are some projects adopted while others languish, how are 
resources obtained, what information is provided, do high profile events 
influence policy, and can common influences be identified through thematic 
analysis? While this research provided answers to these questions, more 
questions arose during the journey to answer them and the complexity 
around how and why governments respond to child safety policy issues 
became apparent.  
Methodologies used were interviews and the presentation of a case study. 
The Foucauldian approach of exploring the detail of everyday actions and 
discourse was used. These were underpinned by the normative expectation 
that preventable child injuries are best avoided.  
During the 1980s New Zealand’s unintentional child injury rate was noted to 
be comparatively high amongst the OECD countries (The Board of Health 
Commitee on Child Health, 1982). During the 1990s key barriers to the 
adoption of child injury prevention policies in New Zealand were attributed 
to a failure to prioritise child injury prevention, and the lack of available 
information and resources (Tuohy, 1999). Although some Government 
programmes were developed and implemented, concern was expressed 
that much of this effort was ineffectual (Langley, 2010). Despite such 
criticisms, there is clear evidence that in recent years child injury rates have 
been falling (Johnston, 2016a).  
Answering the question about what information is provided to inform child 
safety policy was relatively straightforward. Injury prevention has 
traditionally included public health methodology which requires a step by 
step process that starts with the identification and explicit description of 
problems, their measurement, followed by the identification and testing of 
solutions, which must be implemented, and results recorded. This approach 
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has had many successes but has also been criticised for repeatedly failing 
to bridge the gap from evidence to policy and the publication of such 
research is not recognised as a definitive motivator for the introduction of 
government policy (Langley & Brenner, 2004; MacKay, Macpherson, Pike, 
Vincenten, & McClure, 2010; Mock, Peck, Peden, & Krug, 2008).  
Research projects may be influential because they identify issues and their 
authors can promulgate discourse, but  a single research project is usually 
insufficient to focus the government’s agenda onto any specific public health 
or social issue. Moreover, caution must be exercised when academics 
attempt to deliver policy prescriptions to government, rather than reporting 
data as scientists. Such advocacy efforts can be counterproductive when 
they fail to take into account wider social trade-offs and accommodations 
politicians must make, thereby alienating decision makers (Gluckman, 
2013; The Editor: The Lancet, 2011).  
A simple cause and effect relationship is often ascribed to political 
awareness of an issue and the introduction of policy. This suggests that if 
politicians seek a governmental outcome, it happens. Although political 
leadership is necessary, is not usually enough on its own to ensure effective 
child injury programmes are delivered by government. Such attribution 
conflates the decisions of politicians and public servants, failing to 
acknowledge the complex jostling between politicians and public servants 
for sought after projects to be prioritised, the effect of outsider advocacy and 
the disruptive impact of electoral cycles (Chapman, 2007, 2015; Kingdon, 
2003). 
There was a research question about whether governments are prompted 
into policy development following tragedy. The answer is, prosaically, 
sometimes. The Pike River Mine disaster exemplifies how the loss of 
multiple lives resulted in major change to legislation (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Library, 2014). This is not always the case. Under the same 
system, many children drowned (though not in a single event) before the 
government passed and implemented policy that required home swimming 
pools to be fenced and it took almost thirty years for recommended child car 
 235 
 
restraint law to be adopted (Appleton, 1983; Bridges, 2012; Gulliver et al., 
2009; Local Bills Committtee, 1983). Such differences highlight the scarcity 
of New Zealand research into the critical factors that make some policies 
and programmes more - or less - likely to be adopted, funded and 
implemented.   
The last and most important question was whether themes about how and 
why policies are introduced by governments could be identified through a 
qualitative research process. This thesis identifies and explores the themes 
of power, funding, collaboration, perceptions of safety and supervision, and 
advocacy and lobbying.  
This research draws attention to the importance of achieving widespread 
acceptance of issues and supports the observation that the broader the 
base of people involved in the development and sharing of evidence and 
desired hegemony, the more likely it is to be adopted by government 
insiders and political decision makers (Bugeja et al., 2011; Gluckman, 2011; 
Murdoch Children's Research Institute, 2017).  
This research also draws attention to the complexities of government 
decision making and emphasises the need for child safety advocates to 
have ‘insider’ information about how and when government makes 
decisions. Kingdon’s research showed there was no single place in which 
power resided in America’s legislature. Moreover, Kingdon and other 
researchers identified that public servants are not neutral, apolitical agents 
who constrain themselves to delivering only projects determined by 
politicians (Hartley et al., 2013; Kingdon, 2003). Government insiders at all 
levels mobilise resources and establish programmes that operate outside of 
usual political decision-making processes.  
Throughout this thesis, interview participants described the things they did 
that ‘made a difference’ for child injury prevention. Government employees 
discussed how resources were found (the road safety coordinator who ran 
a local poisoning prevention project), funding was provided (Ministry of 
Health managers who argued for the prioritisation of child injury prevention) 
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and how insider knowledge was used to advance child safety policy (the 
Crown Entity Advisor who arranged a meeting between expert researchers 
and government decision makers). When public sector employees enable 
the development of government funded child injury prevention programmes, 
this can be interpreted as an example of the expression of government 
power (Burchell et al., 1991; Hartley et al., 2013; Kingdon, 2003). 
In contrast to traditional representations of power as the purview of rulers 
and leaders, this thesis highlights how the exercise of ‘government power’ 
at many levels has been important for the simple, pastoral, social good 
function of keeping children safe from accidental harm. Rather than power 
being entrenched within select social groups, ‘power’ (in the case of child 
injury prevention) can be seen as diffuse and characterised by individual 
action (Peterson & Bunton, 1997). This perspective is heartening, because 
instead of looking for expressions of power in the application of force, 
accumulation of wealth or behaviour of rulers, it suggests we can find the 
workings of power in the everyday occurrence of child injury prevention 
actions within family, society and government (Hindess, 2012).  
Foucault asserted that within modern society power is dispersed through 
both society and government, a dynamic he described as governmentality 
(Burchell et al., 1991). Child safety policy provides a useful lens on the 
concept of governmentality because it incorporates both private and public 
spheres. Governmentality proposes there is a link between the traditional 
differentiation of self-governance (governance of one’s own personal 
morality and spirituality), governance within the family (the parental83 
responsibility to keep order within the family) and governance of the state. 
The family and the modern state, flow from each other (Burchell et al., 1991; 
Lemke, 2000; P. Miller & Rose, 2009). Modern society, Foucault said, 
accepted government as an expression of paternalistic guidance, which 
Foucault suggested, “…ushered in the age of the government of ‘life’ and 
‘life processes’”(McHoul & Grace, 1998, p. 71). The modern state, Foucault 
                                                          
83 To signal the historical and traditional context of this analysis we note that Foucault used the 
word ‘patriarch’ which is replaced. 
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pointed out, has become involved in the ‘pastoral’ training of individuals to 
conform to norms, shaping and guiding thinking and in caring and controlling 
their populace (Burchell et al., 1991, p. 3). One interview participant 
described his perception of the interrelationships and communications 
between community and government, describing them as a ‘a constant 
weaving… a ballet dance between them all…” (see page 181) with neither 
government or community leading or dominating decision making. 
Since its early days as a field of study, injury prevention leaders have 
recommended practitioners work collaboratively and build coalitions to 
deliver services and achieve objectives (Coggan & Gabites, 2007; MacKay 
& Vincenten, 2010; World Health Organisation, 2007). This advice is echoed 
across government agencies in other sectors, with collaboration cited as an 
important part of best practice public service delivery. An important feature 
of collaboration is that it creates a need for dialogue between groups and 
organisations, and the forging of agreements to work together, which in turn 
creates shared discourse and understandings (Erakovich et al., 2013; 
Majumdar, 2006; Marek, Brock, & Savla, 2015; Office of Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2003; R. Scott & Boyd, 2016). 
Collaboration takes many forms and has important preconditions. Kania and 
Kramer’s (2011) analysis of organisational collaboration describes types of 
collaboration and identified the importance of ‘backbone’ organisations, who 
financially support and sustain the work of other organisations. This 
research identified the Ministry of Health as an important ‘backbone’ 
organisation that funded multiple collaborative injury prevention 
programmes. Organisations that received Ministry funding often funded 
others, who in turn supported further groups (see appendix 3). Such 
‘backbone cascades’ (hierarchies) of collaborative support were not 
identified by Kania and Kramer, nor have they been previously described or 
discussed by other scholars. They do, however, add another layer to the 
analysis here. 
Collaborative injury prevention projects are often difficult to evaluate 
because they typically involve contributions from multiple partners and 
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deliver social outcomes over time periods longer than the original project. 
Other challenges arise when groups vary in their assessment of priorities, 
there are multiple and unclear objectives, and over lapping roles which 
create challenges for accountability. The failure and cessation of 
collaborative projects sets up the opportunity for government agency 
resistance to future projects.  
Valuable and essential aspects of collaboration, such as framing and shared 
discourse can create challenges. In 2009 Shiffman noted the apparently 
idiosyncratic rise of health issues on the world stage and linked this to their 
successful public portrayal by organisations and institutions seeking 
resources for their eradication or management. This success required the 
consistent depiction and promotion of issues, referred to as ‘frames’. When 
effective, these portrayals are adopted by governments and organisations 
who share discourse about them and can collaborate more effectively 
(Shiffman, 2009). Framing is increasingly used in politics and is perhaps 
most evident in the promotion of environmental issues, where the 
identification and widespread acceptance of issues (such as plastic bag 
pollution) has prompted policy change (Gray, 2004; Lakoff, 2014).  
None-the-less the use of ‘framing’ is not always conducive to collaborative 
decision making. Gray (2004) looked at environmental discourse, or 
‘frames’ used by environmental groups. Framing is often described as a 
social construct, or ‘lens’ stakeholders use to make sense of their issues 
and conflicts. This description is only partial, because it suggests passivity; 
a lens is simply a way of looking. Using the term ‘identity frames’ Gray 
described the dynamic growth of these frames through evolving group 
interaction. As individuals adopt and use terminology shared by the group, 
membership of the group becomes a powerful part of group members’ self-
identity. The stronger and more self-defining identity frames were (and the 
more they were reinforced by a group’s process), the less likely it was those 
groups would successfully communicate or collaborate with groups who had 
opposing frames (Gray, 2004). In the case of pool fencing, the ‘problem’ of 
pool fencing was framed differently by different, equally strongly self-
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identifying groups - those in support of more stringent pool safety regulation 
and those supportive of less. One group (the group supportive of less 
regulation) managed to recruit a powerful ‘insider’. Their interpretation of the 
problem was accepted (albeit not by everyone) and prevailed. The issue 
moved into the political realm, where there was little communication 
between groups and no apparent attempt at resolution of opposing views. 
Whether such communication would have changed the outcome is 
uncertain (though previous inter-sectorial communication had been 
successful in developing a Pool Fencing Standard), but without 
communication between those groups, according to Gray, an agreed 
outcome was very unlikely and subsequently did not occur. 
Political ideologies can also contribute to the rejection of child safety 
measures. The retrenchment of pool fencing policy illustrated how policy 
initiatives can be grounded in a politically driven motivation to promote 
business interests over other considerations. A range of mechanisms were 
used effectively by political and government insiders, which included 
negatively stereotyping and marginalising child safety practitioners, 
reframing the issues and providing increased standing and access to 
business over child health expertise.  
Despite drives to promote acceptance of child injury prevention, advocacy 
for child injury prevention was described as a ‘battle’ by several interview 
participants. The topics of parenting and the supervision of children evoke 
strong opinions. Interview participants reported hostility and challenge 
during interactions revolving around adults caring for children in 
playgrounds. Governments are accused of being a ‘nanny state’ for 
requiring safety standards. Conversely, when a child is injured, especially if 
the injury was fatal or life threatening and preventable, there are often public 
expressions of moral outrage, blame and accusations of neglect (Hymel, 
2006; Thomas et al., 2016). Such accusations can also become personal. 
One participant reported being called a ‘Safety Nazi’ when he was speaking 
at a playground design seminar, another recalled a parent challenging them 
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with “Are you saying I am a bad parent?” during a discussion about the 
supervision of children at a beach. 
Origins of the battle may lie within parts of the injury prevention discourse. 
Safety is often measured with positivist methodology, by counting injury or 
trauma that leads to hospitalisation or death and noting how it is reduced 
through safety measures.84 The measurement of injury in this way suggests 
safety can be reified, considered a thing that has quantity and substance. 
When there are more admissions for trauma, there has been less safety, 
the more safety present, then there is ‘less’ of something else, such as 
unsafe behaviour, or excitement or risk or adventure. This is enmeshed in 
debates about whether all injuries should be prevented, or just some, or 
most. Such debates usually skirt the issue of the heterogeneity of injury 
circumstances and diversity of consequences. Such debates routinely avoid 
discussing the difference between promoting circumstances that might 
result in a child having a minor injury (such as a grazed knee) as opposed 
to permitting circumstances that might result in a child’s avoidable, 
unnecessary death. 
In contrast to the common perception of child safety (injury prevention) as 
being restrictive and precautionary, the public health orientation within the 
sector focuses on encouraging children to be active and participate in new 
experiences (such as enjoying water environments) while staying safe and 
how much (or what) injury is acceptable are topics discussed cautiously 
(Peden et al., 2008). Bruises and scratches and most types of broken bones 
can be considered a normal part of growing up. Risk taking is part of healthy 
development and injury prevention and child education literature often 
debate the issue of exposing children to risk while keeping them safe. In 
practice, injury prevention practitioners struggle to identify the most 
acceptable and effective ways of advising parents of ‘all the things they 
would prefer to know about’. Achieving a balance between providing useful 
information without appearing overly intrusive or vague and judgemental is 
a constant challenge for injury prevention practitioners (Brussoni et al., 
                                                          
84 It is also measured by how people feel, and their belief about how safe they are. 
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2014; Campbell & Cowley, 2015; Green, 1997; Johnston & Ebel, 2013; 
Mack, Sogolow, Strouse, & Lipman, 2008; O'Neill, 2016).  
Injury prevention academics have responded to this challenge by focussing 
on positivist deconstruction of the supervision circumstances between child 
and caregiver. At the same time, they describe and codify the outcome 
(impact) of trauma on the human body, then deduce antecedents and 
consequences (Haddon Jr, 1968; B. Johnston, 2016). There is an 
underlying normative value of creating a safer world and a desire to project 
this value and its accompanying methodology widely, so that both the 
positivist approach to the science of injury prevention and a safety culture 
can be achieved.  
Sociology describes and explores risk differently. In a sociological sense 
“risk” is a socially constructed phenomenon that characterises modernity 
(Beck, 1992a, 1992b; Green, 1999). Risk, in this context is a social 
construction of control and anxiety, of unstated manipulation. Beneath the 
surface of this analysis is the normative value of ‘freedom from control and 
surveillance’. Governmentality adds to the anxiety in that there is intrusion 
and control of our everyday, private lives. Surveillance and ‘big data’ are the 
‘panopticon’ of modern society. Yet the panopticon is without morality, it 
simply exists. Injury prevention practitioners, on the other hand, selectively 
collect and present data, coupling this with the careful framing of issues to 
create a moral imperative for government to prevent child injury. 
The moral imperative to enact injury prevention strategies affects the 
personal realm. One interview participant hypothesized a relationship 
between the severity of an adverse outcome, government action and 
personal control, wherein government intervention was considered more 
acceptable when there was a higher level of risk and more severe 
consequences (page 163).  
This draws attention to the ideas of ‘control’, ‘risk’ and ‘consequence’ as 
motivating factors for either rejecting or accepting government injury 
prevention initiatives. It also highlights the interest that government has in 
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the population accepting (and welcoming) the provision of injury prevention 
programmes.  
This thesis links child injury prevention to governmentality and highlights the 
importance of child safety discourse becoming hegemonic. The stakes are 
high. Modern government is engaged in pastoral care, and if child injury 
prevention is an expression of government power, then rejection of 
government’s imperatives for its population to care for children and avoid 
their harm, would be a rejection not just of the politicians currently in power, 
but of government itself.  
The failure of child injury prevention advocates to manage oppositional 
discourse and work collaboratively across government and community 
groups creates a situation where government insiders might shift 
commitment away from child injury prevention. This analysis suggests that 
without government support for child injury prevention programmes, 
community support is also likely to falter, creating a feedback loop where, 
just as in the 1980s, those who continue to support child safety will no longer 
be able to access information or prioritise resources for the development of 
government injury prevention policy or programmes.   
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CHAPTER 10: CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, most child injury prevention policy and safety interventions are 
delivered through a wide range of government funded projects and 
programmes. Reduced rates of preventable injury signal this strategy has, 
to the present time, been a success. That success has been achieved by 
political and community leadership, and by government insiders who, 
supported by injury prevention advocacy, have provided resources for injury 
prevention programmes and contracts which have promoted collaboration 
between groups, organisations and agencies. Such programmes are 
validated by positivist scientific method, while at the same time seeking to 
embed child safety discourse and behaviours as a dominant hegemony 
within New Zealand society.  
Limitations of the research methodology within this thesis were discussed 
briefly in the methods chapter and are revisited here. Thematic analysis and 
purposive sampling (of both interview participants and the case study) are 
subject to the introduction of bias, which was managed primarily through an 
explicit values statement (page 13) and challenges throughout the 
supervisory and examination processes. Undisclosed bias remains due to 
the deliberate anonymising of interview participants (page 51). It is possible 
that different findings may arise if the same questions were asked of a group 
with different demographic or social features. This is another research topic.  
A second bias is that purposive sampling and narrative interpretation might 
direct the researcher to self-evident, banal findings. For example, interview 
participants disclosed how important government is for the delivery of child 
injury prevention programmes, which is unsurprising as most were 
government employees. This is an acknowledged limitation, but participants 
were chosen for this research because they were known (by the researcher) 
to have supported child injury prevention and were identified as best placed 
to provide insights into government decision making. This thesis was about 
government decision making. The research also identified other elements 
important to the decision-making process, such as insiders and outsiders, 
the challenges of collaboration and the counterproductive nature of 
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polemics. Despite these limitations, this thesis provides a starting place for 
further research into New Zealand child safety. 
Research into the drivers behind government’s development of child safety 
policy is essential. There cannot be a simple assumption that within the 
complexity of government, insiders will always be able to prioritise 
preventing avoidable harm to children. Discourse within government 
changes and ideologies which promote other outcomes are championed as 
more pressing priorities. Safety laws can be repealed, programmes 
abandoned, and funds reallocated (Bland et al., 2011; Bowman & Aitken, 
2010; Shepherd et al., 2013; World Health Organisation (WHO), 2007). 
Much like the advancement of the rights of women and minorities to 
participate fully in society, constant effort is required to avoid regression. 
Non-government organisations, groups and individuals provide important 
leadership in their roles as government outsiders who advocate to influence 
government and promote safety practices, so they become embedded as 
social norms. It is not a simple task to influence governments, nor can it be 
simply achieved. It is a complex, collaborative and often opportunistic 
process on which outsiders have relied in order to gain government support 
to deliver child safety programmes and messages. 
The value of collaboration within the child safety sector is emphasised, yet 
collaboration is difficult for governments to measure and can be 
disadvantageous when child safety groups become inward looking and 
disconnected from the wider discourse. Oppositional discourse to child 
injury prevention also emerges from the community and can be effective for 
influencing a retrenchment of government safety policy. The effectiveness 
of child injury prevention researchers, practitioners and advocates in 
recognising and managing the influence of such discourse is pivotal to the 
continued involvement of government in child injury prevention.  
Child injury prevention practitioners 
Injury prevention practitioners are essential as advocates who raise the 
public profile of child injury prevention. Practitioners participate in public 
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discourse about child injury, engage with government to request injury 
prevention projects and programmes, and deliver programmes. They need 
to be both well versed in the positivist, evidence-based practices of injury 
prevention research and at the same time be an integral part of their 
communities, cognisant of prevailing attitudes to risk and safety.  
There is growing awareness of the importance of public discourse and how 
health issues are framed within public debate. Recognition of the 
importance of establishing and maintaining a hegemony that supports a 
safety culture, and recognition that narratives can become hostile to safety 
measures, suggests child safety practitioners may benefit from greater 
access to training in framing communication and social media skills.    
This thesis drew attention to child injury prevention leadership from within 
the child health sector. This included leadership by paediatricians, Ministry 
of Health staff, ACC and injury prevention practitioners who, through their 
relationships and opportunities frequently achieved the framing and 
prioritisation of child injury, generating wider public discourse on child injury 
prevention issues. Yet there is little training in this area. Effective advocacy 
requires being aware of the incidence and causation of injury, social norms 
related to these and the importance and vulnerability of effective leadership.  
This thesis makes no pretence to being a ‘how to guide’ for advocacy and 
lobbying. Such publications as do exist include lists of ‘step by step actions’ 
for those setting out to change a policy or influence government decision 
makers (Chapman, 2007; Friedlaender & Winston, 2004; Young, 2003), 
others are in-depth descriptions of the working of government and policy 
processes (Chen, 2012; Miller, 2010). These publications are useful and 
enlightening, but insufficient for fully understanding the factors that might 
come into play when government is considering (or determinedly not 
considering) either changing legislation or funding a programme and this 
thesis points to the myriad factors that might be relevant in such a context.  
The next section provides recommendations for further research.  
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Further research  
Child injury prevention practitioners are dependent upon the continued 
involvement of researchers who are expert in injury epidemiology and 
aetiology and who can generate and publish information that raises and 
maintains the profile of child injury issues.  
There is little research about the ‘backbone’ organisations identified in this 
thesis. Further, the identification of cascades of collaborative backbone 
organisations suggest a new avenue for further research to determine the 
extent and operation of such arrangements, and their efficacy.  
Government briefing documents (such as BIMs) are important ways that 
issues arise on government agenda. There is little or no research showing 
relationships between issues identified within such reports and government 
programmes. Neither is there research that demonstrates the degree to 
which BIMs are evidence based (i.e. the result of systematic scoping and 
collation of independent research) or descriptions of existing work 
programmes, which have been determined through internal processes and 
whether that impacts on child injury prevention. 
There is also a scarcity of research into injury prevention advocacy and 
lobbying at its government coal face. There is no research about whether 
different strategies are required for either advocating for legislative change 
or for the adoption of particular programmes. The elements that constitute 
effective advocacy for child safety, the effectiveness of making submissions 
and the value of petitioning New Zealand decision makers, are largely 
unresearched.  
It is not clear how consistently government agencies respond to different 
political ideologies when developing advice or prioritising issues for the 
government executive. For example, a review of policies and processes that 
reflect prioritisation of business interests over safety within government 
could provide greater understanding of the dynamics implied within the case 
study.  
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Further research might be useful to explore whether discourse about the 
economic value of preventing unintentional child injuries is confined to 
academic literature and whether (and/or how) this impacts upon child injury 
prevention programme funding. The impact of increasing requirements for 
government agencies to demonstrate business cases for programmes and 
the relationship of these to moral arguments are also opportunities for 
research and commentary.  
Child injury prevention has been grounded in the positivist, traditionally male 
dominated world of medical science and statistical analyses. While essential 
components of injury prevention, they do not necessarily present a holistic 
accounting of the field. What might a feminist analysis of policies, power and 
governmentality provide to the current body of knowledge?   
 
Conclusion 
Last, but not least this research has looked at who sets the child injury 
prevention agenda, identifying the importance of government insiders and 
community-based advocacy. This research did not explore what motivated 
those individuals to become involved and a major question is whether those 
motivations will persist and be enough to normalise child safety practices as 
an accepted part of the dominant hegemony, within both government and 
the community, securing child injury prevention efforts into the future.  
Achieving best practice child safety as hegemony will help to anchor child 
injury prevention within government and ensure gains made over the past 
thirty years are maintained and built upon, so that New Zealand children are 
given the best opportunity to grow up free from preventable harm. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Briefings for Incoming Ministers (BIMs) 85 
Date Ministry of Health BIMs Child 
safety/injury 
prevention 
1984  
General 
Election  
 
 
Barker RA, Director General of Health, General Briefing 
Notes for the Minister of Health: Post Election Briefing: 
Overview of Health Policy Wellington. Department of 
Health New Zealand, July (1984) (Dept. Health Report 
Page 6) 
 
 
✓ 
1987  
General 
Election 
 
 
Salmond G, Director General of Health. General Briefing 
Notes for the Minister of Health Department of Health. 
Wellington August 1987 
 
 
X 
1989 
New 
Minister of 
Health  
 
 
Salmond G, Director General of Health. Briefing 
Notes for the Minister of Health Department of 
Health. Wellington January 1989 
 
 
X 
1990 
General 
Election 
 
 
Director General of Health. The department and the 
health sector today Department of Health. Wellington 
October 1990 
 
 
✓ 
 
1992 
Health 
Service 
restructure 
 
Crown Health Enterprise Advisory Committee.   
X 
1993 
General 
Election 
 
 
Ministry of Health. 1993. Post-Election Briefing: 
Strategic Issues in the Health Sector Volume one and 
Volume two Wellington: Ministry of Health. Published 
in November 1993  
Plus, the Public Health Commission 
At this time the Public Health Commission was created 
as a standalone public health agency and provided 
strategic advice for the Minister of Health. This noted 
child injury prevention as a public health issue.   
 
✓ 
 
1996 
General 
Election 
Ministry of Health Information Centre.  1996 Crown  
                                                          
85 http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events/general-elections-1853-2014-dates-and-
turnout  
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Date Ministry of Health BIMs Child 
safety/injury 
prevention 
  
 Health Enterprises: Briefing to the Incoming Minister 
Crown Company Monitoring Unit.  Published 11 
October 1996 Ministry of Health Wellington.  
X 
1999 
General 
Election 
 
Health Funding Authority. Briefing Papers for the 
Minister of Health Wellington 1999.  The Health 
Funding Authority was separate to what were referred 
to as ‘provider arms’ of health service delivery.  
 
 
✓ 
 
2002 
General 
Election 
 
Ministry of Health.  Doing Better for New Zealanders: 
Better health, Better participation, Reduced 
inequalities. Published August 2002 Ministry of Health 
PO Box 5013, Wellington, New Zealand ISBN 0-478-
25521-7 (Book) ISBN 0-478-25522-5 (Internet) 
 
✓ 
 
2005 
General 
Election 
 
Ministry of Health. Health and Participation: An active 
agenda: Advice to the incoming Minister of Health. 
Wellington: Ministry of Health. Published in October 
2005 ISBN 0-478-29679-7 (Internet) 
 
✓ 
 
2008 
General 
Election 
 
Ministry of Health. Briefing for the incoming Minister of 
Health Published in 2008  
 
 
X 
 
2011 
General 
Election 
 
Ministry of Health. Briefing to the Incoming Minister of 
Health. Wellington: Ministry of Health. Published in 
February 2012 ISBN 978-0-478-37389-9 (online) HP 
5450 
 
 
✓ 
 
2014 
General 
Election 
 
Ministry of Health. Briefing to the Incoming Minister 
2014. Wellington: Ministry of Health. Published 
November 2014 by the Ministry of Health ISBN 978 0 
478 44455-1 (online)  
 
X 
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Appendix 2: Ministry of Health Injury Prevention Contracts 
Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
Financial Year 2005/6  
Injury Prevention 
Network 
Aotearoa New 
Zealand 
Incorporated 
IPNANZ  
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
 
  
Injury 
Prevention 
Network 
 
 
  
Providing network for injury prevention sector across New 
Zealand 
 
Delivering workforce development project, 'The 
Foundation Certificate in Injury Prevention, Te Aho Tapu' 
(commenced on 1 July 2009 ceased on 30 June 2012)  
Auckland DHB Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board  
Regional Public 
Health Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Auckland 
Transport 
 
Crown Owned 
Company  
Regional Road 
Safety 
 
Fund Regional Road Safety Co-ordinator in Auckland 
Region 
 
Auckland 
Transport 
 
Crown Owned 
Company 
Walking School 
Bus – Counties 
Manukau 
 
Walking School Bus in Auckland Region, including Counties 
Manukau area 
 
Auckland 
UniServices 
Limited 
 
Crown Owned 
Company 
Injury and 
Information 
Resource Unit 
 
National injury prevention information services 
 
Auckland 
University of 
Technology 
 
Crown Owned 
Company 
Co-ordinating 
and Training of 
Practice Nurse 
to deliver the 
Otago 
Education 
Programme 
 
Co-ordination and Training of Practice Nurses to deliver the 
Otago Exercise Programme (a falls prevention programme 
for older people 
Kahungunu 
Health Services 
Charitable Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Safe 
Environments 
for Whanau 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting tamariki, including child car/booster seat 
rental/buy scheme, for the people of Kahungunu (Hastings 
area) 
 
 
Northland DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Regional Public 
Health Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Taranaki DHB Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
New Plymouth 
District Injury 
Needs 
Assessment 
Injury prevention needs assessment in the New Plymouth 
district 
Te Hauora o 
Ngati Haua Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Health 
Promotion 
(including 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme) 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme, 
targeting people of Te Hauora o Ngati Haua (Injury 
Prevention is part of integrated contract)  
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Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
 
Te Hauora O 
Turanganui A 
Kiwa Limited 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting people of Te Hauora O Turanganui A Kiwa (Injury 
Prevention is part of integrated contract)  
 
Te Runanganui o 
Ngati Porou 
  
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
National 
Rangatahi 
Maori Physical 
Activity 
Programme & 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targetting people of Te Runanganui o Ngati Porou, 
including child car/booster seat rental/buy scheme (Injury 
Prevention is part of integrated contract)  
 
Te Taiwhenua o 
Heretaunga 
Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Safe 
Environment 
for Whanau 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting people of Te Taiwhenua o Heretaunga, including 
child car/booster seat rental/buy scheme (Injury 
Prevention is part of integrated contract) 
 
The Tuhoe 
Matauranga 
Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention and 
Community 
Action on Youth 
and Drugs – 
CAYAD 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting people of Tuhoe (Injury Prevention is part of 
integrated contract) 
 
University of 
Otago 
 
Crown Entity 
 
Injury 
Prevention 
Research Unit 
(Provision of 
Injury Statistics) 
 
National service for provision and promotion of Injury 
statistics to the general public and injury prevention sector 
 
University of 
Otago – National 
Poisons Centre 
Crown Entity Poison Advice 
Services 
National 24/7 poison advice service to the general public 
and medical professionals. 
 
Wellbeing North 
Canterbury 
Community Trust 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Safer Schools Safer Schools programme  promoting injury prevention 
messages, strategies and programmes within selected 
schools located in North Canterbury 
Waitakere City 
Council 
(service 
continued under 
Auckland 
Council) 
 
Local Authority 
 
Safe Waitakere 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
(SWIP) 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
(intentional and unintentional) and maintenance of WHO 
Safe Communities accreditation in the former Waitakere 
City 
 
Hapai Te Hauora 
Tapui Ltd 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Maori Health 
Promotion 
(multiple 
services 
including injury 
prevention) 
Integrated Health Promotion, including injury prevention 
targeting Māori in the Auckland Public Health District 
(includes sub-contracting arrangements) (Injury Prevention 
is part of integrated contract) 
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Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
  
South 
Canterbury DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board  
Stay on your 
Feet Falls 
Prevention 
Programme  for 
Older People 
 
Falls prevention for the elderly – 'Stay On Your Feet 
programme' 
 
University of 
Otago - National 
Poisons Centre 
 
Crown Entity 
University   
 
Health 
Promotion 
Agreement 
National 
Poisons Centre 
– Dunedin 
 
National service to provide resources and information on 
poisons, poisonous plants, first aid and prevention of 
poisonings and conduct a needs analysis on the feasibility 
of developing a website. 
Develop and promote poison prevention initiatives as per 
WHO Guidelines for poisons control and identify which 
communities are most in need of poison prevention 
initiatives 
 
Sandra James 
Services 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Injury 
Prevention 
National service to improve collaboration and co-
ordination of injury prevention performance at community, 
regional and national levels in line with the 10 objectives of 
the NZ Injury Prevention Strategy 
The Pacific Island 
Safety and 
Prevention 
Project 
Incorporated 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Pacific Island 
Child Car 
Restraint 
Promotion and 
Interpersonal 
Violence 
Prevention 
 
Pacific Island Safety and Prevention Project – Child Car 
Restraint Promotion 
 
Financial Year 2006/07 (ongoing contracts are not re-listed  ) 
Bay of Plenty 
DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Core Public 
Health Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Canterbury DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Eastbay Rural 
Education 
Activities (REAP) 
Incorporated 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Safe Kawerau 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Project 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme in 
Kawerau area and including child car/booster seat 
rental/buy scheme 
 
Hawke's Bay 
DHB 
 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Health 
Sponsorship 
Council 
 
Crown Entity 
 
Public Health 
Programmes 
 
National Bike Wise Programme to assist in reducing the 
incidence of cycling related injuries and fatalities amongst 
8 – 12 year old cyclists 
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Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
Hutt DHB t/a 
Hutt Valley DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Maraeroa Marae 
Association Inc 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Injury 
Prevention – 
Car Seat Loan 
Scheme and 
Tamariki Safety 
Promotion 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting tamariki in wider Porirua, including child 
car/booster seat rental/buy scheme 
 
MidCentral DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Nelson 
Marlborough 
DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not 
Ngati Hine 
Health Trust 
Board 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme based 
on the World Health Organisation Safe Communities model 
in the Te Tai Tokerau area (Injury Prevention is part of 
integrated contract) 
 
Otago DHB 
(service 
continued under 
Southern DHB) 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Tairawhiti DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Taranaki DHB Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services – 
Multi-service 
(including injury 
prevention 
Preventing childhood poisonings from medicines (Injury 
Prevention is part of integrated contract). 
Taranaki DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Te Runanga O 
Kirikiriroa 
Charitable Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Health 
Promotion 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting people of Te Runanga O Kirikiriroa (Injury 
Prevention is part of integrated contract) 
 
Tuwharetoa 
Health Services 
Limited 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Health 
Promotion 
Services 
(including 
community 
injury 
prevention 
programme) 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting people of Tuwharetoa  
 
 255 
 
Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
 
Waikato Burn 
Support 
Charitable Trust 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Burn Prevention 
Programme for 
At Risk Children 
Burns prevention programme delivered to schools in 
Waikato, King Country and Thames Valley 
 
Waikato DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Whanganui DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
 
Te Maru o 
Ruahine Trust 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Injury 
Prevention 
Analysis 
Providing the Ministry of Health with analysis of the 
unintentional injury prevention needs of the Whanganui 
DHB 
Accident 
Compensation 
Corporation 
Crown Entity Falls Research 
Co-funding 
Co-funding research for falls prevention in older people 
Auckland City 
Council 
 
Local Authority 
 
Auckland City 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme and 
Glen Innes 
Health Project 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
(intentional and Unintentional), based on the World Health 
Organisation Safe Communities model in Auckland City 
area 
Auckland DHB 
 
Crown Entity - 
District Health 
Board 
National Injury 
Prevention 
Services for 
Children 0-14 
years (known as 
Safekids 
Aotearoa) 
 
National Unintentional Injury Prevention Services for 
Children 0-14 years  
 
Tui Ora Limited Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Maori Injury 
Needs 
Assessment 
Identifying injury prevention issues and service gaps 
through consultation with Māori in Taranaki 
Age Concern 
North Shore 
Incorporated 
(service 
continued under 
Safer North 
Community 
Trust) 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
ShoreSafe 
 
Community Injury Prevention Programme for North Shore 
 
Financial Year 2007/08 
Auckland 
University of 
Technology 
Crown Entity 
 
Co-ordination 
and Training of 
Practice Nurses 
to deliver the 
Otago 
Education 
Programme 
Co-ordination and Training of Practice Nurses to deliver the 
Otago Exercise Programme (a falls prevention programme 
for older people) 
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Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
Kahungunu 
Executive Ki Te 
Wairoa 
Charitable Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Safe 
Environments 
for Whanau – 
Wairoa District 
  
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme, 
including child car/booster seat rental/buy scheme for the 
people of Kahungunu in the Wairoa area 
 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
 
Crown Entity 
 
Bikewise 
Project 
 
National service to encourage and promote cycling and 
cycle safety through the national Bike Wise programme 
 
Te Runanga o 
Toa Rangatira 
Incorporated 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme in wider 
Te Tahi Bay area, including child car/booster seat 
rental/buy scheme 
 
Waimakariri 
District Council 
 
Local Authority 
 
Injury 
Prevention 
Waimakariri 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
(intentional and unintentional) and maintenance of WHO 
Safe Communities accreditation 
 
Christchurch City 
Council 
Local Authority Safe 
Communities 
Conference 
Sponsorship 
Ministry of Health sponsorship of WHO Safe Communities                 
Conference 2008, Christchurch 
Christchurch City 
Council 
 
Local Authority 
 
Christchurch 
Injury 
Prevention 
Coordinator 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
(intentional and unintentional) and maintenance of WHO 
Safe Communities accreditation 
 
Whanganui DHB 
 
District Health 
Board 
 
Whanganui 
Regional Injury 
Prevention 
Programme 
(Safe 
Environments 
for Whanau) 
Whanganui Regional Injury Prevention Programme 
 
Litmus Limited Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Evaluation of 
Injury 
Prevention 
Workforce 
Development 
Project 
Evaluation of Injury Prevention Network Aotearoa New 
Zealand Injury Prevention Workforce Development Project 
Financial Year 2008/09 
Manukau City 
Council 
 
Local Authority 
 
IFCM/Healthy 
Cities and HPS 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
(intentional and unintentional), based on the World Health 
Organisation Safe Communities model in Counties 
Manukau area (Injury Prevention is part of integrated 
contract) 
 
Safe 
Communities 
Foundation New 
Zealand 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Safe 
Communities 
Foundation NZ 
Certifying and 
Support Centre 
for Safe 
Communities 
 
National Certifying and Support Centre for World Health 
Organization (WHO) Safe Communities 
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Contracted 
Party/ 
Organisation 
Type of 
organisation 
Title of contract Brief description of services 
Financial Year 2009/10 
Tui Ora Limited 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Health 
Promotion 
Services 
(including 
community 
injury 
prevention) 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
targeting people of Tui Ora  
 
Financial Year 2010/11 
Age Concern 
Otago 
Incorporated 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Falls Prevention 
 
Falls prevention for the elderly – ‘Steady As You Go’ 
programme 
 
Southern DHB District Health 
Board 
Public Health 
Services 
An integrated approach to injury prevention and support of 
the regional/local Injury Prevention/Safe Communities 
coalitions whether WHO accredited or not. 
(Previously Otago DHB) 
Australia New 
Zealand Falls 
Prevention 
Society 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
Contribution to 
Australia NZ 
Falls Prevention 
Conference, 
Dunedin, 21-23 
November 2010 
Ministry of Health contribution to Australia NZ Falls 
Prevention Conference, Dunedin 
Financial Year 2011/12 
Auckland Council 
 
Local Authority 
 
Social 
Environment 
Services 
(including Injury 
Prevention) 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme 
(intentional and unintentional), based on the World Health 
Organisation Safe Communities model in Auckland Council 
area and working towards WHO Safe Communities 
accreditation for the former Auckland City and Manukau 
City. 
(Previously Auckland, Manukau, Waitakere and North 
Shore City Councils) 
Safer North 
Community Trust 
 
Non-
Government 
Organisation 
 
Community 
Injury 
Prevention 
Programme – 
Shoresafe 
 
General Community Injury Prevention Programme for the 
people of Auckland's North Shore and Hibiscus Coast, 
including assisting to maintain World Health Organisation 
Safe Communities accreditation for North Shore 
(Previously Age Concern North Shore Incorporated) 
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Appendix 3: Supervision factors deconstructed 
Factors in supervision: 
A. = Attitudes (e.g. towards safety gear) 
B. = Behaviours (e.g. risk taking) 
C. = Cognitions (e.g. vulnerability for injury) 
D. = Distractibility  
E. = Expectation for self and others (e.g. regarding behaviour, 
injuries etc.) 
F. = Feelings (e.g. excited, fearful, depressive state) 
G. = Goals (immediate, long term) (e.g. do what is convenient)  
H. = Hazard awareness (perception of risk)  
I. = Individual's traits (personality, temperament)  
 
Reference: Morrongiello, B (2005) Caregiver supervision and child injury risk: 1. Issues in 
defining and measuring supervision; 11. Findings and directions for future research. 
Journal of Paediatric Psychology 30(7), 536-552 
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Appendix 4: MBIE Swimming and spa pool Determinations 2002-16 
(Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2018b) 
Determination 
Number   
Who 
applied  
Description Outcome  
2002/10 owners 
vs TA 
Lockable cover as a 
safety barrier for spa 
Declined Does not 
comply 
2003/06 owners 
vs TA 
Sliding and sliding 
folding doors 
Complies - not 
directly onto pool 
2005/124 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply 
2005/125 TA vs 
Owners 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2006/16 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2006/022 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2006/081 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2006/103 owners 
vs TA 
reapplication for 
2005/125 
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2007/076 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2007/079 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply  
2007/87 owners 
vs TA 
Request for pool cover 
and alarm instead of 
fence 
Declined - Does do 
not comply  
2007/95 owners 
vs TA 
application to add trees 
declined 
agreed - permit 
landscaping 
2008/103 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
self-closing / latching 
direct access doors  
Complies - doors 
suitably restricted 
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Determination 
Number   
Who 
applied  
Description Outcome  
2008/123 owners 
vs TA 
building in pool area 
with doors 
Complies - doors 
suitably restricted 
2009/076 owners 
vs TA 
Consent requested for 
direct access doors  
Declined - Doors 
do not comply 
2010/014 owners 
vs TA 
Unique design safety 
Barriers 
Complies  
2010/035 owners 
vs TA 
Notice to fix for safety 
barriers / owners failed 
to put up fence 
Notice to fix upheld 
2010/036 owners 
vs TA 
Doors opening directly 
onto pool 
Declined - Doors 
do not comply 
2010/085 owners 
vs TA 
safety from falling from 
infinity edge 
Complies - 
complex solution 
2010/097 owners 
vs TA 
Doors opening directly 
onto pool 
Declined - Does do 
not comply  
2010/098 owners 
vs TA 
Garden inside pool 
area 
Declined - Does do 
not comply  
2010/104 owners 
vs TA 
Garden inside pool 
area 
Declined - Does do 
not comply  
2010/119 owners 
vs TA 
Use of a cover as 
barrier to swimming 
pool 
Declined - Does do 
not comply  
2011/013 owners 
vs TA 
Barriers do not comply  Declined - Does do 
not comply  
2011/ 071 owners 
vs TA 
Doors opening into 
pool area / Building 
code performance 
Agreed - permit 
doors  
2011/111 owners 
vs TA 
stairs being part of the 
barrier 
Declined does not 
comply 
2011/112 owners 
vs TA 
pool gate opening 
inwards  
Declined does not 
comply 
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Determination 
Number   
Who 
applied  
Description Outcome  
2012/037 owners 
vs TA 
Notice to Fix pool 
barrier  
Agreed - revoke 
notice to fix  
2012/052 TA vs 
Owner 
Code compliance re 
pool barrier 
Compliance 
agreed 
2015/012 owners 
vs TA 
compliance of pool 
barriers - self closing 
sliding doors 
Compliance 
agreed 
2015/037 owners 
vs TA 
compliance of pool 
barriers - self closing 
sliding doors 
Declined - do not 
comply 
2015/039 owners 
vs TA 
Notice to fix pool 
barriers 
Application upheld  
2015/053 owners 
vs TA 
Compliance of barriers Declined - does not 
comply 
2016/044 owners 
vs TA 
Changing house within 
pool area 
Declined - does not 
comply 
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Appendix 5: Chronology of activities to prevent toddler drowning: 
Acknowledgement: Personal Communication from Dr I Hassall   
Year Action/Event 
 
1975 
 
Petition to have all private swimming pools fenced signed by 800 people and delivered 
to Parliament: (Callagher & 800 others, 1975)  
 
1976 
 
Statistics show a peak of 11 drownings of under 5 year old children in private pools for 
the year:  Atkins J, Laugesen M. Drownings of young children in New Zealand 1973 – 
1981. Management Services Research Unit, Department of Health (Unpublished). 
Wellington, 1982 
 
1978 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) begins publishing monthly drowning 
surveys 
 
1979 
 
 
Local Government Amendment Act passed to permit all Councils to pass a Pool Fencing 
By-Law (New Zealand Government, 1979) 
 
1979 
 
Standards Association of New Zealand (SANZ) published an example of a local authority 
pool fencing By-law. This ‘model’ By-law allowed property perimeter fencing as an 
alternative to the enclosure of the pool area:  Standards Association of New Zealand. 
Model General Bylaws: Chapter 21: Restriction of access to private swimming pools. NZS 
9201: 1979. SANZ. Wellington, 1979. 
 
1981 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) statistics show new peak of 17 drownings of 
children younger than 4 years of age, in private swimming pools, for the year.  
 
1982 March 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) convenes representative forum to plan 
strategies. Plunket and Health (Department Board of Committee on Child Health) table 
background papers identifying home swimming pool drowning as a major factor in child 
death for children younger than aged four:  
Hassall IB, Under five year olds drowning in private swimming pools. Plunket Society 
(Unpublished). Auckland, 1982. 
Board of Health Committee on Child Health and Child Health services in New Zealand: 
Board of Health Report Series No 31 Wellington, New Zealand.  
 
1982 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC), Plunket, Parent Centres, Ministry of Health 
and their allies conduct a campaign involving publicity; education; research and lobbying 
to promote fencing swimming pools to a safe standard. Locally, countrywide, Plunket 
groups lobby local authorities to adopt pool fencing. The Spa & Pool Association 
(representative organisation for swimming pool retailers) and a number of pool owners 
and their allies conducted an opposing campaign. 
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Year Action/Event 
 
1982 
 
John Terris MP for Western Hutt: Introduces Private Member’s Bill, ‘Fencing of 
Swimming Pools Bill’ into Parliament. National Party Government opposed to action but 
their Parliamentary majority of one neutralised by Ruth Richardson crossing the floor. 
 
1982 
December 
 
Parliament: Directed the Local Bills Committee to undertake an inquiry into the progress 
being made by local authorities in introducing fencing by-laws 
 
1982 
December 
 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) publish ‘Facts & Fallacies’, making a case for 
the fencing of private swimming pools and advising local authorities on safety measures: 
New Zealand Water Safety Council. Facts and fallacies: The case for the fencing of 
private swimming pools: A practical guide for local authorities. NZWSC. Wellington, 
1982. 
 
1983 
 
Plunket publish a guide to swimming pool fencing including advertisements from 
providers of fences and gates: Royal New Zealand Plunket Society. The Plunket Society 
guide to: Fencing of domestic swimming pools. Plunket Society. Dunedin, 1983. 
 
1983 
 
Parliament receives the Local Bills Committee Report. This report includes 27 
recommendations to prevent the continuing death of children in home swimming pools. 
These recommendations include the following: 
1. Private swimming pools are a major cause of accidental death of preschool 
children and are second only to motor vehicle accidents in this regard. 
2. Reliance on education alone would achieve very little in reducing the number of 
preschool drownings.  
3. The principle recommendation is that all councils which have not adopted a 
provision specifically requiring the fencing of private swimming pools should 
adopt by-laws for this purpose as soon as possible.  
4. Following the tabling of this report it (the Local Bills Committee) be directed to 
continue its enquiry into progress being made by territorial authorities in the 
introduction of by-laws dealing with the fencing of swimming pools. 
Local Bill Committee (1983) report on the fencing of private swimming pools. Laid on the 
Table of the House of Representatives Wellington New Zealand Government Printer.  
 
1984 
 
Standards Association of New Zealand publishes a new model by-law requiring enclosure 
of pool: Standards Association of New Zealand. Model General Bylaws: Chapter 21: 
Restriction of access to private swimming pools NZS 9201: 1984. SANZ. Wellington, 1984. 
 
1984 
November 
 
Prime Minister the Rt Hon Robert Muldoon (National) calls snap election and dissolves 
New Zealand’s 40th Parliament, setting the scene for the election of the first term of the 
4th Labour Government.  
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Year Action/Event 
1985 New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) publishes ‘Home pools are fun: A guide to 
swimming pool health and safety’, in collaboration with health and safety organisations 
and the swimming pool industry: New Zealand Water Safety Council. Home pools are 
fun: A guide to swimming pool health and safety. NZWSC. Wellington, 1985. 
 
1986 
 
John Terris MP Western Hutt (Labour) re-introduces a Private Member’s Bill to fence 
home swimming pools into Parliament. Bill sent to Select Committee. Further round of 
submissions. 
 
1987 
 
Parliament enacts ‘Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987’ by 31 votes for Aye to 20 votes 
against: Reference:  Hansards vol. 482 1987 
 
1989 
 
The New Zealand Police undertake the first successful prosecution of a pool owner for 
negligence resulting in death:  Dominion Newspaper, 1/11/1989: $1000 fine in first pool 
death case. NZPA 
 
1989 
 
Ministry of Health adopts a reduction of pre-school drownings in private pools as a 
health outcome target. Personal Communication Dr I Hassall  
 
1990 
October 
 
Department of Internal Affairs publishes ‘Guidelines for territorial authorities on the 
Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987’: Department of Internal Affairs. Guidelines for 
territorial authorities on the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987. Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. Wellington, 1990. 
 
1991 
 
New Zealand’s 43rd Parliament (National) passes the Building Act 1991:  NZ Government. 
Building Act 1991. 4th Schedule, pp108-109. NZ Govt. Wellington, 1991. 
 
1991 
 
Sharp drop in drowning rate reported by the Ministry of Health:  Ministry of Health. 
Progress on health outcome targets: The state of the public health in New Zealand 1997, 
pp 80-87. Ministry of Health. Wellington, 1997.  
 
1991 
September 
 
 
Child Accident Prevention Foundation of New Zealand (CAPFNZ) Undertake survey of 
local authorities: Stupples P. Survey of local authorities on the Fencing of Swimming 
Pools Act 1987. Child Accident Prevention Foundation of New Zealand. Dunedin, 1991. 
 
1991 
September 
 
 
Child Accident Prevention Foundation of New Zealand (CAPFNZ), the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC), Health Research Council of NZ (HRC) together hold 
national childhood injury prevention forum, Wellington. Hassall IB. The epidemiology 
and prevention of drowning (Unpublished). A paper given at the annual meeting of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics. San Fransisco, 1992 
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Year Action/Event 
1992 Drowning rate reported at 0.7/100,000 age specific, i.e. two drownings 
 
1992 
 
Parliament passes Building Regulations (Building Code) which supersedes the Fencing of 
Swimming Pools Act but continues its effect: New Zealand Government. Building 
Regulations 1992 (The Building Code), Clause F4. NZ Govt. Wellington, 1992. 
 
1993 
February 
 
Building Industry Association clarifies scope of the Building Regulations (Building Code) 
in relation to swimming pools. Regulations amended accordingly  
New Zealand Government. Building Amendment Act 1993. NZ Govt. Wellington, 1993. 
Anon. Swimming pool fencing. BIA News: Building Industry Authority Publication: 1993; 
20:4 
 
1994 
 
Parliament Amends Building Regulations to cover ranch sliders, closing loophole in the 
1987 Act and conforming to modern ideal of ‘isolation’ enclosure of a swimming pool. 
Anon. Closing the door on pool access. BIA News Building Industry Authority Publication 
1994; 33:3-4. : NZ Government. The Building Regulations 1992, Amendment No. 1. NZ 
Govt. Wellington, 1994. 
 
1995 
December 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) Convene a ‘Fencing of Swimming Pools 
Consultative Group’ 
 
1996 
 
California State Legislature enacts AB 3305 – State legislation requiring mandatory 
isolation enclosure of newly installed or altered pools. Overseas developments can have 
an important influence in NZ. 
 
1997 
 
New Zealand Water Safety Council (NZWSC) commissions ‘Survey of local authorities on 
compliance and enforcement’ that showed at that time there were 59,000 private pools 
and only 9% of local authorities had a process for checking compliance with the Fencing 
of Swimming Pools Act.  This meant the compliance status was unknown for up to one 
third of all pools. Of those pools that were checked, 44% of pools were compliant, 4% 
were granted exemptions and 19% did not comply. The report concluded “Due to 
ambiguities within the legislation, and differing levels of commitment by authorities to 
locate pools and monitor compliance, compliance with the FoSP Act is not consistent 
nationally. If the Act were less ambiguous, there would be greater consistency and more 
enforcement”  
Morrison, L., Chalmers, D. J., Langley, J. D., Alsop, J. C., & McBean, C. (1999). Achieving 
compliance with pool fencing legislation in New Zealand: a survey of regulatory 
authorities. Injury Prevention, 5(2), 114-118 (Page 114) 
 
1999 
 
Solicitor–General (Rt Hon Douglas Graham, National Party MP) reduces a manslaughter 
charge against Auckland pool owners to ‘creating a criminal nuisance’ 
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Bodger S. Pool fencing rules hitting wall of resistance. Laws whittling back drownings. NZ 
Herald, 29/5/99, A10. 
Catalogue of oversights in pool fatality. NZ Herald, 20/6/99, A5. 
 
1999 
 
High Court Convicts pool owners. Rejects Auckland City Council appeal  
Griffin P. Court signals tougher line on pool rules. NZ Herald, 24/9/99, A11. 
 
1999 
 
Safekids New Zealand, supported by Water Safety New Zealand (formally the Water 
Safety Council) focuses on drowning prevention as the subject of a national Kidsafe 
Week campaign using the tag line “Keeping Kids Safe Near Water”. The focus for the 
campaign was on hot water burn prevention and promoting swimming lessons: Safekids 
Newsletter: 4th March 1999 
http://www.safekids.nz/Portals/0/Documents/Safekids%20News/2008%20&%20Older/1
999SafekidsNewsMarch.pdf Accessed 13/11/2016   
 
1999  
 
Department of Internal Affairs Releases Guidelines for Territorial Authorities on the 
Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987 Ref: Accessed 17/11/2016 
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/building-construction/safety-quality/documents-
and-images-library/fencing-swimming-pools/pool-guide.pdf  (Department of Internal 
Affairs (DIA), 1999) 
 
2000 
 
Local Government New Zealand Annual General Meeting calls for the ‘Fencing of 
Swimming Pools’ law to be made more readily enforceable. The meeting rejects 
revocation call by some members (personal communication Dr Ian Hassall). 
 
2000 
 
Accident Compensation Corporation: Settles with parents with apology for enforcement 
shortcomings:  English P. Cash and vow in pool-death deal. NZ Herald, 24/9/2000, A5. 
 
2001 
 
Central Property Press – Auckland Real Estate publicity magazine includes front page 
glossy picture of expensive home that features pool and isolation fencing  
The Central Property Press. 22/2/01, p1. Liberty Press Ltd. Auckland. 
 
2002/3 and 
onwards 
 
Hamilton City Council created the “Your Pool -Your Responsibility” campaign with 
associated publicity. This campaign was well received and was later provided to 
Auckland Territorial Authorities and Water Safe Auckland for delivery across the 
Auckland Region.   
 
2003 
 
Accident Compensation Corporation Minister (Hon Ruth Dyson MP – Labour) releases 
the National Injury Prevention Strategy which includes drowning prevention among 
priorities. Based on this initiative, the Drowning Prevention Strategy is developed and 
released in 2005. 
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Ref. Accident Compensation Corporation: New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy. 2003 
 
2004 
 
Pool owners prosecuted by Council and seek broader definition of pool area.  
Ref Thompson W.  Pool safety issue has owners sputtering: NZ Herald 16/04/2004 
 
2004  
 
Pool Owners Action Group formed in Waitakere City to object to enforcement processes 
undertaken by Waitakere City REF http://nzpoag.blogspot.co.nz/p/need-for-change.html  
Accessed 19/11/2016  
 
2003/4 
 
Water Safe Auckland worked in collaboration with ACC and Auckland Council commence 
“Your Pool Your Responsibility campaign in Auckland Region. Initially started in Hamilton 
City This programme was first delivered in the Auckland Region in the 2003 and 2004 
summer, and then repeated.  The Auckland Regional “Pool Safety Group” is also started 
at this time, Ref: Watersafe Auckland Inc. Pool Safety Project Report to ACC June 
2005.Unpublished report. Personal Communication 
 
2004 
 
Waitakere City Council Seeks declaratory judgment on the definition of the immediate 
pool area. Ref: Thompson W. Council bans tables and chairs by swimming pools. NZ 
Herald, 16/4/04, A3. 
 
2004 
 
High Court: Judgement defines 'immediate pool area' and proposes alignment of access 
provisions of FOSP Act and Building Code Ref: Waitakere City Council v Hickman, 
Hickman. Judgement of Randerson J. High Court of New Zealand: CIV 2003-404-7266. 2 
August 2004. 
 
2006 
 
Dept Building and Housing take over the administration of FOSP Act from the 
Department of Internal Affairs: Ref: Addendum to “Guidelines for Territorial Authorities 
on the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987” Accessed 17/11/2016  
 http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/building-construction/safety-quality/documents-
and-images-library/fencing-swimming-pools/pool-guide-addendum.pdf  
 
2005 
August 
 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) releases the “Drowning Prevention Strategy: 
Towards a Watersafe New Zealand 2005-2015”. This strategy document identifies 
children drowning in home swimming pools as an important cause of mortality and 
seeks partnerships with pool owners and the pool building industry. 
 
 
2006 
 
 
Standards New Zealand convenes a cross sector Standards Committee and publishes a 
new reference standard with directions for the fencing of swimming pools and spas: Ref: 
Standards New Zealand. (2006) NZS 8500:2006. Safety barriers and fences around 
swimming pools, spas and hot tubs. Wellington: Standards New Zealand. 
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2007 Water Safety New Zealand (WSNZ) publishes replication of 1997 survey of local 
government agencies to determine the activities in relation to the FOSP Act. Compliance 
up from 43% to 71%. Re-inspection programmes up from 30% of Territorial Authorities 
to 66%: Ref: Gulliver, P., Chalmers, D., Cousins, K. (2007) Survey of local authorities 
regarding compliance with and enforcement of the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 1987: 
A replication. Injury Prevention Research Unit, University of Otago, Dunedin. 
 
2008 
March 
 
Department of Building and Housing (DBH) release a discussion document on the 
Fencing of Swimming Pools Act called “Evaluation of the Fencing of Swimming Pools Act 
1987”: This document lists ten issues with the Act that include low public awareness, 
differing interpretations of the requirements of the Act by local councils, difficulties with 
territorial authority record keeping and restrictions of Local Authority powers to enforce 
the Act. WSNZ, Safekids, Plunket, Watersafe Auckland submit to the discussion 
document. 
New Zealand Government. (2008) Swimming pool fencing laws to be reviewed. Retrieved 
March 31, 2008 from  http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0803/S00502.htm 
 
2008 
 
General Election voted in New Zealand’s 49th Parliament with a change of government 
and National Party majority. 
 
2009 
 
As part of a Regulatory Review Programme, the Minister for Building and Housing directs 
the Department to report to the Minister of Finance, Minister for Regulatory Reform on 
‘clarifying’ the requirements for swimming and spa pool fencing under the FOSP Act. 
Ref: Personal Communication from Dr I Hassall:  Department of Building & Housing 
(2009) Draft memo. Proposal to clarify the amendments to the Fencing of Swimming 
Pools Act 1987. Wellington: Department of Building & Housing. 
 
2009 
 
The Child & Youth Mortality Review Committee’s Fifth Report to the Minister of Health 
(2009) noted that there is variable checking of swimming pool compliance, a lack of 
ongoing maintenance of pool fences and a lack of education for pool owners and users 
Ref: Child and Youth Mortality Review Committee, Te Ropu Arotake Auau Mate o te 
Hunga Tamariki, Taiohi: Fifth report to the Minister of Health: Reporting mortality 2002 - 
2008. (page 21) Wellington, Child and Youth Mortality Review Committee: 2009   
 
2009 
December 
 
Auckland City Councillor (aligned to the National Party government) proposes that the 
Auckland Council City Development Committee petition the government to change the 
requirement for spa pool fences moved a motion to remove the need for fencing spa 
pools in the Auckland Council boundaries and cease Auckland Council’s enforcement of 
spa pool fencing. The Motion was passed. Ref Scoop News “Auckland City Spa Pool 
Fencing Rules change” Monday 7 Dec  
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK0912/S00086.htm accessed 14/11/2016 
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2010 
January  
Auckland City Council adopts the Fencing of Swimming Pool Standard NZS 8500:2006 
and requests government change the Standard to permit lockable covers instead of 
fences for spa pools. Ref: Media Release from Auckland Council reported in Standards 
New Zealand Touchstone Magazine: Accessed on 14/11/2016 from 
https://www.standards.govt.nz/touchstone/business/2010/jan/auckland-city-council-
adopts-new-spa-pool-fencing-rule  
 
2010 
 
Paediatric Society of New Zealand publishes ‘Position Statement’ on “The provision of 
Swimming Pool Fencing” on its website. Paper silent on spa pool fences and lockable 
covers. Accessed on 15/11/2016 at 
http://www.paediatrics.org.nz/files/2010/Pool%20Fencing%20Final.pdf  
 
2010 to 
2013 – 
possibly 
ongoing 
 
Auckland business owner sending monthly and weekly emails to the Minister for 
Building and Construction (and other Ministers, Mayors, City Councillors, senior local 
government officials and others in the swimming pool building industry).  
 
Emails indicate ongoing meetings and phone calls are occurring between the Minister 
and business owner.  Emails request a law change that will remove local government 
from pool fencing enforcement; the introduction of door alarms as a safety feature and 
the removal of latches and bolts from doors opening onto the pool area. Email thanks 
Minister for instructing MBIE staff to work with him, accept his technical advice and 
include him on meetings.  
REF Unpublished documents released in 2014 under the provisions of the Official 
Information Act 1982.    
 
2013  
January  
 
Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment meets with other government agencies 
about consultation document. Ref: Unpublished documents (emails) released under 
Official Information Act 1982.  
 
 
2013 March 
 
“Making Pool Fencing Easier”: Minister for Building and Housing (National Party) 
releases consultation document on pool fencing. Summary of submissions reported back 
November 2015. 3% of submissions were described as coming from ‘safety groups’ 
(Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2013b).  
 
2013 March 
 
Ministry Business Innovation and Employment circulate draft pool fencing Bill to other 
government agencies for Departmental comment.  
Reference: Documents released under the Official Information Act 1982 
 
2013  
20th 
November 
 
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee minutes the acceptance of 
Department of Building and Construction documents and agreement to amend the 
Building Code. Documents include a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) for Fencing of 
Swimming Pools Act 1987 and Policy Proposals document. Accessed from: 
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http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/building-construction/safety-quality/review-of-
the-fencing-of-swimming-pools   
 
 
2014 
January  
 
Local newspaper reporter interviews Minister of Building and Housing together with spa 
pool owner about spa pool changes “Spa pool owners welcome rule changes” Accessed 
17/11/2016 http://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/central-leader/9641629/Spa-
pool-owners-welcome-rule-changes  
 
2014 May 
 
Minister for Building and Construction (Hon Maurice Williamson) who was sponsoring 
Building (Pools) Amendment Bill  resigns from all portfolios due to a ‘significant error of 
judgement’ (A Young, NZ Herald May 1 2014 “Williamson’s ‘significant error of 
Judgement’ accessed 19/11/2014 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11247618 ) 
 
National Government Minister Hon Dr Nick Smith becomes Minister for Building and 
Housing and continues policy programme.  
 
2015 
May  
 
 
Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ) submits to the Rules Reduction Taskforce 
requesting spa pools with lockable lids not require fencing and minor decisions can be 
delegated to Council Officers.  
Ref: Local Govt NZ: Rules Reduction Task Force Submission 2015 
Accessed 17/11/2016:  http://www.lgnz.co.nz/home/our-work/submissions/rules-
reduction-taskforce   
 
2015 August 
 
 
 
 
Cabinet Minutes: Second Regulatory Impact Statement and Policy papers presented to 
Cabinet. Motion sought to amend earlier Cabinet Committee decisions re-Building Pools 
Amendment Bill.  Reference: URL Accessed 17/11/2016 
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/publications-research/publications/building-and-
construction/cabinet-minute-15-26-5-modifications-to-fencing-of-swimming-pools-
decisions.pdf  
 
 
2015 
September  
 
Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment releases Departmental Disclosure 
Statement found online: Ref: Unpublished document Accessed and downloaded 20th 
September 2015 URL not found in 2016  
 
2015 
November 
 
Building (Pools) Amendment Bill 2016  
Tabled in the House – referred to Select Committee for submissions: Ref accessed 
17/11/2016  http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/building-construction/safety-
quality/review-of-the-fencing-of-swimming-pools   
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2015 
November  
 
Pool industry representatives continue to lobby MPs “Open letter to Pool Industry”. 
Water safety and child health organisations and individuals also lobby government. 
Media story states “Spa pool industry is celebrating”. Reference:  “Hot Pools could get 
cheaper to install after law changes” Nov 2015 Rob Stock Stuff Business 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/money/74271293/Hot-pools-could-get-cheaper-to-
install-after-law-changes accessed 17/11/2016 
 
2015 
November  
 
The majority of select committee submissions are opposed to the changes in the Bill. 
Chief Coroner, child health community, water safety community, Auckland Regional 
Public Health (representing three District Health Boards) Commissioner for children all 
express concern in media and in submissions.  
“Govt cops criticism after rules relaxed for swimming pools” October 2015 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11732921 
“Fury at changes to pool laws” Nov 2015 NZ Herald Accessed 17/11/2016 
 http://m.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11538213 
“Swimming pool changes ‘reckless’ NZ Herald Feb 2016 Accessed 17/11/2016 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11593313 
 
2016 May 
 
 
Select Committee Report Tabled: The Bill is referred for Committee Debate Stages: 
Hansards 
 
 
2016 
 
Bill debated during its passage through the House: Labour and Greens each submit 
Supplementary Order Papers on improving safety: Minister for Building and Housing 
submits SOP on independently qualified pool inspectors 
 
2016 
October 
 
 
Building (Pools) Amendment Bill 2016 read a third time.  
Ayes: 73 National 59, New Zealand First 12; Act New Zealand 1 United future 1 
Noes: 45 New Zealand Labour 29: Green Party 14; Maori Party 2 
Building (Pools) Amendment Act provided with Royal Assent 28th October 2016 
 
2016 
November 
 
Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment begins consultation on the Acceptable 
Standard, warning labels for spa pool covers and Independently Qualified Pool 
Inspectors and Acceptable Solutions. 
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